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ABSTRACT 
LISA A. GOBLE: Evaluating the Influence of University Organizational Characteristics and 
Attributes on Technology Commercialization 
(Under the direction of Maryann Feldman) 
 
 
This dissertation project seeks to make a contribution to the growing body of literature on 
academic technology commercialization and the entrepreneurial efforts of faculty and students at US 
research universities. The academic environment across the United States has seen an increased 
emphasis on moving the results of academic research into the commercial sector. In addition to their 
core missions of education and basic research, universities are expected to have a larger role in 
stimulating regional and national economies. This dissertation project contributes to this growing 
body of literature on university technology commercialization efforts by summarizing findings on 
characteristics and factors known to have an influence technology transfer outcomes, evaluating a 
technology licensing consortium between three large research institutions, and empirically evaluating 
specific university and technology licensing office characteristics for their influence on the 
technology transfer process and its outcomes.  
Three related research studies contribute to this project. The motivating framework, 
background and context for the three research projects in this dissertation are presented in an 
introductory chapter. The literature review in Chapter 2 summarizes findings from a selection of 
studies evaluating characteristics and attributes of US universities, their technology licensing offices 
(TLOs), and regions that have an influence upon a university‘s involvement in technology 
commercialization efforts. Findings are summarized for how various characteristics influence the 
technology transfer process, invention disclosure from faculty, and subsequent licensing and startup 
formation form US research universities. Chapter 3 presents a case study of an early technology 
 iv 
licensing consortium between three North Carolina universities: Duke University, The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University during 1988-1995. This 
consortium facilitated a growing entrepreneurial culture, increased patenting and technology licensing 
activities at each campus, and enabled the successful licensing of several academic inventions. In 
Chapter 4, an empirical analysis utilizes survey data from 76 universities to review potential 
correlations between university organizational and TLO characteristics and the metrics commonly 
reported by US research universities engaged in technology transfer. This research fills a gap in the 
literature by evaluating the potential influence TLO organizational reporting structure and 
characteristics of the TLO director may have on the technology commercialization efforts and 
outcomes of US research institutions. Chapter 5 integrates the general findings from the three 
projects, and outlines the significance of those findings for how characteristics of the university and 
TLO influence the technology transfer process and its outcomes. Implications and recommendations 
for university administrators and for policy development within the US university environment and 
their economic regions are discussed in this final chapter. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
US research universities are recognized by institutional and political leaders alike for their 
potential ability to enhance a region‘s long term stability and economic growth through their 
technology commercialization efforts. Licensing results of academic research to industry and creating 
startups to further develop and commercialize early stage inventions are acknowledged by several as 
mechanisms both university leadership and regional policy developers consider to promote economic 
development (Siegel & Phan, 2005; Breznitz & Feldman, 2012; Audretsch, 2013). While considering 
this potential economic development impact, university administrators may be uncertain as to the 
optimal alignment of organizational characteristics, practices, and policies for university technology 
transfer efforts (Siegel & Phan, 2005) to meet strategic commercialization objectives.
1
 University 
technology licensing offices (TLOs) are the primary unit at most US research universities tasked with 
providing commercialization services and support to entrepreneurial faculty, translating research 
results to the public, and maximizing licensing revenues for the university (Abrams, Leung & 
Stevens, 2009). An increased emphasis is being placed by national legislators on academic 
entrepreneurship and technology transfer efforts for economic development across the US, and many 
recommendations are being proffered to stimulate the commercialization of inventions created from 
publicly funded research (Wright, Clarysse, Lockett, & Knodkaert, 2007; Litan & Cook-Deegan, 
2011; Merrill & Mazza, 2011). Federal initiatives are being presented to congress supporting 
commercialization of federally funded academic inventions and startup formation, including The 
                                                     
1The terms ‗technology transfer‘ and ‗technology commercialization‘ are used interchangeably throughout this 
document, and mean the activities engaged in by a university technology licensing office (TLO) to move 
academic inventions into the commercial market. TLOs act to transfer university inventions to a commercial 
entity, via a license to an existing firm or a university startup. 
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Startup Act 3.0 (H.R.714 & S.310)
 2
, and the Technology and Research Accelerating National 
Security and Future Economic Resiliency Act of 2013 (H.R. 2981)
3
.  These bills propose federal 
funding agencies provide funds for initiatives to identify optimal technology transfer programs for 
replication across other universities to facilitate the transfer of commercially viable innovations 
developed from federal funding, including the formation of university technology licensing consortia 
and proof of concept centers at universities across the US. The present state of academic technology 
transfer capabilities at US research universities can be linked to history, culture and experience in 
transferring innovation to industry (O‘Shea, et al., 2005); as well as a key policy development (the 
Bayh-Dole Act) in 1980 which allowed universities to retain title to patentable inventions sponsored 
by US federal funding agencies (P.L. 96-517).
4
 The existing organizational cultures and 
characteristics when technology licensing offices TLOs are established have an influence upon 
subsequent structures, decisions, actions and processes (David, 1994), suggesting the early 
organizational structure of the TLO and other university characteristics can exert influence upon the 
internal technology transfer process and its outcomes.  
Moving university developed innovations forward for the benefit of the public is a growing 
concern for federal funding agencies and academic research institutions alike; now an implicit third 
mission of US research institutions along with teaching and research activities (Etzkowitz, 2003; 
Breznitz & Feldman, 2012). This effort requires balancing both traditional roles of the university and 
new entrepreneurial roles (Etzkowitz et al., 2000). This expanded 3
rd
 mission may become more 
                                                     
2
A bill ―To jump-start economic recovery through the formation and growth of new businesses, and for other 
purposes,‖ introduced as H.R. 714 and S. 310, Startup Act 3.0, & presented to the 113th congress February 2013 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr714, and http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s310 
 
3
A bill requiring each federal agency ―carry out a grant program to support innovative approaches to technology 
transfer at institutions of higher education …, nonprofit research institutions and Federal laboratories in order to 
accelerate the commercialization of federally funded research...‖  
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2981/text 
 
4
The Association of University Technology Managers website has a comprehensive explanation of this Act and 
its impact upon university technology transfer activities. See http://www.autm.net/Bayh_Dole_Act/7698.htm  
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important as academic universities evaluate potential for regional economic development impact 
through technology commercialization efforts, and look for alternative sources for research funding. 
In response to these initiatives and growing expectations, university leaders are evaluating existing 
mechanisms and processes for technology transfer to identify sources of increased efficiency and 
effectiveness. Key university technology commercialization mechanisms include direct licensing to 
existing industries, the generation of university-based startups, and research partnerships with 
industry and other research institutions (Phan & Siegel, 2006), all of which may result in financial 
gains and other benefits for the university. TLO and university characteristics, cultures, policies and 
expectations supportive of the technology transfer process may positively influence technology 
commercialization efforts in the academic environment. This dissertation project, with three separate 
and distinct studies, provides insight into characteristics of universities, licensing consortia, and 
university TLO characteristics and attributes that can influence the technology transfer processes and 
commercialization outcomes from US research universities.  
University Characteristics and Technology Transfer 
Heterogeneity in regional characteristics, university characteristics, and TLO characteristics 
and capabilities across US research universities have been observed by practitioners and researchers 
of academic technology transfer, as well as industry licensees and legislators involved in technology 
transfer policy development. Siegel & Phan (2005) find the effectiveness of a university‘s technology 
transfer process is influenced by competencies of university faculty inventors, licensees of university 
inventions or entrepreneurs forming startups, as well as business capabilities and competencies of 
licensing staff within the TLO, and university incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities. The 
institutional and environmental characteristics in which academic technology transfer activities are 
carried out can influence a university‘s abilities in negotiating licensing agreements and forming 
startups (Siegel, et al., 2003; Lockett & Wright, 2005; Powers & McDougal 2003; Link & Siegel, 
2005; Chapple, et al., 2005).  External regional resources such as venture capital availability, and 
  4 
levels of industry research and development can facilitate a university‘s propensity to engage in 
technology transfer activities and startup formation (Powers, 2003; Powers & McDougal, 2005a & 
2005b). A clear university mission statement and leadership focused on the goals of technology 
transfer contribute to a positive entrepreneurial culture and facilitate licensing activities and licensing 
revenues received from technology transfer efforts (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). The propensity of 
faculty to disclose inventions to the TLO is influenced by several characteristics including faculty 
quality, research levels, and university incentive policies–specifically policies regarding university 
royalty and equity distribution (Renault, 2006; Markman, et al, 2004).  Support from university 
leadership and policies in support of technology commercialization activities enable the development 
of an entrepreneurial culture (O‘Shea, et al, 2005). Invention disclosures are a critical input into the 
technology commercialization process; with higher disclosures leading to increased licensing and 
startup activity (Siegel, Waldman & Link, 2003; Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Siegel, Veugelers, & 
Wright, 2007; Feldman & Berovitz, 2010; Jensen & Jones, 2011). University inventors must also 
have confidence in the commercialization skills and abilities of the TLO to successfully transfer their 
innovation to the market (McGee, 2007). Organizational practices and TLO structural characteristics, 
contribute to the productivity of the TLO and use of various licensing mechanisms (Feldman, Feller, 
Bercovitz & Burton, 2002; Siegel, et al., 2003; Markman Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2005a; 
Markman, Gianiodis, & Phan, 2009). Appropriate alignment of characteristics under control of the 
university can facilitate certain technology commercialization activities in support of the university‘s 
strategic technology transfer goals (Lockett & Wright, 2005).  
TLOs facilitate commercialization of academic inventions through protection of intellectual 
property (via patent applications, copyrights, and trademarks), marketing the inventions and 
negotiating licenses with industry, and facilitating the formation of university startups (Dill, 1995; 
Bozeman, 2000; Lerner, 2005). The organizational structure of the TLO within the university 
environment and educational skills within the TLO can have an influence upon the technology 
  5 
transfer process (Bercovitz, et al., 2001; Markman, Gianiodis, Phan & Balkin, 2004; Markman et al., 
2005a; Markman et al., 2009). Organizational differences in these characteristics may contribute to 
variances in academic entrepreneurial activity and the formation of university startups across 
universities. As such, these specific characteristics can be evaluated for their relationship and 
potential influence upon the outcome metrics by which TLOs are evaluated.  
The work contained in this dissertation project contributes to the growing body of literature 
on academic entrepreneurship and technology transfer.
5
  The information provided is timely as 
federal discussions continue regarding efforts to stimulate the commercialization of federally funded 
research; and research universities across the US continue to be scrutinized and evaluated for their 
efficiency and effectiveness in moving academic innovations into the private sector (Litan & Cook-
Deegan, 2011). The studies in this project provide information for universities or other parties that 
may be considering entering into partnership or consortia to facilitate technology licensing activities, 
or for those evaluating internal university TLO structures and knowledge skillsets for alignment to 
maximize technology transfer efforts. This research project on how specific university characteristics 
may influence the academic technology transfer process and its outcomes provides information for 
interested university leaders, economic development practitioners, and legislators on how university 
and TLO characteristics may be aligned to facilitate academic technology transfer and support efforts 
of entrepreneurial inventors.  
Dissertation Approach 
This dissertation project is designed to provide academic analysis through three different yet 
related research projects on academic entrepreneurship and technology transfer. The first, a literature 
review of specific studies on academic technology transfer, discusses the implications of findings 
                                                     
5Rothaermel, Agung, and Jiang (2007); Agrawal (2001); Djokovic, and Souitaris (2008); O‘Shea, Allen, 
O‘Gorman, and Roche (2004); Phan and Siegel (2006); Siegel (2012) and all provide comprehensive literature 
reviews on university entrepreneurship and technology transfer.  
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from these studies on drivers behind the growth in university licensing and commercialization efforts, 
characteristics and attributes factoring into the technology transfer process, and influencing its 
commercial outcomes. Findings from these groups of studies are summarized and synthesized for 
what they tell us of how various regional, university and TLO characteristics may factor into the 
academic technology transfer process, and gaps in analysis are identified for further research. The 
second project is a case study of an early licensing consortium between Duke University, The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) and North Carolina State University (NCSU) in 
1988, and provides relevant background and perspective on early stage technology licensing consortia 
between research universities. A quantitative analysis in a third project evaluates TLO reporting 
structures and characteristics of TLO directors from 76 US research universities to explore possible 
correlations between these characteristics and academic technology commercialization outcomes. 
This analysis attempts to fill a gap in the literature by identifying organizational reporting structure 
and educational degrees of TLO directors as characteristics that guide and enhance specific activities 
along the technology transfer process. Each of these studies builds upon and supplements existing 
research on academic entrepreneurship and technology commercialization efforts. 
Literature Review 
The first research project in this series of studies: University, TLO and Regional 
Characteristics Related to the Technology Transfer and its Outcomes–A Literature Review, provides 
an introduction to key university, TLO and other characteristics shown to have an influence upon 
academic technology transfer. This literature review analyzes key research studies on organizational 
resources, characteristics, attributes and licensing practices of universities and TLOs. These studies 
evaluate characteristics of institutions that seem to be more effective and efficient in obtaining 
invention disclosures, licensing inventions to industry and generating licensing revenues, in 
generating startups, and in using equity with startups formed to commercialize university intellectual 
property (IP). Findings on the influence of various institutional, organizational and regional 
  7 
characteristics are summarized and evaluated for similarities and differences, and how these 
characteristics are related to the technology transfer process and its outcomes. Some differences are 
noted for characteristics that seem to influence licensing activities versus startup formation. General 
conclusions are discussed, implications presented for university leadership, and gaps in the literature 
are identified for further analysis.  
Case Study 
The second research project, Collaborative Technology Transfer: A History of North 
Carolina’s Triangle University Licensing Consortium, documents the history of one early stage 
technology licensing consortium among the three research universities situated around the Research 
Triangle Park in North Carolina (the Triangle). This consortium, the Triangle University Licensing 
Consortium (TULCO) managed technology commercialization and licensing activities for the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), North Carolina State University (NCSU), and 
Duke University (DUKE) for eight years. Founded in 1986 and active from 1988 until 1995, 
TUCLO‘s history is presented as an illustrative case study of the promise and pitfalls of a regional 
licensing consortium between three large research universities.  
The framework for establishing, funding, and managing of TULCO is presented, as are the 
factors contributing to its dissolution. The culture around the Research Triangle Park at the time 
provides background context of a growing desire to increase university-industry interactions and 
transfer academic inventions to the private sector. An external consulting agency‘s 1986 report on 
technology transfer capabilities in the triangle provided recommendations; upon which the initial 
consortium structure was built to address this growing need. TULCO‘s impact on technology 
licensing activities at each of the three universities is reviewed, with analysis of various technology 
transfer activities during its operation. Funding levels, issued patents, and royalties collected by the 
universities during TULCO‘s timeframe are also presented to better understand the growing demand 
for technology licensing and commercialization capacity at each of the triangle universities. The 
  8 
events leading up to the dissolution of TULCO are discussed, with recommendations presented for 
those considering similar technology licensing collaborations. Post-TULCO technology transfer 
activities from each of the three universities indicate increased technology licensing capacity and 
activity at each institution.  
This case study provides examples of success factors and potential risks for any technology 
licensing collaboration. This study is timely – regional academic licensing consortia that combine 
multiple institutions‘ technology licensing efforts and capabilities into a single organization to 
increase effective transfer of academic innovations have been introduced into bills being reviewed by 
the US Congress (S.310, H.R.714). These policy recommendations suggest regional universities 
involved in licensing consortia may be more efficient at institutional technology transfer activities by 
combining and leveraging resources, potentially gaining economies of scale in technology licensing 
efforts. This case study provides timely perspective on such consortia and provides recommendations 
that may facilitate successful technology licensing partnerships.  
Empirical Analysis  
The third research project; US University Organizational Characteristics and Technology 
Transfer Performance, examines TLO organizational structure and educational background of the 
TLO director, as factors that may influence technology transfer outcomes from US research 
universities. Many previous studies examine university characteristics and relative productivity in 
transferring the results of research to the commercial market.
6
 These studies find a number of 
university characteristics support successful academic commercialization efforts including: 
institutional culture, tradition and history; research funding levels and type; the presence of medical, 
engineering, or law schools; university policies and orientation in support of inventors and 
entrepreneurial faculty; TLO organizational structure and interaction with other academic units; as 
                                                     
6
For a current thorough review of these studies, see Bradley, S. R., Hayter, C. S., & Link, A. N. (2013). Models 
and methods of university technology transfer. Foundations and Trends® in Entrepreneurship, 9 (6), 571-650. 
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well as characteristics of inventors and university faculty. Technology licensing office characteristics 
important to the technology commercialization process include the number of disclosures received; 
the age and size of the TLO; its financial structure; legal expenditures; cumulative experience; and 
prior experience. Studies evaluating these characteristics suggest that heterogeneity in these 
characteristics among universities can help explain why some universities seem to be more effective 
than others (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Siegel, et al., 2003; Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010; Jensen & Jones, 
2011). This research project evaluates specific characteristics of the university TLO; organizational 
reporting structure, and the educational background and job tenure of the TLO director to determine 
their potential influence on the technology transfer process. This third research project employs an 
econometric modeling approach to provide statistical inference for how these characteristics are 
related to technology transfer outcomes.  
There are different organizational structures of university TLOs identified from previous 
work (Bercovitz, et al., 2001; Feldman & Bervocitz, 2010) that may determine how they interact with 
other university functions and the availability of resources that can be leveraged for 
commercialization activities. The majority of TLOs report to the research function within the 
university, while some TLOs report directly to the leader of the institution, some to an economic 
development or business development office, and some report to multiple university functions. These 
alternate reporting structures provide an opportunity for comparison between them for their influence 
on the effectiveness of university technology transfer. The educational training and background of the 
TLO director bring additional skills to the technology transfer process that may facilitate certain 
activities over others. The educational degree of the TLO director is tested as a proxy for skillsets of 
the individual responsible for managing these activities. The findings from this empirical analysis 
suggest these characteristics do have an influence upon academic technology commercialization 
efforts, with some configurations being more effective than others.  
  10 
Outline of the Dissertation  
The background and context for the three research projects is presented in this introductory 
chapter. The following three chapters each comprise the entirety of each of the three research 
projects. The literature review in Chapter 2 analyzes previous academic studies on university 
technology transfer and entrepreneurship and the methodologies used to evaluate university and TLO 
characteristics. Findings synthesized and summarized for the university characteristics and attributes 
identified as important to invention disclosure receipt, licensing and revenue generation, startup 
formation and use of equity. Gaps are identified and discussed for other university and TLO 
characteristics unaccounted for; providing the foundation for the empirical analysis contained in 
Chapter 4.  Chapter 3 consists of the case-study analysis of an early licensing consortium in North 
Carolina‘s Research Triangle: the Triangle University Licensing Consortium (TULCO). This case 
study evaluates this licensing consortium‘s impact upon subsequent technology licensing activities at 
Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and North Carolina State University 
after the consortium‘s demise in 1995.  The empirical study comprises Chapter 4, and evaluates TLO 
organizational reporting structure, educational skillsets of the TLO director, and the director‘s job 
tenure for their influence on three technology licensing metrics: invention disclosures, licenses and 
startups. Chapter 5 presents overall policy implications and a summary analysis of the lessons learned 
from these three research projects. Policy implications are reviewed; the results of the research 
projects contained herein may be of interest to university administrators and legislators regarding the 
support of academic entrepreneurship, technology transfer, and licensing efforts of US universities. 
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Chapter 2.  University, TLO, and Regional Characteristics Related to the 
Technology Transfer Process and its Outcomes–A Literature Review 
Introduction 
US university technology transfer (TT) initiatives raise important policy issues as some 
university administrators expect to gain substantial financial returns from technology transfer & 
commercialization efforts (Friedman & Silberman, 2003); while at the same time communities and 
regional legislators expect local universities to have a more direct role in stimulating economic 
growth and job creation (Smilor & Mathews, 2004; Siegel & Phan, 2006). Federal legislation in 
discussion by the US Committee on Science, Space and Technology proposes to award grants to 
―support innovative approaches to technology transfer at research institutions,‖ for proven technology 
transfer processes and efforts (H.R. 2981, 2013). The terms ‗technology transfer' (TT), and 
‗technology commercialization,‘ as used in this paper refer to the process by which academic 
inventions are licensed to industry or to a newly formed startup for eventual commercialization; 
entrepreneurship refers to academic inventors actively engaged in the technology transfer process of 
university inventions. Invention disclosures are identified by several previous studies on academic 
technology transfer as a critical input into this process (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Siegel, 
Waldman & Link, 2003). Thursby and Kemp, (2002) find university effectiveness in technology 
transfer can vary depending upon characteristics and capabilities of the university, research faculty, 
technology licensing office (TLO) staff, and the application of available resources. Institutional 
structure, organizational capabilities, and incentive policies of the university can also influence the 
technology transfer process and its outcomes (Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz & Burton, 2002; Siegel, 
Waldman & Link, 2003; Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2005a; Markman, Gianiodis & Phan, 
2009). Some note the dual function of TLOs in both licensing to established firms and supporting 
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new startup companies to commercialize university inventions (Smilor & Matthews, 2004; 
Chukumba & Jensen, 2005); these two outcomes require different commercialization skills and 
capabilities of the licensing staff in the TLO (Siegel, Veugelers & Wright, 2007). Universities may 
wish to focus efforts on specific technology transfer outcomes, through direct licensing to industry or 
forming startup companies (or both). Understanding the characteristics that influence licensing versus 
startup formation will be beneficial for university administrators and policy developers working to 
expand university technology commercialization efforts. 
This literature review synthesizes findings from a cross section of prior studies on the 
influence of various characteristics and attributes of universities, TLOs and their regions upon the 
growth of technology transfer activities and outcomes among US research universities. Findings are 
summarized for how university, TLO, and regional characteristics may affect the technology transfer 
process. The influence of these characteristics on the invention disclosures submitted to the TLO, 
licensing outcomes, and the formation of university startups is synthesized from this body of 
literature. Findings suggest universities with strong capabilities in startup formation may be different 
from those who have success in generating large revenues from licensing. Royalty rich TLOs who 
have significant past success with licensing may be locked into direct licensing and may not have 
much success with startup formation, potentially viewing that commercialization path as a last resort 
(Chukumba & Jensen, 2005, p. 18). The academic technology transfer studies in this literature review 
come from a variety of journals dedicated to the study of academic technology commercialization 
efforts and startup formation, including several studies identified from the Journal of Technology 
Transfer, a special edition from Research Policy (The Creation of Spin-off Firms at Public Research 
Institutions: Managerial and Policy Implications), The Journal of Economics and Innovation of New 
Technologies, and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy-Intellectual Property Edition, 2007. Other 
journals include the Journal of Business Venturing, The Journal of Management Studies, and 
Management Science. The highlighted studies in this literature review evaluate characteristics of US 
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research universities and their TLO offices, and are synthesized for their findings and how they 
inform the study and practice of academic technology transfer.  
Examples of some case studies, benchmark studies, and efficiency studies that examine the 
growth and relative performance of university technology transfer functions over time are evaluated 
as a starting point. These studies identify characteristics of universities and TLOs that contribute to 
the growth and overall effectiveness of the academic technology transfer process. The first section of 
this review summarizes the general findings of these studies, including best practices and 
characteristics contributing to nominal and total factor productivity growth in university technology 
transfer. These studies provide background on factors driving university involvement in 
commercialization of university inventions (Smilor & Matthews, 2004), and describe aspects of the 
technology transfer process in US research universities.  
Research identifying characteristics influencing (a) invention disclosure submission to the 
TLO, (b) facilitating licensing activity and licensing revenue, and (c) startup formation and use of 
equity as a licensing mechanism are each examined in subsequent sections. Invention disclosures are 
identified as a critical input to the technology transfer process and the level of invention disclosures 
coming into the TLO have a strong influence on both licensing and startup activity (Siegel, et al., 
2003; Jensen & Jones, 2011). We summarize findings from several studies on various characteristics 
that are related to the flow of invention disclosures to the university TLO. Outcomes from university 
technology transfer can fall into two general categories: licensing activities, with subsequent licensing 
revenues; and startup formation with possible use of equity as a licensing mechanism for startups. 
Findings are summarized on various university and TLO characteristics that have an influence upon 
these outcomes. The results from these studies are compared and contrasted to evaluate the 
relationships discovered between characteristics and outcomes, differences in findings are evaluated 
for possible explanation. A discussion section summarizes the key findings from this body of 
literature. Findings are reviewed for overlaps and conflicts, and gaps are identified for future research. 
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The general managerial conclusions from this literature review and their potential policy implications 
are presented in a final section. 
Benchmarking and Growth in Technology Transfer  
Efficiency studies, surveys, case studies and benchmark comparative studies provide 
mechanisms for universities to evaluate their technology transfer activities relative to their peers, and 
identify best practices in university technology commercialization efforts. Thursby and Kemp, in their 
2002 study, ―Growth and Productive Efficiency of University Intellectual Property Licensing,‖ 
evaluate various university characteristics to identify the drivers behind the increasing levels of 
technology licensing efforts at US research universities. Using data envelope analysis (DEA) 
combined with quintile and logistic regression analysis, the authors examine overall productivity 
changes in invention disclosure, patent applications, industry sponsored research agreements, license 
agreements, and royalty payments for 57 research universities from 1991 to 1996. The DEA method 
creates an efficiency frontier maximizing a ratio of multiple resource inputs to multiple outputs. 
Universities are partitioned into quintiles by their input and output measures, allowing comparisons of 
efficiency between universities of similar size; finding smaller schools and larger schools tend to be 
more efficient on a number of dimensions than larger schools, with higher efficiency ratios for their 
use of resources for TT outcomes. Logistic regression tests the influence of various characteristics for 
universities defining the efficiency frontier with highest efficiency ratios. Efficiency is significantly 
influenced by TLO size, federal funding, faculty size, and faculty quality. Quality of engineering 
faculty members and size of bioscience faculty positively influence a universities efficiency levels. 
Private universities may be up to four times more efficient than public, while the presence of a 
medical school somewhat reduces efficiency scores. The study attributes an observed growth in 
licensing to a changing entrepreneurial culture and increasing interactions with industry. The use of 
the DEA method in this study to identify efficient universities is problematic due to the method‘s 
highly deterministic nature and its susceptibility to outliers and noise in the model. Noise may reflect 
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other university characteristics that cannot be measured and may over-estimate, or under-estimate 
efficiency. The dichotomous variable created for efficient universities used in the logistic regression 
is evaluated in the study using the same input and output variables used in generating the frontier, 
potentially introducing serial correlations and endogeneity into the analysis, introducing concerns 
regarding statistical inference. 
A growing receptiveness to both technology transfer and entrepreneurship is considered one 
of the primary drivers for growth in academic commercialization activities. In their 2002 study, ―Who 
is selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing,‖ Thursby & Thursby (2002) 
evaluate data between 1994 and 1998 from 64 universities, and a survey of 112 licensees and industry 
sponsors of university IP. They evaluate growth in invention disclosure, patenting and licensing 
activities at US universities, using DEA to create three ‗best practice frontiers‘ of universities with the 
highest ratios of resource inputs for three outcome measures: disclosures, patents, and licenses; and 
evaluate growth rates. TLO size, prior federal and industry research funding levels, and faculty size 
are used as inputs for disclosures; then disclosures, TLO size, and faculty quality are used as inputs 
for patents; and finally, disclosures, patents, TLO size and faculty quality are used as inputs for 
licenses. This study finds universities have seen nominal growth in all activities over the 5 year 
period; invention disclosures grew by 7.1%, patents by 17.1%, and licenses by 8.4%. Annual total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth rates increased for disclosures (2.7%) and patent applications 
(12.1%), but decreased for licensing (-1.7%); this decreased TFP may potentially be due to the time 
lag between initial invention disclosure and final license (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Logistic 
regressions are also used to evaluate the relationship between the nominal growth rates and annual 
total factor productivity, including TLO growth in the regression evaluating licensing activity. The 
study finds higher patenting levels and increases in the size of the TLO have a negative relationship 
with licensing TFP, indicating universities may be ‗deep-diving‘ and patenting inventions that have 
marginal commercial value to industry (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). The negative relationship 
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between growth in the TLO and licensing efforts suggests there may be a steep learning curve in 
developing skills required by TLO licensing professionals (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). In their 
survey analysis, industry research sponsors and licensees identify low cost of university research and 
growing faculty acceptance of industry supported research as important factors in the growth of 
industry research contracts with universities. Overall growth in academic acceptance and university 
leadership orientation toward technology transfer are identified as primary factors related to 
technology licensing growth (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Decision envelope analysis (DEA) uses 
multiple inputs and outputs to create an efficiency ratio, allowing universities to benchmark 
themselves against peer institutions. The deterministic nature of DEA is incapable of distinguishing 
between random noise and true sources of inefficiency, so may not provide a true value. 
Multicollinearity and omitted variables can be problematic in the use of DEA, so while this method 
measures efficiency via an input/output ratio; it could be overlooking other characteristics that are 
influencing the technology transfer process.  
Organizational practices in university management and commercialization of intellectual 
property can also influence the performance of university technology commercialization efforts. 
Identifying and measuring those practices sheds light on their influence. A study by Siegel, Waldman 
& Link (2003), ―Assessing Impact of Organizational Practices on The Relative Productivity of 
University Technology Transfer Offices,‖ evaluates university productivity in technology licensing 
activities from 80 universities from 1991-1996. This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS), 
stochastic frontier estimation (SFE), and qualitative field research interviews. Fifty-five interviews 
with university technology transfer stakeholders: business entrepreneurs, university administrators 
and university scientists, identify critical environmental and organizational characteristics that may 
influence licensing and licensing revenues of a university. SFE, similarly to the DEA method, 
provides a measurement of the relative productivity of each university in licensing activities and 
revenue generation. SFE utilizes maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the stochastic 
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frontier and a vector of potential technical inefficiency sources simultaneously, allowing hypothesis 
testing and construction of confidence intervals. The study uses several characteristics identified from 
their qualitative interviews (Siegel, et al., 2003), distinguishing these characteristics from random 
noise. Invention disclosures, size of the TLO, and external legal expenditures are used as inputs; 
licenses and licensing revenues are outputs from this efficiency model. This study finds the size of the 
TLO has a positive influence upon licensing activity, but is not significantly related to licensing 
revenues. Findings indicate external legal expenditures of the TLO have a negative influence upon 
license agreements, but a positive influence on revenues, suggesting legal wrangling or risk adversity 
may have a negative influence on license negotiations (Siegel, et al., 2003), but may be effective in 
garnering higher royalty streams. Environmental and institutional determinants of inefficiency include 
indicators for public universities and the presence of a medical school, the age of the TLO, in addition 
to regional characteristics such as industry R&D intensity and annual state GDP. Older TLOs are 
somewhat more efficient at revenue generation, which may be indicative of the time lag between 
finalizing a license and royalty income, or of cumulative effects from prior licensing efforts. 
Indicators for the presence of a medical school and for public institutions are statistically 
insignificant. Any precision of SFE methods is highly dependent on the number of universities in the 
analysis used to project the frontier, and while production functions fit well with the data, institutional 
inefficiencies in academic technology transfer activities cannot be completely explained by 
environmental and institutional characteristics (Siegel, et al., 2003). The qualitative research from 
interviews reveals other characteristics that might negatively influence academic technology transfer 
activities: insufficient faculty rewards, a lack of resources and staffing commitment to the TLO, 
cultural barriers, and administrative bureaucracy. A lack of marketing or technical skills in the TLO 
and low salary compensation for TLO professionals are also suggested as potential barriers (Siegel, et 
al, 2003); however there is no operationalization of these potential barriers, providing opportunities 
for evaluation by others who are able to capture a way to measure these characteristics.  
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A recent study evaluates whether the 50% growth in government research funding from 1998 
to 2008 corresponds to increased efficiency in academic technology transfer activities (Kim, 2013). 
This study, ―The Ivory Tower Approach to Entrepreneurial Linkage: Productivity Changes in 
University Technology Transfer,‖ uses the DEA method to evaluate panel data from 90 US research 
universities using invention disclosures, TLO licensing staff, and research expenditures as input 
factors to determine relative efficiencies between universities and overall growth in US issued 
patents, licenses, and revenue. This study finds an upward trend in overall efficiency of US research 
universities; with an average TFP growth of 31% over the nine years, providing some evidence that 
universities have developed effective strategies to leverage resources for TT efforts. Licenses grew an 
average of 4% each year and licensing income about 28%.  Inputs increased over time as well: 
research expenditures grew about 8.3% per year, invention disclosures grew by about 7.5% each year, 
and licensing staff grew an average of 11% per year, indicating growing commitment to university 
technology transfer. This study finds the presence of a medical school has little impact on higher TLO 
productivity, and no significant difference in productivity between public and private institutions, 
possibly due to an increased prioritization of technology transfer and commercialization across all 
universities (Kim, 2013). As with other studies utilizing DEA, university annual productivity data is 
quite volatile; universities have yearly fluctuation in efficiency measures, potentially due to the time 
lags between disclosure of the invention and licensing. Endogeneity concerns are a problem if 
productivity is measured by numerous input variables that may be highly correlated (Kim, 2013). 
This production function methodology is useful however, in looking at aggregate growth or decline in 
university technology transfer outputs over several years, and in benchmarking techniques for 
universities who evaluate themselves relative to their peers. 
Comparative analytic methods identifying best practices from five universities known to have 
strong technology transfer programs and a significant influence upon regional economic development 
provide benchmarks for other institutions. Smilor & Matthews, in their 2004 qualitative study, 
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―University Venturing: Technology Transfer and Commercialization in Higher Education,‖ compare 
and contrast university policies, roles of university leadership, incentives for faculty inventors, and 
use of equity in licensing from five institutions (Georgia Tech, North Carolina State, University. of 
Florida, University of Texas at Austin, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute), identifying factors that 
influence technology transfer and commercialization activities (Smilor & Matthews, 2004). 
Interviews with university representatives and technology transfer professionals provide data on 
organizational support for technology transfer and commercialization efforts, in addition to faculty 
incentive structures that support entrepreneurial behavior. Institutional characteristics, royalty 
distribution policies, promotion and tenure metrics, leadership support, and TLO commercialization 
skillsets are evaluated to determine how these characteristics support the technology transfer process 
(Smilor & Matthews, 2004). Strong support from university leadership in policy and practice, 
unequivocal support for a properly resourced TLO, and incentive systems designed to support 
entrepreneurial faculty are all identified as important characteristics at each of the five universities. 
The dual focus of the TLO: generating startups and licensing inventions requires alignment with 
appropriate skill sets (Smilor & Matthews) to fit with these differing commercial paths. The 
university TLO may benefit from staff with knowledge of university research, business 
commercialization skills, and links to bus development organizations to help facilitate startups and 
provide resources beyond the capabilities of the TLO and the university. 
Summary 
Several key characteristics are identified as factors related to the technology transfer process 
from these studies on university effectiveness in technology commercialization. Thursby and Kemp 
(2002) note university productivity varies with capabilities of TLO staff and research faculty, as well 
as the use of university resources, suggesting that the efficiency of universities in technology 
commercialization is not necessarily deterministic and may depend upon the environment in which it 
is carried out. An entrepreneurial culture, support from leadership, quality of research faculty, 
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research funding levels, and size of the TLO are identified as characteristics that influence technology 
transfer. Each study notes the importance of an entrepreneurial culture and support from university 
leadership. Invention disclosures are a critical input into the technology commercialization process, 
and have a significant influence on both licensing activities and licensing revenues (Siegel, et al., 
2003). Private universities are more efficient that public universities in one 2002 study (Thursby & 
Kemp, 2002), while subsequent studies show no difference between public and private institutions 
(Siegel, et al, 2003, Kim, 2013). The presence of a medical school has a negative relationship with the 
likelihood of a university being on the efficiency frontier in Thursby & Kemp‘s (2002) study, even 
though many licenses are for biomedical inventions; authors suggest this relationship may be due to 
heavy service commitment of medical schools rather than commercialization (Thursby & Kemp, 
2002). Quality of the engineering faculty and size of the bioscience faculty also have a positive 
influence on technology transfer efforts in Thursby & Kemp‘s (2002) study. University TLOs have 
grown as there has been an increased resource commitment to technology transfer and faculty 
entrepreneurs (Kim, 2013). Findings on TLO size vary: larger TLOs are more effective in revenue 
generation, but less effective at licensing activities in one study (Siegel, et al, 2003). Another study 
finds growth in a university TLO reduces efficiency levels for commercialization outcomes, 
potentially due to steep learning curves of new licensing staff (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Business 
skills are noted as important in two of the qualitative analyses (Siegel, et al., 2003; Smilor & 
Matthews, 2004), suggesting the commercialization skills of the licensing staff may be a 
characteristic for further exploration. TLO age has a positive relationship with revenues, somewhat 
expected due to time lags between invention disclosure, licensing, and receipt of revenues (Siegel, et 
al., 2003). Regional research and development levels in Siegel, et al.‘s (2003) study have a positive 
relationship with university licensing activities, suggesting universities situated in areas with higher 
levels of industry R&D may have more opportunities for licensing. Table 2.1 summarizes the findings 
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from this select group of studies on efficiency and best practices of US universities in technology 
transfer.   
 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Efficiency and Effectiveness in Technology Transfer 
University Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcomes Finding 
Private 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002) 
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
Private may be 4X more efficient than 
Public Universities 
Kim (2013) 
Issued US patents, 
licenses, and revenue 
No significant difference in 
productivity  
Public 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
No significance for public indicator on 
licenses and revenues 
Medical 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002) 
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
The presence of a medical school has a 
negative influence upon efficiency 
scores in logistic regression 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
No significance for medical school 
indicator on licenses and revenues 
Kim, (2013) 
Issued US patents, 
licenses, and license 
income 
Presence of a medical school has little 
impact on higher productivity of 
licenses & licensing income 
Federal research 
funding 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002) 
 
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
Slight significance for federal res 
funding levels when environ 
characteristics (private & medical 
school) are included 
Entrepreneurial 
policy orientation 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002) 
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
Expanding entrepreneurial culture, 
increased willingness of faculty to 
disclose, & university to apply for 
patents drive TT activities 
Thursby & 
Thursby (2002)  
1. Disclosures;  
2. Patent applications;  
3. Licenses;  
Growth in TT comes from increasing 
entrepreneurial culture and willingness 
of faculty to disclose. 
Growth in patenting has not seen 
corresponding growth in licensing. 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
Barriers to TT: lack of faculty rewards, 
compensation & staffing of the TLO, 
cultural, & administrative bureaucracy  
Smilor & 
Matthews (2004) 
 
TLO (budget, staff, $, 
#licenses, #startups, 
equity use)  
Royalty distribution 
Strong support from leadership, 
unequivocal support for TLO, & 
incentive systems designed to support 
entrepreneurial faculty positively 
influence TLO outcomes 
Faculty quality 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002)  
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
National Research Council (NRC) 
rankings: Quality of engineering 
faculty positive influence upon 
efficiency 
Faculty size 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002)  
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
Size of biological faculty present at 
university has positive influence on TT 
outcomes 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
TLO Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcomes Finding 
Disclosures 
received by TLO 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
Critical input: strong positive 
influence on licensing and revenue 
Engagement of TLO with faculty 
significantly influences disclosure rate 
Size of TLO 
Thursby & Kemp 
(2002) 
Disclosures, patent 
apps, industry research 
licenses, & revenue 
Larger TLOs more inefficient in all TT 
outputs 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
Significant influence on increased 
licensing, not revenues 
Kim (2013) 
Issued US patents, 
licenses, and license 
income 
Licensing staff grew an average of 
11%/year ‗98-‗08, indicating growing 
commitment of university resources  
Age of TLO 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
Older TLOs have significant influence 
on increased revenues, not licensing 
External legal 
expenditures of 
TLO 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
 
Licenses and revenues  
External legal costs have a positive 
influence on revenues, and a negative  
influence upon licensing agreements 
Business skills 
Thursby & 
Thursby (2002) 
1. Disclosures;  
2. Patent applications;  
3. Licenses; 
Rapidly expanding TLO = lower 
productivity due to steep learning 
curves of new hires 
Siegel, et al. 
(2003) 
Licenses and revenues  
Qualitative research: lack of marketing 
or technical skills in the TLO, and low 
salary compensation are identified as 
potential barriers 
Smilor & 
Matthews (2004) 
TLO (budget, staff, $, 
#licenses, #startups, 
equity use)  
Royalty distribution 
Dual focus of the TLO requires 
alignment with appropriate skill sets to 
increase commercialization outcomes 
Links to business resources are key. 
Regional Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcomes Finding 
Regional 
Industry R&D 
Siegel, et al., 
(2003) 
 
Licenses and revenues  
Level of industry R&D in state has a 
positive influence upon licensing 
activity of universities 
 
Disclosure Submission 
Invention disclosures from research faculty are a critical input into the technology transfer 
process; previous studies find invention disclosure receipt by the university TLO influences all 
subsequent technology commercialization efforts (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Siegel, Waldman & 
Link, 2003; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011).Universities with more experienced 
TLOs, incentive policies for inventors, and strong entrepreneurial culture are likely to have higher 
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invention disclosures from research faculty. Siegel, Waldman & Link (2003) find invention 
disclosures received by the TLO to be a critical input into the technology transfer process, and are 
significantly and positively related to both licensing and licensing revenue. Higher disclosure rates 
can lead to (a) more licenses, (b) execution of more licenses with equity interests (Friedman & 
Silberman, 2003), (c) higher licensing revenues (Siegel, et al., 2003), and (d) the formation of more 
university startups (Jensen & Jones, 2011). Determining characteristics of universities and TLOs that 
have high rates of invention disclosures provide information relevant to those wishing to encourage 
disclosure from research faculty. Several studies analyze the disclosure of inventions to the TLO as 
part of their overall analysis of the technology transfer process, these findings help identify 
characteristics of universities, university faculty, and TLOs related to high disclosure rates, which 
provide increased opportunities for licensing and startup formation.  
In the efficiency benchmark studies discussed above, Thursby and Thursby (2002) find 
invention disclosure rates increasing by 7.1% from 1994 to 1998. This study attributes growth in the 
propensity of faculty to disclose their inventions to growing cultural acceptance and previous 
licensing success by the TLO. The study finds growth in invention disclosure submission is primarily 
driven by an increased receptiveness of faculty to disclose results of their research rather than a 
reorientation of research interests away from basic research towards applied research (Thursby & 
Thursby, 2002). In interviews with key technology transfer stakeholders, including entrepreneurs, 
TLO directors, and university scientists, Siegel, et al, (2003) identify relationship building as an 
important element of the technology transfer process, and the TLO licensing individuals as key to 
facilitating relationships between research scientists and licensees. Building relationships with 
research scientists can influence their participation in the technology transfer process starting with 
submission of invention disclosures; facilitating relationships between university research scientists 
and industry licensees expedite the transfer of technology from the university (Siegel, et al, 2003). 
Thursby and Kemp (2002) find that universities most efficient in obtaining invention disclosures fall 
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in the largest and smallest of the five quintiles in their comparison groups among peer universities, 
suggesting the largest may have higher faculty engagement in the technology transfer process 
requiring less outreach of the TLO, and smaller universities may be able to directly engage with 
research faculty to build relationships, positively influencing invention disclosure rates.  
Friedman & Silberman, in their 2003 study, ―University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, 
Management and Location Matter?‖ evaluate data from 93 research universities from 1997 to 1999, 
and find several university and faculty characteristics influence invention disclosure submission to the 
TLO. A two equation OLS regression recursive system models the technology transfer process of the 
university as a sequence of events, and identifies invention disclosure from research faculty as a 
critical ―raw input‖ to the technology transfer process (Friedman & Silberman, 2003, p.21). Invention 
disclosures are modeled in the first regression, finding faculty quality, the number of science 
departments offering a PhD degree (as determined by the National Research Council - NRC), and 
levels of federal and industry sponsored research all have a positive influence on invention disclosure 
submission. The estimated invention disclosures are subsequently utilized in several second stage 
regressions as an independent variable to analyze characteristics influencing licensing activity, 
licensing income, the number of startups, and use of equity in licensing deals. The findings for these 
outcomes are further explored in the sections below. There are some limitations to this study 
including a relatively high correlation among the independent variables in the equation modeling 
invention disclosures; faculty quality, federal research funding, and industry research funding are all 
highly correlated with each other (>0.7). The endogeneity and multicollinearity of these variables are 
likely influencing each other, introducing potential bias and making causal determinations difficult 
(Friedman & Silberman, 2003). An alternative measure may be the use of a ratio of industry to federal 
funding to remove the correlation problem with using both funding variables.  
A study by Thursby and Thursby (2007), ―University Licensing,‖ evaluates the rationale 
behind university licensing activities, looking at the stage of technologies being licensed, the 
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relationship between university characteristics and licensing revenue, and the propensity of faculty to 
disclose to the university TLO. This study combines OLS regression, logistic regression and 
qualitative interviews to evaluate university technology commercialization, and to evaluate whether 
research faculty are diverted from basic toward applied research. For invention disclosure from 
faculty, the study utilizes logistic regression to evaluate the propensity of faculty disclosure to the 
TLO modeled as a function of university and inventor characteristics. This study finds the scientific 
background of the inventor can have an influence upon disclosure rates; inventors with an 
engineering background are more likely to disclose inventions to the TLO, and bioscience faculty 
least likely to disclose. Quality measures such as high publication rates and high levels of both federal 
and industry research funding increase the likelihood of disclosure. Industry funding may have twice 
the influence on disclosure rates compared to federal research funding, possibly due to the more 
applied nature of industry funding creating outcomes with commercial value (Thursby & Thursby, 
2007). The study finds little evidence that faculty are being diverted from basic research; changes in 
publication rates show no substantial shift towards applied research despite the positive influence of 
industry research funding on invention disclosure rates (Thursby & Thursby, 2007).   
Summary 
The studies summarized herein find that invention disclosure submission to the university 
TLO can be influenced by different characteristics of the university, its faculty, and of the TLO itself. 
University characteristics influencing disclosure rates include the university‘s culture and support for 
entrepreneurial activities, which can facilitate disclosure from faculty as the critical first step in the 
technology transfer process (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). The growing willingness of universities to 
invest in commercialization of research-based inventions through intellectual property protection, 
marketing and licensing have facilitated the development of entrepreneurial cultures at research 
universities. Federal and industry funding levels for research, and the relative number of science 
departments university with graduate programs can also influence disclosure rates (Friedman & 
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Silberman, 2003), as do various aspects of faculty quality, including publication rates, individual 
funding levels, and scientific background (Thursby & Thursby, 2007). TLO engagement with 
research faculty can also have a strong positive influence upon invention disclosure submission 
through relationship building (Siegel, et al, 2003), suggesting the networking and commercialization 
skills with the TLO are important to this critical input to the technology commercialization process.  
Table 2.2 summarizes the findings on characteristics identified as influencing invention disclosure 
submission at US research universities.   
 
Table 2.2 Characteristics Influencing Invention Disclosure 
University Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcomes Finding 
University support/ 
Policy orientation 
Thursby & 
Thursby (2002) 
DEA: 3-stage 
process 
1
st
 Disclosures 
Qualitative Survey, 
N=112 licensees  
7.1% growth in disclosures; influenced 
by increased propensity for faculty to 
disclose, facilitated by university 
willingness to support & patent IP 
Federal & industry 
research funding 
Friedman & 
Silberman, (2003) 
Disclosures (ID)  
‗97-99 
High levels of federal and industry 
funding has a strong positive influence 
on invention disclosures to the TLO 
University size 
Thursby & Kemp, 
(2002) 
Disclosures  
Smallest and largest universities are 
more efficient in obtaining disclosures 
than mid-size universities 
University size 
Friedman & 
Silberman (2003) 
Disclosures (ID) 
‗97-99 
Universities with more science 
departments offering a PhD have 
higher rates of disclosure submission 
Faculty quality 
Friedman & 
Silberman (2003) 
Disclosures (ID)  
‗97-99 
NRC faculty quality index highly 
correlated with invention disclosure 
Faculty quality 
Thursby & 
Thursby, (2007) 
Probability of 
Faculty Disclosure 
Faculty publication rates positively 
correlated with disclosure; engineering 
faculty more likely to disclose than 
bioscience; more research funding 
leads to more disclosures; industry 
funding has about 2X impact of federal  
TLO Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcomes Finding 
TLO engagement 
with faculty 
Siegel, et al. (2003) 
(Qualitative 
interviews) 
Licenses and 
revenues  
 
Engagement of TLO with faculty 
encourages disclosure rate, a critical 
input and strong positive influence for 
licensing activities and revenue  
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Licensing Activities & Licensing Revenues 
License agreements with industry are one of the primary outcomes from the university 
technology transfer process, and effectively transfer the commercialization rights of the IP to the 
industry partner, who is responsible for further development, marketing and selling the IP. One 
measure of success for this particular activity is royalty revenues received from licensees who are 
successful in commercializing university inventions. Several studies analyzing licensing efforts and 
licensing revenue as outcomes of the technology transfer process find the probability of licensing 
success depends upon various attributes of the university, the TLO, the inventor, and licensees of 
university intellectual property. Shifts in university policies can enhance the entrepreneurial culture of 
the university, positively influencing invention disclosure to the TLO (Powers & McDougall, 2005b), 
and increase the pool of inventions available for licensing (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). University 
characteristics related to licensing efforts of US universities include institutional characteristics such 
as public or private institutions, the presence of a medical school, levels of federal and industry 
research funding, university policies in support of academic entrepreneurship, revenue sharing 
percentages with inventors, and quality of faculty engaged in the technology transfer process. TLO 
characteristics that can influence licensing activities and revenues include the structure of the TLO, 
age and experience level, and business & commercialization capabilities. Findings from several 
studies on licensing efforts of universities provide a comprehensive picture of the various university, 
TLO, and regional characteristics that can influence licensing efforts of US universities.  
In a two equation recursive system, Friedman & Silberman (2003) find several characteristics 
that can factor into licensing activities and licensing revenues at a university, the most important 
being the number of invention disclosures in the technology transfer pipeline. Invention disclosures 
received for the three years prior show a strong positive influence upon licensing activity in 1999 
(Friedman & Silberman, 2003). This study includes institutional indicators for private versus public 
institutions, the presence of a medical school, and whether the institution is land grant; finding no 
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significant influence of these institutional characteristics on licensing activities or licensing revenues. 
University policies in support of academic entrepreneurship can have a direct impact on licensing 
activities: a higher royalty sharing percentage with an inventor‘s department is negatively related to 
the number of license agreements, while a higher royalty sharing percentage with inventors is 
positively related to licensing revenue (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). The study also finds older, 
more experienced TLOs are more likely to have higher rates of licensing and licensing revenues. 
Using a two-stage recursive OLS model, their method is unable to control for any nested interactions 
of these characteristics; suggesting a hierarchical modeling technique might be helpful in evaluating 
the different commercialization outcomes simultaneously. Use of ratios rather than both federal and 
industry funding measures which can be highly correlated with each other may help address any 
multicollinearity issues biasing results. 
Chukumba and Jensen, in their 2005 study, ―University Invention, Entrepreneurship and 
Start-ups,‖ evaluate characteristics related to inventor quality, the research environment of the 
university, and the environment of the TLO on the ability to license inventions to existing firms. 
Their study uses a negative binomial regression method, useful for data in count form with a high 
number of zeros and over dispersion, to examine characteristics and attributes of 110 universities. 
This study finds successful licensing is more likely with higher inventor quality, experienced TLOs, 
and inventions with lower costs of development (Chukumba & Jensen 2005). Indicators for the 
presence of a medical school and private institutions are not significant, while the percentage of 
industry funding of total research has a positive relationship with licensing activities. Chukumba & 
Jensen (2005) provide strong evidence that inventor quality, (as determined by NRC rankings) is 
positively related to success in licensing activity, particularly that of engineering faculty. The age of 
the TLO (as a proxy for experience and expertise) is strongly correlated with increased licensing 
activities, while the size of the TLO is not found to have significant influence. The numbers of 
disclosures received by the TLO and royalty income from previous successful licenses have a positive 
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influence with current licensing efforts, suggesting a large pipeline of invention disclosures and 
previous success in licensing university inventions create a positive entrepreneurial culture.  
Commercialization speed can also be a significant influence on successful licensing and 
royalty generation from academic technology transfer activities. Markman, Gianiodis, Phan and 
Balkin (2005a) in their study, ―Innovation Speed: Transferring University Technologies to Market,‖ 
find TLOs that are successful in quickly moving university inventions to commercialization have 
higher licensing revenues. Their study evaluates characteristics of 91 universities using speed of 
technology commercialization as a mediator to licensing revenues and new venture formation, 
focusing on the importance of faculty inventors, the degree of collaboration, and the competency of 
the TLO on the receipt of licensing revenues. Hierarchical linear regressions allow modeling to 
evaluate the mediating effects of time to commercialization, providing a mechanism to investigate 
commercialization speed as exogenous to technology transfer outcomes. University and TLO 
characteristics also include indicators for public institutions, the age and size of the TLO, and TLO 
structure. The study finds public universities generate less licensing revenues than private 
universities; and the size of the TLO has a positive influence on revenue generation, while no 
significance is found for TLO age (Markman, et al, 2005a). TLO structure, defined as either a) 
Traditional (an internal unit of the university), b) Non-profit (external to the university, such as a 
research foundation), or c) For-profit (with a venture arm focused upon startup creation), can also 
have an influence upon licensing activities and licensing revenues (Markman, et al, 2005a). 
Traditional TLO structures generate less revenue than non-profit or for-profit structures; however 
TLO structure is not significantly related to commercialization time in licensing. Determinants of 
commercialization time include collaboration complexity involved in the creation of the invention, 
TLO competencies (number of industry contacts to license), and faculty involvement. The study finds 
inventor-initiated licensing marginally reduces time to commercialization and the number of 
inventors from other universities contributing to an invention increases time to direct licensing 
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(Markman, et al, 2005a). Business skills within the TLO can have an impact upon commercialization 
speed, a lack of business competencies (# of contacts to license) increases commercialization time, 
which has a negative influence on licensing revenues. Early stage limitations posed by inventor-
related impediments such as resistance, indifference, and poor-quality disclosures increase time to 
commercialization, while later in the commercialization process the number of external inventors and  
lack of business competencies of the TLO significantly increases time to licensing (Markman, et al., 
2005a). These findings suggest time to commercialization is significantly related to technology 
transfer outcomes, with increased speed a strong positive influence on licensing revenues.  
University policies in support of the technology transfer function can interact with regional 
characteristics to influence licensing and licensing revenues. In their study, ―Policy Orientation 
Effects on Performance with Licensing to Startups and Small Companies,‖ Powers and McDougall 
(2005b) compare interactions of institutional policies and attributes with regional entrepreneurial 
density characteristics on licensing revenues and IPO events for 134 US universities from 1999-2000. 
A hierarchical moderated regression approach evaluates the potential influence and interactions 
between selectivity policies of the university oriented toward startup and small business licensing, 
support for the TLO, and regional entrepreneurial density on a variety of technology transfer 
outcomes. The hierarchical method allows the evaluation of university and TLO characteristics in 
their nested environments, and of any interactions between them. Statewide research & development 
activity, number of patents per state, venture capital investment levels, and SBIR & STTR grants 
provide measures for a combined regional entrepreneurial density characteristic, but findings indicate 
entrepreneurial density has little influence upon licensing revenues of the university. The potential 
interactions between startup selectivity policies and entrepreneurial density are not a significant 
influence on revenues; however the interaction of commercialization strategies oriented towards 
startups with large resource commitment to the TLO can have a negative influence on licensing 
revenues (Powers & McDougall, 2005b). The age of the TLO provides a proxy for licensing 
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experience; university characteristics include faculty quality measures (from the 1997 Gourman 
rankings of graduate programs), and the presence of a medical school. Faculty quality and the age of 
the TLO have a positive influence on licensing revenues, and the presence of a medical school is not 
significantly related to licensing revenues. Capturing regional entrepreneurial densities by state may 
overlook metropolitan areas that cross over state boundaries, utilizing metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) regional variables for entrepreneurial characteristics may be an appropriate alternative, as 
noted by the authors (Powers & McDougall, 2005b). This study finds a university‘s policy orientation 
for licensing and startup formation should be developed in consideration of regional entrepreneurial 
characteristics that may support technology transfer from the university. 
Licensing revenues received by universities are indicators of some level of success in the 
technology transfer process, as licensing income indicates the university invention has reached its 
commercial application. Characteristics of universities, TLOs and inventors that may have an 
influence upon licensing revenues are analyzed by Thursby & Thursby (2007), in their study, 
―University Licensing.‖ This study utilizes OLS regressions to evaluate relationships between 
university and TLO characteristics and the licensing revenues received for 148 universities in 2004. 
Characteristics include TLO age, the number of current licenses generating income, the size of the 
TLO, and research funding levels. Their study finds research funding levels have a strong significant 
relationship with licensing revenues, indicating larger research institutions may have greater success 
in licensing inventions. The number of TLO licensing personnel, and prior experience and success in 
licensing, measured via the number of licenses currently generating income all have a strong positive 
correlation on revenues received by the universities in 2004. The study logs all variables to control for 
non-linearity in the data, and OLS provides measures of strengths of relationships, without pointing to 
a causal influence.  
The impact of TLO licensing strategies, TLO structure and payment contracts with inventors, 
their departments and licensing personnel are analyzed for their influence on licensing revenues by 
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Markman, Bianiodis, and Phan (2009) in their study ―Supply-Side Innovation and Technology 
Commercialization,‖ for 128 US research universities from 1999-2002. This study utilizes a 
hierarchical regression method to model the university TLO as a supplier of innovation to industry, 
controlling for institutional characteristics, including the age and size of the TLO, indicators for 
public universities, faculty quality measures and the presence of a university affiliated incubator in 
the first stage of their hierarchical regression. Outcomes are log-transformed to control for non-
linearity in the data. Second stage regression includes characteristics of TLO licensing strategies 
(licensing for sponsored research versus licensing for cash), TLO structure (low versus high 
autonomy), and university incentive policies in the form of percentage sharing of revenues with 
inventors and their departments, and TLO salaries (Markman, et al., 2009). This study finds the size 
of the TLO and faculty quality are related to licensing revenues in the initial regression, with public 
universities generating less revenues than private universities. Both licensing for sponsored research 
and cash licensing are indicated as having a negative influence on licensing revenues, suggesting 
TLOs focused upon sponsored research or upfront cash licenses may under perform their peers in 
collecting revenues from licensing activities (Markman, et al., 2009). A focus upon cash licensing 
may reflect university administrative expectations of the TLO to become self-sustaining, but a 
predominant focus upon short-term funding may have a negative influence on overall revenue 
generation in comparison to a more balanced licensing strategy. TLO structural autonomy, 
categorized as low (constrained by centralized university policies) or high (decentralized, with 
freedom to negotiate terms based upon market dynamics) can influence revenues, with TLOs 
categorized as low autonomous structures having a negative influence upon revenues received from 
1999-2002, suggesting centralized university control over the TLO may deter the TLO from creative 
licensing efforts. Findings suggest licensing strategies of university TLO may benefit from a mixed 
approach for determining payments from licensees, and may benefit from less centralized control 
over the TLO. Findings for incentive policies for inventors suggest a negative influence between 
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percentage sharing with inventors and overall revenues, while payments to inventor departments have 
an overall positive influence on revenues. TLO salary levels of licensing professionals are not 
significantly related to licensing revenues. Larger TLOs and faculty quality are positively related with 
revenues, while public universities receive less revenue than private institutions (Markman, et al., 
2009). This study finds characteristics of the TLO in organizational structure and licensing strategies 
can have a strong influence upon licensing revenues received from the technology transfer process.  
Bulut and Moschini (2009) in their study ―US Universities‘ Net Returns from Patenting and 
Licensing: A Quantile Regression Analysis,‖ also evaluate returns, or net revenues received by 148 
universities from 1998-2002 from licensing efforts, evaluating basic institutional characteristics such 
as indicators for public/private institutions and the presence of a medical school, and levels of 
research expenditures. Data come from AUTM licensing surveys, calculating net revenues as 
royalties with deductions for external legal expenditures. This study uses OLS and quantile 
regressions on averages of all time varying variables to determine the influence of institutional 
characteristics on net revenues received from licensing activities. Indicators for private institutions 
and medical schools are interacted with each other to determine how the interaction of these two 
institutional characteristics might influence licensing revenues. Quantile regressions divide the 148 
institutions into six equal groups, and allows the estimation of the maximum revenues a university 
might gain at a given probability level. Institutional indicators are interacted with each other to create 
four institutional variables for analysis: public without a medical school, private without a medical 
school, public with a medical school, and private with a medical school; in addition to research size 
and faculty quality, measured as number of citations received by a department‘s faculty in 1993 
(Bulut & Moschini, 2009). This study finds private universities with a medical school have the 
highest levels of net revenues from technology licensing activities, significantly higher than a public 
institution without a medical school. The size of the institutions‘ research base also has a positive 
influence on net licensing revenues, significant for all universities except those in the lowest quantile. 
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The faculty quality measure (# of citations) is not significantly related to net licensing revenues. This 
latter study suggests private universities with a medical school and large research base are strong 
positive predictors of successful revenue generation from university licensing.  
Summary 
Findings vary for university and TLO characteristics, with some finding no differences 
between public & private universities in licensing activity, while some find private universities more 
successful than public at obtaining licensing revenues. Bulut and Moschini‘s (2009) study interacts 
private and medical school indicators, finding schools with both of these characteristics are more 
successful obtaining licensing revenues than public universities without a medical school. Research 
funding, both federal and industry positively influence licensing and licensing revenues (Thursby & 
Thursby, 2007; Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). Quality of faculty, measured 
by the NRC rankings of graduate programs, has a positive influence on licensing and licensing 
revenues (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005b; Markman, et al. 2009), while 
use of citations as a quality proxy for faculty is not significant (Bulut & Moschini, 2009). Controls for 
TLO size and prior licensing success are evaluated in several studies. Chukumba & Jensen (2005) 
find no influence of TLO size on licensing or revenues, potentially due to their use of gross royalties 
received as a measure of past success, which may have some correlation with TLO resources. 
Markman, et al., (2005a), Markman et al. (2009) and Thursby & Thursby (2007) all find a positive 
relationship between TLO size and licensing revenues received by the university.  
The organizational structure of the TLO and licensing strategies used by the TLO can have an 
influence upon licensing revenues received from the technology transfer process; TLOs focused upon 
primary licensing strategies for industry sponsored research or upfront cash may generate less 
licensing revenues than TLOs with more flexibility and creativity in licensing.  TLOs with low 
autonomy and centralized decision authority may have less flexibility in negotiating terms that could 
improve licensing revenues (Markman, et al., 2009).  Incentive structures and university policy 
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orientation can influence university licensing efforts and licensing royalties. Findings from various 
studies on royalty sharing with inventors and their departments are mixed. Friedman and Silberman 
(2003) find higher royalty sharing with inventors has a positive relationship with licenses completed 
and royalty revenues received in 1999, but higher royalty sharing rates with the inventor‘s 
departments are a negative influence upon licenses executed, suggesting higher revenue sharing with 
inventors may have a positive influence on individual entrepreneurship, but university departments 
may not view entrepreneurial activities as important to departmental goals. Markman, et al., (2009) 
have opposite findings on royalty sharing incentives; their study finds a higher royalty sharing 
percentage with inventors has a negative relationship with licensing revenues, while higher sharing 
percentages with an inventor‘s department has a positive relationship with licensing revenues 
received between 1999-2002. Findings from Markman, et al.‘s (2009) study suggests some 
universities may have implemented high royalty sharing policies with inventors and departmental 
support to incentivize disclosure and entrepreneurial activities, but may be lagging behind peer 
institutions. Friedman and Silberman‘s (2003) findings for 75 universities are limited to a single year 
of outcome data (1999), while Markman, et al.‘s (2009) study has a larger sample (128 universities), 
and uses averaged licensing revenues received over four years, reducing any potential anomalies in 
data that might bias results. Increasing quality of academic faculty through hiring practices, 
expanding federal research activities, encouraging industry funded research, and enhancing the 
commercialization expertise of the TLO through hiring experienced licensing professionals may have 
a positive impact on general licensing practices of the university. Findings from these studies are 
summarized in table 2.3 below. 
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Table 2.3 Characteristics Influencing Licensing and Licensing Revenues 
University Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Private & Land 
grant 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
Licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
No significant influence on licensing or 
licensing revenues 
Private 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
No significance on licensing activity 
Public 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Public universities generate less revenue 
than private  
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues  
(1999-2002) 
Public universities generate less 
revenues than private 
Private/Medical 
Bulut & 
Moschini, (2009) 
Net revenues 
Private universities with a medical 
school obtain significantly higher 
returns than public universities without a 
medical school 
Medical 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
Presence of medical school has no 
significant influence on licensing 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
Licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
No significant influence on licensing or 
licensing revenues 
University size 
Thursby & 
Kemp, (2002) 
Licenses  
Smallest and largest universities are 
more efficient in licensing efforts than 
mid-size universities 
Federal research 
funding 
Thursby & 
Thursby (2007) 
Licensing revenue 
 
Higher research levels has a positive 
influence upon licensing income 
Bulut & 
Moschini, (2009) 
Net revenues 
Research funding (univ. size) has strong 
influence on licensing revenues, 
significant for all universities except 
those in smallest (0.10th) quintile 
Industry funding 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
% of industry funding has a positive 
influence on licensing  
Entrepreneurial 
policy orientation 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average revenues 
(99-00) 
Universities focused upon licensing to 
startups combined with large TLOs may 
receive less revenues 
Incentive policies 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
Licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
Higher royalty sharing % with 
inventor‘s department has a negative 
influence upon licenses, royalty sharing 
% with inventor has a positive 
relationship with license revenues  
Markman, et al. 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002),  
Inventor royalty % has negative 
correlation with licensing revenues, 
while department % has positive 
correlation with licensing revenues. 
  
 37 
Table 2.3 (continued) 
Faculty quality 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
NRC faculty quality rankings positively 
related to licensing 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average revenues 
(99-00) 
Faculty quality strong influence for 
royalty income 
Markman, et al. 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002) 
Quality of faculty (1995 NRC survey of 
graduate faculty) significant for 
licensing revenues 
Bulut & 
Moschini, (2009) 
Net revenues 
Faculty quality (log of citations) not 
significantly correlated with net 
licensing revenues 
Faculty 
involvement in 
TT process 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Faculty may increase time via inventor-
related resistance, indifference, and 
poor-quality disclosures 
TLO Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Age of TLO 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
Age of TLO strongly correlated with 
increased licensing activities 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
Experienced TLOs more likely to have 
higher rates of licensing & licensing 
revenues. 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average revenues 
(99-00) 
Age of TLO has positive influence on 
royalty revenues 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
TLO experience (age) not significantly 
related to revenue generation. 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002) 
Age of TLO not significant for revenues 
Prior experience 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
Royalty income from previous licenses 
positively correlated with licensing 
Thursby & 
Thursby, (2007) 
Licensing revenue 
 
Prior licensing success (# of licenses 
generating income) has a positive 
influence upon licensing revenues 
Disclosures 
received by TLO 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
Licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
Higher levels of invention disclosures 
are critical for licensing. 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
# Disclosures received is a strong 
positive influence on licensing activities 
TLO Size 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of licenses  
(1993-2002) 
TLO size not significant for licensing 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Larger TLOs have positive influence on 
revenues, and reduce time to license 
Thursby & 
Thursby, (2007) 
Licensing revenue Larger TLOs generate more revenues 
Markman, et al. 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002) 
Larger TLOs more successful with 
licensing revenues 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Business skills 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Lack of business competencies (# of 
contacts to license) increases 
commercialization time, negative 
influence on licensing revenues 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002) 
Higher TLO staff salaries has no 
significant influence on revenues 
TLO Structure 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Traditional structure has a negative 
relationship with revenues 
Markman, 
Gianiodis & 
Phan, (2009) 
Average annual 
licensing revenues 
(1999-2002) 
Low autonomy of the TLO has a 
negative correlation with revenues 
Regional Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Regional industry 
R&D 
Friedman & 
Silberman, 
(2003) 
licenses, licensing 
revenue in 1999 
Technology industry R&D – higher 
concentration has a positive influence on 
licenses, use of equity and startups. 
Bulut & 
Moschini, (2009) 
Net revenues 
Regional R&D intensity facilitates 
revenues for universities already 
actively engaged in TT 
 
Startups, IPO Events & Use of Equity 
A variety of university and TLO characteristics are found to support university startup 
formation and the use of equity as a licensing mechanism. TLO experience (age), the university‘s 
policies and orientation towards startup formation and use of equity, the size and commercialization 
skills of the TLO, faculty quality, levels of industry sponsored research at the university, regional 
entrepreneurial density, industry R&D, and access to venture capital are all implicated as factors that 
influence the technology transfer process and support startup formation from the university. 
University and TLO history and prior success with startup activity and use of equity can have a strong 
positive influence on subsequent startup efforts (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; 
Jensen & Jones, 2011). Taking equity in startups or small companies in the form of stocks, options or 
warrants is one growing mechanism utilized by research universities in licensing inventions to 
startups (Brown & Soderstrom, 2007), in lieu of upfront cash payments for licensing fees or in 
exchange for delay of costs related to IP reimbursement. Unlike established firms, startups may lack 
 39 
cash flow and the ability to pay upfront fees for intellectual property licenses. University support in 
taking equity from a licensing deal reduces cash outlay for the startup in the short run and facilitates 
investment in development of IP for commercialization (Feldman, et al, 2002). Equity allows the 
university to benefit when the startup successfully reaches an IPO or other liquidity event, providing 
something of value even if the initially licensed intellectual property is dropped (Bray & Lee, 2000; 
Feldman, et al., 2002). Findings from a range of studies on these characteristics provide insight on 
their overall influence on startup formation, the success of startups and small business becoming a 
publicly traded company and reaching an IPO event and university use of equity as a licensing 
mechanism. 
Income received from licenses and university startups are determined by initial terms and 
conditions of licensing agreements. Short term licensing considerations include cash licensing, 
upfront licensing costs, reimbursement of IP costs, and defined royalty streams; while long term 
considerations can include equity ownership and proportions of asset sales. Accepting a combination 
of short and long term financial considerations from a licensee allows the university to realize the full 
potential of its initial investment in the innovations (Bray & Lee, 2000). A financial comparative 
analysis method used in a 2000 study, ―University Revenues from Technology Transfer: Licensing 
Fees versus Equity Positions,‖ compares financial outcomes from equity sales from university 
startups to revenue streams from average royalty bearing licenses, evaluating prevailing attitudes of 
10 US research universities regarding the use of equity in licensing to startups (Bray & Lee, 2000). 
Average equity income from these 10 universities is compared to the average licensing income 
reported to the AUTM Annual Licensing Survey in 1996. The study finds some defining 
characteristics of universities utilizing equity in licensing. These universities are larger and more 
established, have larger TLOs, higher royalty income levels, and have a large number of invention 
disclosures to the TLO each year. The equity sales from these universities in occurred in states with 
high venture capital availability, suggesting a relationship may exist between these variables; the 
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regional availability of venture capital may act as a moderator to a small company‘s access to 
investment and its long term success (Bray & Lee, 2000). Typically, equity taken by a university in a 
licensee/startup is worth little until the company can gain investment and move the product or service 
towards the commercial market, combining equity with other licensing mechanisms can maximize the 
financial return available to research universities over the long term, and may even produce income 
faster than a license without equity (Bray & Lee, 2000). The universities comprising this study are 
larger research universities, not necessarily representative of all US research universities, but their 
findings indicate use of equity in licensing to startups in combinations with other mechanisms may 
have a positive influence on long run revenues for the university. The correlation between venture 
capital availability and large equity sales can benefit from further analysis to determine the influence 
this regional characteristic may have on the use of equity by universities.  Feldman, et al., (2002) 
analyze equity use by 62 universities in 1998, modeled as a function of TLO age, cumulative 
licensing efforts, industry sponsored research, budgetary structure of the TLO, and relative experience 
in their study, ―Equity and the Technology Transfer Strategies of American Research Universities.‖ 
The existence of a medical school, private universities, and the Carnegie classification for research 
intensity provide institutional controls (Feldman, et al., 2002). This study finds prior history and 
experience in licensing, the presence of a medical school, and higher levels of industry funding have 
positive relationships with a TLO‘s use of equity. A non-linear relationship appears with cumulative 
licensing: equity use increases with TLO experience, but decreases with TLOs who have higher 
licensing levels (Feldman, et al., 2002). This divergence suggests a university with higher licensing 
activity may be focused on increasing revenues in the shorter term, and may be locked into direct 
licensing to industry rather than supporting startups. Self-funded TLO‘s are less likely to utilize 
equity in licensing in Feldman, et al.‘s (2002) study, possibly due to a short-term focus on guaranteed 
revenues.  Universities with research levels in the lower ranges ($15-40 million) and those institutions 
catching up to peers in technology transfer are also more likely to utilize equity in their licensing 
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deals in this study (Feldman, et al., 2002), suggesting smaller universities and relative newcomers to 
the field may be more willing to be creative in licensing to university startups. The changing 
perception on use of equity in licensing to startups is driven by increased TLO experience with this 
licensing mechanism, and the increased prestige and legitimacy of university startups across the US 
(Feldman, et al., 2002). This study is limited by its data collected at a single point in time on equity 
use by universities. Startup creation and subsequently the use of equity may vary each year; data from 
multiple years can help determine if the influence of these characteristics holds over time, but would 
require mechanisms to control for serial correlations and unobserved institutional effects. Endogenous 
or unobserved variables of the institution or region may also have an impact upon the university‘s use 
of equity. 
Previous history and tradition of working with university startups has a strong positive 
influence on subsequent startup formation as well as use of equity in licensing. O‘Shea, Allen, 
Chevalier and Roche (2005) studied 141 universities over a six year period (1995-2001) in their study 
―Entrepreneurial Orientation, Technology Transfer and Spinoff Performance of US Universities‖ to 
identify university characteristics and capabilities that can help explain variation in startup formation 
across universities. The annual number of startups is modeled in their study as a function of historical, 
human capital, financial and commercial characteristics, using a negative binomial model for count 
data with a high number of zeros that create skewness and over dispersion in the data. Random effects 
provided additional controls in their model for any unobserved heterogeneity in repeated measures 
over time. Previous experience working with startups, measured as the average number of startups 
formed from 14 years‘ previous history, has a significant positive relationship with startup activity for 
the six years included in this study (O‘Shea, et al., 2005), suggesting universities who have 
successfully worked with startups in the past will continue to have higher rates of startup formation. 
High research levels in science, engineering, faculty quality measures, and the size of the TLO all 
positively influence a research university‘s ability to form startups, and a relatively high percentage of 
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industry research funding also facilitates startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 2005). Institutional 
controls, including indicators for public and land grant universities, the presence of a medical school, 
and the size of the university endowment do not have a significant influence upon startup formation 
in this study. Findings indicate regional knowledge infrastructure does not have a strong influence 
upon startup formation for the universities in their sample. Friedman & Silberman, (2003) include 
estimated invention disclosures in their models for startups and use of equity by 93 research 
universities from 1997 to 1999. University characteristics in their model include: private versus 
public institutions, the presence of a medical school, whether the institution is land grant, the age of 
the TLO, and incentive policies for inventors and their departments. The age of the TLO, and the 
regional measure of technology industry concentration are positively correlated with startup 
formation (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), suggesting experience of the TLO and ability to engage 
with regional business networks may have a positive influence on startup activity. The number of 
invention disclosures, as well as the experience levels (age) of the TLO, and the regional measure of 
technology industry concentration are strongly correlated with a university‘s use of equity (Friedman 
& Silberman, 2003), suggesting the TLOs experience and ability to engage with faculty to drive 
increased disclosure activity and network with regional partners may have a positive influence on 
equity use in licensing to university startups. The study controls for non-linearity of the data in the 
recursive model by logging all variables. There is a relatively high correlation among faculty quality, 
federal research, and industry research variables, suggesting there may be multicollinearity and 
endogeneity issues making causal determinations difficult (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). Using a 
ratio of industry to federal funding might help to address some multicollinearity in the model with 
both funding variables.  
Policies on formal incentives to academic researchers and their departments in royalty 
sharing distributions and salary levels of TLO staff have an influence on startup formation and use of 
equity, and may incentivize entrepreneurial efforts of faculty and create an entrepreneurial culture 
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that embraces technology commercialization. DiGregorio and Shane (2003) evaluate university 
policies on taking equity in exchange for intellectual property and licensing costs in their study, ―Why 
do some Universities Generate more Start-Ups than Others?,‖ finding the proportion of industry 
funded university research, the university‘s intellectual eminence, and royalty sharing policies with 
inventors all factor into the formation of university startups and use of equity. Comparing cross-
institutional variation in licensing policies across 116 universities from 1994-1998, this study finds 
willingness to use equity in licensing has a positive influence on startup formation. A low royalty 
sharing rate for faculty inventors is positively correlated with startup formation, possibly 
incentivizing entrepreneurial efforts of inventors for increased monetary gain (DiGregorio & Shane, 
2003). Findings indicate a higher percentage of industry research funding is not significantly related 
to startup formation between 1994 and 1998. Regional venture capital availability and a university 
affiliated incubator also have little influence upon startup formation. The non-linearity of the count 
data with clustering around a few small numbers and a high number of zeros indicated use of a 
negative binomial regression model as the best fit, using generalized estimating equations (GEE) to 
control for autocorrelation from unobserved factors in repeated measures over time. A linear model 
with mechanisms to control for serial correlation between repeated measures may be an alternative, 
transforming count data via logs to normalize the dependent variables. Other forms of investment or 
regional support to university startups may be important in early stages of technology 
commercialization efforts, and their influence upon startup formation and use of equity by 
universities may benefit from further exploration. Smilor and Matthews‘ (2004) case study identifies 
three key factors influencing startup formation and use of equity: 1) strong cultural support from 
university leadership, 2) unequivocal support and resource commitment for the TLO function within 
the university, and 3) incentive systems designed to support entrepreneurial faculty. This 
benchmarking study finds universities generally willing to use equity in licensing but with certain 
caveats. This study also notes the dual focus of the university TLO; supporting the formation of 
 44 
startups as well as marketing and negotiating licensing agreements with industry. These two very 
different activities requiring appropriate skill set alignment within the TLO, indicating the 
commercialization skills within the TLO may also have an influence on startup formation and use of 
equity.  In their study, ―Entrepreneurship from the Ivory Tower: Do Incentive Systems Matter?,‖ 
Markman, Gianiodis, Phan & Balkin, (2004) evaluate academic incentive systems in the form of 
monetary payments to inventors, their department or institution, and salary levels of university 
technology licensing office personnel for their influence on use of equity and startup formation at 128 
US research universities during 1999. This study finds incentive policies can ―reinforce goal 
symmetry between technology commercialization and entrepreneurial activity‖ (Markman, Gianiodis, 
Phan, & Balkin, 2004, p. 354). Findings indicate monetary incentives for inventors are negatively 
related to the number startups and equity licenses, while salary compensation levels for TLO 
personnel (as a proxy measure of quality commercialization skills) are positively related to both the 
number of licenses using equity and startup formation (Markman, et al., 2004). The findings from this 
study suggest higher incentives to faculty for revenue sharing may have a negative influence upon 
startup formation by reducing the risk of staying within the academic environment (Markman, et al., 
2004). Salaries of TLO personnel are used as a proxy for high quality and commercialization skills of 
the licensing staff, suggesting those TLOs with higher salary levels may be able to retain individuals 
who have commercialization skills and ability to work with entrepreneurial faculty and facilitate 
startups. Hierarchical regression methodology works well for measuring outcomes from activities 
nested in universities and technology regions. Logarithmic transformations for variables controlled 
for any potential issues of non-linearity, non-normality or heteroscedasticity. Findings suggest the 
presence of a medical school has a positive influence on startup formation, but not equity licensing. 
The level of research funding is a significant and positive predictor for both startups and use of 
equity. A negative relationship between the age of the TLO and both startup formation and use of 
equity suggests those who have more experience with direct licensing may be locked in to those 
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activities due to path dependency and focus upon short-term monetary gains (Markman, et al., 2004). 
This finding could also reflective of a single year‘s data for the 128 institutions, as university 
outcomes and relative productivity can fluctuate yearly; a finding noted by Kim‘s (2013) review of 
productivity changes in university technology transfer outcomes. A larger panel study or additional 
year‘s data averaged over time may be beneficial to see if the relationships between these incentive 
payment structures for faculty, their departments, and TLO personnel on startups and use of equity 
continue to hold.    
Regional characteristics such as the availability of regional venture capital, local industry 
research and development, and entrepreneurial activities can also have an influence upon university 
technology commercialization efforts. Several studies suggest these regional characteristics may 
interact with institutional characteristics including faculty size and quality, TLO age, and industry 
research funding levels to influence academic startup formation. Powers and McDougall (2005a), 
evaluate startup formation and IPO events from university licensees for 120 research intensive and 
extensive institutions in their study, ―University Start-Up Formation and Technology Licensing with 
Firms that go Public: A Resource Based View of Academic Entrepreneurship,‖ evaluating university 
and regional characteristics and their influence upon entrepreneurial activities. This study totals data 
over 5 years, from 1996 to 2000, using a negative binomial model for count data. Findings indicate 
larger universities in terms of higher faculty levels are able to facilitate more startups, but aren‘t 
necessarily related to IPO events. Faculty quality is recognized as a strong positive predictor of both 
startups and IPO events.  The age of the TLO, the level of industry research funding at the university, 
and the level of regional venture capital availability also all have a positive influence upon both 
startup formation and successful IPO events (Powers & McDougall 2005a). Endowment size of the 
university (a measure of wealth of the institution) is positively related to IPO events from university 
licensees in this study, but not startups; and the study finds the importance of the patent portfolio of 
the university to have little influence on startups or IPO events. Chukumba and Jensen (2005), in their 
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study ―University Invention, Entrepreneurship and Start-ups,‖ also evaluate regional financial market 
characteristics in addition to institutional characteristics such as private institutions, the presence of a 
medical school, faculty quality, age of the TLO, invention disclosure receipt, and industry funding 
levels for their influence on startup formation. Specific attributes of 110 universities are evaluated 
using a negative binomial regression for over dispersed count data. Inventor quality, experienced 
TLOs, prior invention disclosures and gross royalties are all positively correlated with startup 
formation (Chukumba & Jensen 2005), suggesting prior experience and success in technology 
transfer activities in general have a positive influence on a university‘s entrepreneurial activities. The 
size of the TLO is not significant for startup formation. Findings for regional financial market 
characteristics indicate venture capital funding in each state has a moderately positive influence on 
startup formation. The five year average return on investment (ROI) has a negative relationship with 
university startup formation, suggesting when returns to investment are high, venture capital investors 
may turn to more lucrative activities (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). The ratio of industry to federal 
research funding is strongly correlated with startups, suggesting industry sponsored research has a 
positive influence on startup formation, while no difference is indicated for private institutions and 
medical schools. The findings from these studies suggest attributes under the control of the institution 
such as supporting industry sponsored research, hiring and supporting quality faculty, and enhancing 
the commercialization expertise of the TLO through training or hiring experienced licensing 
professionals who can leverage regional investment sources and other business resources may have a 
positive influence on startup formation.  
University policies oriented toward startup formation and support of faculty entrepreneurial 
efforts may interact with regional characteristics to influence university startups. Powers and 
McDougall (2005b) compare differing institutional policies and attributes from 134 universities for 
their influence on successful IPO events of university licensees from 1996-2000, and how university 
entrepreneurial policies may interact with regional entrepreneurial characteristics. A hierarchical 
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moderated regression provides a mechanism to evaluate potential interactions between selectivity 
policies of the university, university support for the TLO, and regional entrepreneurial density; 
variables are averaged or logged to address normality issues and yearly fluctuations. This study finds 
universities oriented towards startups have higher levels of university startups or small businesses 
reaching successful IPO events than universities with less selective policies (Powers & McDougall 
2005b). The level of statewide R&D activity, number of patents per state, the venture capital 
investment levels per state, and the number of SBIR & STTR grants provide measures for 
entrepreneurial density, each expressed as a proportion of the square mileage of each state. Regional 
entrepreneurial density has a positive relationship with IPO events for university licensees; however 
interactions between university selectivity policies and entrepreneurial density do not have a 
significant influence. University policies with strong orientation towards startups and larger TLOs in 
a strong regional entrepreneurial environment may be an overinvestment of scarce university 
resources, while university policies with low orientation towards startups, and smaller TLO support in 
weak entrepreneurial regions may represent an underinvestment for institutions trying to establish 
themselves as entrepreneurial universities (Powers & McDougall, 2005b). Control variables include 
the age of the TLO as a proxy for experience levels of the TLO, faculty quality, and a medical school. 
Faculty quality is strongly significant, and the age of the TLO moderately significant for IPO events. 
The proxy variables for TLO support and selectivity policies are rough measures for university 
entrepreneurial support, and may benefit from alternative measures (perhaps total TLO operating 
budget and total IP budget) for institutional TLO support measures.  
Structural characteristics and licensing strategies of the TLO are additional characteristics 
identified as influencing university startup formation and use of equity. Markman, Phan, Balkin, & 
Gianiodis (2005b) in their study: ―Entrepreneurship and University-Based Technology Transfer,‖ use 
grounded theory to analyze qualitative data collected from long interviews with 128 university TLO 
directors to analyze the influence of TLO structure and licensing strategies on startups and use of 
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equity, and how they may be related. TLO structure is categorized in three groups: 1) the traditional 
structure is considered an integral part of the university, typically organized under and funded by the 
office of research, 2) a non-profit structure is separate from the university organized as a 501(C)3 
research foundation, and 3) a for-profit structure can be either part of the university or part of a 
separate entity, but has a private venture extension focused upon creating startups from the university 
(Markman, et al., 2005b). Licensing strategies include licensing for sponsored research, cash, and 
equity. These characteristics are correlated with each other to evaluate how they might influence each 
other and the formation of university startups. Previous startups (1998-2001) and the presence of a 
university incubator are included in the correlation matrix. Findings suggest the traditional TLO 
structure has no significant correlation with startup activity, but may be likely to license university 
inventions for sponsored research or an equity portion. The non-profit structure indicates no 
correlation with either startup activity or use of equity, and is less likely to license for sponsored 
research, with no significant correlation with either cash or equity licensing. Findings for the for-
profit structure indicate this TLO structure is strongly positively correlated with both startups and use 
of equity in licensing, but a negative correlation with cash licensing suggesting this structure may be 
strategically focused on startup formation (Markman, et al., 2005b). TLO licensing strategies also 
have an influence upon startup formation; sponsored research has a strong negative correlation with 
prior startup activity, and cash licensing has a negative correlation with current startup activity. 
Licensing for equity has strong positive correlations with both current and past startup activity.  These 
findings indicate the structure of the TLO and its licensing strategies can strongly influence 
technology transfer outcomes, and university TLOs may benefit from using a variety of licensing 
strategies to meet needs of the inventor and the startup or licensee. Furthering this initial analysis, 
Markman, Bianiodis, and Phan (2009) evaluate the impact of TLO licensing strategies, TLO 
structure, including incentive payment policies with inventors and their departments, and TLO 
licensing personnel salaries, on startup formation from these 128 universities, using a 2 stage 
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hierarchical regression to model startup formation from 1998-2001, controlling for institutional 
characteristics, the age and size of the TLO, faculty quality measures and the presence of a university 
affiliated incubator. This study finds both TLO age and TLO size are positively related to startup 
formation, as well as faculty quality and the presence of an incubator; no significant difference is 
indicated for public institutions. Second stage regression includes characteristics of TLO licensing 
strategies (licensing for sponsored research versus licensing for cash), TLO structure (the three 
structures used previously collapsed into two contrast codes for low versus high autonomy), and 
university incentive policies in the form of percentage sharing of revenues with inventors and their 
departments, and TLO salaries (Markman, et al., 2009). Licensing strategies (for sponsored research 
and cash) show no significant influence upon startup formation. High TLO structural autonomy is 
found to have a positive influence upon startup formation. Findings for incentive royalty sharing 
policies for inventors indicate a negative relationship between percentage sharing with inventors and 
startup formation, with no significance for payments to inventor departments. TLO salary levels are 
significantly related to startup formation, suggesting high salaried licensing professionals may have a 
combination of competencies (technical aptitude, knowledge of IP law, negotiating, business planning 
capabilities and networks, and industry knowledge) that support successful startup formation 
(Markman, et al., 2009). A shorter time to commercialization can support successful startup efforts 
from academic technology transfer activities. Markman, Gianiodis, Phan and Balkin (2005a), in their 
study, ―Innovation Speed: Transferring University Technologies to Market,‖ find longer 
commercialization time is negatively related to new venture creation. Other characteristics evaluated 
in this study include TLO age and size, whether the university is a public institution, and the structure 
of the TLO. Findings for TLO structure (traditional, non-profit and for-profit), suggest the traditional 
TLO structure has a positive relationship with startup formation, but may take longer to form the 
startup when compared to the non-profit structure. For-profit TLO structure is not significantly 
related to startup formation, but is strongly correlated with a shorter time to startup formation than the 
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non-profit structure (Markman, et al., 2005a). TLO age and size are both positively related to startup 
formation, and TLO experience can shorten time to startup formation. A lack of commercialization 
competencies of the TLO can significantly increase time to startup formation. The findings from this 
analysis suggest time to commercialization for startups is shorter for larger, more experienced TLOs 
under a for-profit organizational structure. These studies on TLO structural characteristics and 
licensing strategies support previous findings on university characteristic and incentive structures, and 
provide additional evaluation of TLO organizational structural influence on entrepreneurial efforts of 
the university. 
Entrepreneurial activities of academic faculty may be more likely to happen during difficult 
economic times when potential risks are reduced relative to direct licensing activities. A 2011 study 
―University Startups and Entrepreneurship: New Data, New Results,‖ by Jensen and Jones (2011) 
analyzes how university, TLO, and regional characteristics affect university entrepreneurial activities 
before and after the NASDAQ stock market crash in 2000. Data is evaluated on startup activity for all 
universities that reported to AUTM from 1994 to 2008, modeled as a function of university, 
departmental and economic characteristics. A negative binomial method is applied to the count of 
startups each year. A random effects method allows the exploitation of an unbalanced panel from 
several years of observations for the units of observations. This study evaluates several institutional 
and TLO characteristics, including indicators for private and land-grant institutions, federal and 
industry research funding levels, TLO age and size, a measure of historical disclosures to the TLO, 
quality measures for faculty, and prior startup formation efforts. Disclosures received by the TLO 
have a positive relationship with startup activity, confirming the importance of this critical input as 
―the lifeblood of startups‖ (Jensen & Jones, 2011, p. 13). The size of engineering and physical science 
faculty and the quality of biological faculty have a positive influence upon startup formation. 
Research funding level has a positive influence on startup formation, with significance of federal 
funding levels increasing after 2001; industry research funding also has strong impact. TLO age and 
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size also have a strong positive influence, and if a TLO has had experience working with a startup in 
the past they are more likely to work with startups in the future. Faculty quality, particularly of 
engineering and biological sciences, has increased in importance after 2000 for startup formation.  
Findings indicate that after the dot-com collapse in 2000, characteristics of universities and TLOs 
influencing startup activity have changed, suggesting a need for continued evaluation of how 
university startups are formed in changing economic environments.   
Summary 
Institutional characteristics are commonly used to control for type and size of an institution in 
these research studies, but findings from several studies indicate various institutional factors can have 
an influence on startup formation from US research universities. Private universities are not 
necessarily better at startup formation than public (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Markman, et al., 
2009), but may be able to move more quickly to startup formation (Markman, et al., 2005a). A recent 
study by Jensen & Jones (2011), finds private & land-grant universities are less likely to form startups 
than public institutions. The presence of a medical school also has mixed results, some find the 
presence of a medical school can positively influence startup formation (Markman, et al., 2004), 
while others find this school has little influence upon startup formation (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; 
Jensen & Jones, 2011). Feldman, et al., (2002) find the presence of a medical school has a positive 
relationship with the use of equity in licensing, while Markman, et al., (2004) find no significance for 
the presence of a medical school on use of equity. Endowment of the university, as an indicator of a 
university‘s wealth can have a positive influence on startup formation (Powers & McDougall, 2005a).  
Disclosures are driven by research funding (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), and the number of 
disclosures received by the TLO have a significant relationship with university startup formation and 
use of equity. Studies find TLOs with a high number of disclosures are more likely to use equity, 
(Bray & Lee, 2000; Friedman & Silberman, 2003). A large number of disclosures in the technology 
transfer pipeline are critical for startup formation; findings from two studies note the number of 
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disclosures received by the TLO is a significant predictor for university startup formation (Chukumba 
& Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011).  
Federal and industry research funding levels of universities can have a significant influence 
upon startup formation and use of equity in licensing, however findings differ among studies. Larger 
research universities are more likely to form startups and utilize equity with startups, (Bray & Lee, 
2000; Markman et. al., 2004; Jensen & Jones, 2011), particularly with high levels of research funding 
in science and engineering (O‘Shea, et al., 2005). Feldman, et al., (2002) find universities federal 
funding levels in the $15-40 million range and higher levels of industry funded research are more 
likely to use equity. Universities considered lagging in technology transfer also use equity more than 
those universities already actively engaged in technology transfer efforts (Feldman, et al., 2002), 
which may help to explain why smaller research institutions may be more likely to use equity than 
larger. Several studies find the levels of industry funding at a university can have a strong positive 
influence upon a university‘s ability to form startup companies (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Chukumba & 
Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011), and their success in reaching an IPO event (Powers & 
McDougall, 2005a). DiGregorio & Shane (2003) find a higher percentage of industry research 
funding does not have a significant influence on startups, potentially due to a lagged effect.   
The entrepreneurial policy orientation of the university has an influence on startup formation, 
with several finding a low royalty sharing rate with university inventors has a positive influence on 
startups and use of equity (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; Markman, et al., 2004; Markman, et al., 
2009), potentially stimulating entrepreneurial activity of faculty for increased monetary gains. Strong 
support from university leadership can have a positive influence on startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 
2005), and university policies oriented towards startup formation are a positive influence on both 
startup formation and successful IPO events for university licensees. These university policies may be 
adjusted to reflect the university‘s entrepreneurial environment (Powers & McDougall, 2005b).  
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Faculty quality is a strong influence upon startups, IPO events, and use of equity (DiGregorio 
& Shane, 2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; 
Powers & McDougall, 2005b; Markman et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Faculty size is 
moderately related to startup formation, (Powers & McDougall, 2005a), the numbers of bioscience 
faculty more so since 2002 (Jensen & Jones, 2011). Faculty engagement in the technology transfer 
process is critical to startup formation and can speed up the process, while the number of inventors 
from different universities can increase the amount of time before a startup forms (Markman, et al., 
2005a). 
The age of the TLO is positively correlated with startup activity, IPO events, and use of 
equity in licensing, suggesting older TLOs may be more experienced and willing to work with 
entrepreneurial faculty, or that faculty may be better informed of entrepreneurial options by the TLO 
(Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Powers & 
McDougall, 2005b; Markman, et al., 2005a; Markman et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Studies 
find different relationships exist between the age of the TLO and equity use, experienced TLOs 
utilize equity more than others (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), but less so with cumulative licensing 
efforts (Feldman, et al., 2002); while another study finds a negative relationship between equity use 
and age of the TLO (Markman, et al., 2004), suggesting TLOs with more experience in direct 
licensing may be locked in to that activity due to path dependency & focus on short-term gains. 
Previous success and experience of the TLO in licensing activities, startup formation and use of 
equity matter, positively influencing subsequent activities (Feldman, et al., 2002; DiGregorio & 
Shane, 2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005;Chukumba & Jensen 2005; Markman, et al., 2005b; Jensen & 
Jones, 2011).  
A lack of commercialization capabilities of the TLO is implicated as a possible impediment 
to startup formation (Markman, et al., 2005a), suggesting increased commercialization training or 
hiring skilled licensing professionals in the TLO may minimize time in finding business contacts for 
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licensing or startup formation. Smilor and Mathews (2004), in their qualitative analysis also find the 
duality of the TLO function (licensing and startup activity) require appropriate skills to facilitate both 
types of commercialization paths, different for licensing directly to industry than working with 
startups. Higher compensation levels of TLO licensing staff is also positively correlated with use of 
equity and startup formation, compensation packages used as a proxy for advanced commercialization 
skills (Markman, et al., 2004; Markman, et al., 2009). These findings suggest highly skilled licensing 
professionals able to command higher salaries may support university startup efforts more effectively 
than those less able to command higher salary levels.  
Various structures of the TLO can also influence university startup formation. Feldman, et al., 
(2002) find self-sustaining TLOs are less likely to use equity as a licensing mechanism due to a short-
term focus on revenue generation needed for operations. Three organizational structures of the TLO 
are analyzed by Markman, et al., (2005a, 2005b) for their influence on startup formation and use of 
equity: 1) a traditional structure of the TLO as an integral part of the university, 2) a non-profit 
structure, separate from the university, commonly organized as a 501(C)3 research foundation, and 3) 
a for-profit structure that has a private venture extension focused upon creating startups from the 
university (Markman, et al., 2005a; Markman, et al., 2005b). Findings from these studies indicate the 
traditional structure of the TLO takes longer to startup formation, but may be willing to utilize equity 
in licensing; and a for-profit TLO structure is significantly and positively related to both startup 
formation and use of equity, is able to form startups more quickly when compared to the non-profit 
TLO structure. Markman, et al. (2009), find high TLO autonomy has a positive influence on startup 
formation, due to increased flexibility in licensing and ability to leverage external resources in 
support of entrepreneurial efforts. Licensing strategies of the TLO focused upon obtaining sponsored 
research funding or cash payments from licensees have a negative correlation with startup formation, 
while licensing for equity can have a positive influence on the formation of startups from a research 
university (Markman, et al., 2005b).  
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Regional characteristics can also influence startup formation from universities. A high 
concentration of industry research and development in the region has a positive relationship with 
startup formation (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), as does financial resource availability, access to 
venture capital, and entrepreneurial density (Bray & Lee, 2000; DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; Powers 
& McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005b). The presence of a 
university affiliated incubator is positively related to startup formation (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003, 
O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Markman, et al., 2009). These findings are summarized in table 2.4 below. 
 
Table 2.4 Characteristics Influencing Startup Formation, IPO Events & Equity Use 
University Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Private 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
No significance on startup activity 
Public 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
# of startups  
(2000 & 2002) 
Public universities time to startups 
formation longer than private  
Markman et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Public universities not significant for 
startup formation   
Private/land grant 
Jensen & Jones 
(2011) 
# Startups 1994-2008 
Private & land grant universities are 
less likely to form startups 
Medical 
Feldman, et al., 
(2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Presence of a medical school 
positively correlated with use of equity 
in licensing 
Markman et al., 
(2004) 
(1999)  
# equity licenses, & 
# startups 
Presence of a medical school has 
positive influence upon startup 
formation, but not equity licensing 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
 # of startups   
(1993-2002) 
Presence of medical school has no 
significant influence on startup 
formation  
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
Startups 1994-2008 
No significance for presence of 
medical school 
Endowment 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
Endowment of universities levels have 
positive influence on IPO events 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Federal research 
funding 
Bray & Lee, 
(2000) 
Use and value of 
equity (equity sale 
compared to return 
on average license) 
Larger research universities & 
established institutions more likely to 
utilize equity with startups 
Feldman, et al., 
(2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
High Research Universities >$40 
million are less likely to use equity 
than those with research levels in the 
$15-40 million range  
Markman et. al., 
(2004) 
(1999)  
# equity licenses, & 
# startups 
Research funding levels are a strong 
positive influence upon use of equity 
in licensing and startup formation 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups per year 
Strong research funding base in 
science and engineering facilitates 
startup activity 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Federal funding levels are an important 
influence on startup activity 
Industry funding 
Feldman, et al., 
(2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Higher levels of industry funded 
research has positive influence on the 
use of equity 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups  
(1994-1998) 
Higher % of industry research funding 
is not significant – potentially due to a 
lagged effect 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups per year 
High percentage of industry funding 
has positive influence on startups 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
Previous levels of industry research 
funding positive influence on startup 
formation and IPO events 1996-2000 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
Positive influence on startup formation 
with controls for faculty quality  
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Strong influence upon startups stronger 
than federal funding 
Entrepreneurial 
policy orientation 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
 
# of startups  
(1994-1998) 
Ability to use equity in licensing and 
low royalty sharing % with inventors 
has a positive influence on startups 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average IPO events 
(96-00)  
Support structures and policies in 
support of startups may be adjusted to 
reflect entrepreneurial environment 
TLO support 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups per year 
Strong support for the TLO facilitates 
startups 
Lagging cohort 
Feldman, et al.,  
(2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Lagging cohort in TT more likely to 
use equity 
Incentive policies 
Markman, et al., 
(2004) 
 (1999)  
# equity licenses, & 
# startups 
Higher royalty % with inventors has a 
negative influence upon both use of 
equity and startup formation, payment 
to faculty departments not significant. 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Inventor royalty sharing % has 
negative influence on startups 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups  
(1994-1998) 
Higher rates of inventor royalty 
sharing negatively influences startups 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Faculty quality 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups  
(1994-1998) 
Intellectual eminence (graduate school 
score)correlated with startup formation 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups/year important for startup formation 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
Strong positive predictor of startup and 
IPO events 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
Positively related to startups, 
engineering more so than science 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average IPO events 
(96-00)  
Faculty quality strong influence for 
successful IPO events  
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Quality of faculty (1995 NRC survey 
of graduate faculty) significant for 
startup formation 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Engin faculty quality important after 
2000 for startups 
Faculty size 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
Size of faculty has moderate positive 
influence on startup formation 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Bioscience faculty size important after 
2000 for startups 
Faculty 
involvement in 
TT process 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged # of startups 
(2000 & 2002) 
Faculty engagement critical for startup 
formation, impediments to 
commercialization posed by inventor-
related resistance, indifference, and 
poor-quality disclosures 
TLO Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Disclosures 
received by TLO 
Bray & Lee, 
(2000) 
Use and value of 
equity (equity sale 
compared to return 
on average license) 
TLOs with a high number of 
disclosures are more likely to use 
equity 
Friedman & 
Silberman, (2003) 
startups, licenses with 
equity 1999 
Higher levels of invention disclosures 
influences use of equity in licensing. 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
# Disclosures is a strong positive 
influence and startup formation 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Lagged disclosures – large # of 
disclosures in the pipeline are critical 
for startup formation (# disclosures 
strong significant predictor) 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Size of TLO 
Bray & Lee, 
(2000) 
Use and value of 
equity 
Universities with larger TLOs use 
equity more than others 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups  
(1994-1998) 
Size of TLO not significant for startup 
activity 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged # of startups 
(2000 & 2002) 
Larger TLOs have positive influence 
on startup formation, but no significant 
reduction in time to startup 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
TLO size not significant for startup 
formation 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups per year 
Size of TLO positive influence on 
startup formation  
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Larger TLOs more successful with 
startups (1%) 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Larger TLOs more successful with 
startups 
Age of TLO 
Feldman, Feller, 
Bercovitz and 
Burton, (2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Age is a positive influence on use of 
equity 
Friedman & 
Silberman, (2003) 
2
nd
 stage DVs= 
startups, licenses with 
equity 1999 
Experienced TLOs more likely to have 
higher rates of startup formation and 
use of equity. 
Markman, et al., 
(2004) 
(1999)  
# equity licenses, & 
# startups.  
Age of TLO negatively related to 
startups and use of equity (unexpected) 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
Age of TLO strong positive predictor 
of startup and IPO events 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
Age of TLO moderately correlated 
with startup formation – suggests those 
universities able to form startups may 
not be same as those with high royalty 
income from licensing (p 18) 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average IPO events 
(96-00)  
Age of TLO has positive influence on 
IPO events and royalty income 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
Logged # of startups 
(2000 & 2002) 
TLO experience (age) has a positive 
influence upon new venture formation; 
significantly reduces 
commercialization time to startup 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Age of TLO has a strong positive 
correlation with startup formation 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Age of TLO has strong positive 
influence upon startup formation 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Prior experience 
& success  
Feldman, Feller, 
Bercovitz and 
Burton, (2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Experience with licensing increases 
equity use, decreases with higher 
levels of licensing activities 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups (1994-
1998) 
Previous experience with equity 
significantly influences subsequent 
startup formation 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005) 
# of startups per year 
Previous success in startup formation 
stimulates subsequent startups. 
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
Revenue from previous successful 
licenses somewhat positively 
correlated with 1993-2002 startups  
Markman et al., 
(2005b) 
Startups in 2002 
 
Prior experience with startups has 
strong positive influence upon 
subsequent startup formation 
Jensen & Jones, 
(2011) 
# Startups  
1994-2008 
Hurdle – prior experience with startup 
increases probability of subsequent 
startup rate by 1.56 
Business skills 
Smilor & 
Matthews, (2004) 
TLO (budget, staff, $, 
#licenses, #startups, 
equity use)  
Royalty distribution 
Dual focus of the TLO requires 
alignment with appropriate skill sets to 
increase startup activity 
Links to business resources are key. 
Markman, et al., 
(2004) 
(proxy – Salaries) 
(1999)  
# equity licenses, & 
# startups.  
TLOs with higher salaries have a 
strong positive influence upon use of 
equity and startup formation 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
# of startups (2000 & 
2002) 
Lack of business competencies in TLO 
increases time to commercialization, a 
negative influence on startup formation 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
(proxy – Salaries) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Higher TLO staff salaries have a 
strong positive influence upon startup 
formation (1%) 
TLO Structure 
Feldman, Feller, 
Bercovitz and 
Burton, (2002) 
% of equity 
investment:  
through 1998 
Self-Sustaining TLO is less likely to 
use equity due to shorter term focus on 
operating expenses. 
Markman, et al., 
(2005a) 
# of startups (2000 & 
2002) 
Traditional structure, has a negative 
influence on startup formation, & 
increases time to startup;  
For-profit structure has lowered time 
to startup  
Markman, et al., 
(2005b) 
Startups in 2002 
Traditional structure positively 
correlated with use of equity 
Non-profit – no significance for startup 
or equity use 
For profit – significantly correlated 
with both startup and equity use 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
High autonomy – positive influence on 
startup formation 
Licensing 
Strategies of TLO 
Markman, et al., 
(2005b) 
Startups in 2002 
Sponsored Research – Strong negative 
correlation with startup formation 
Cash – negative correlation w/ startup 
Equity – strong positive influence 
upon startup formation 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Regional Characteristics 
Characteristic Study TT Outcome Findings 
Regional Industry 
R&D 
Friedman & 
Silberman, (2003) 
startups, licenses with 
equity 1999 
Higher concentration has a positive 
influence use of equity and startups. 
Incubator 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups (1994-
1998) 
Incubator has little influence upon 
university startup formation 
O‘Shea, et al., 
(2005)  
# of startups per year 
Incubator has positive influence upon 
startup formation 
Markman, et al., 
(2009) 
Average # of spinouts  
(1998–2001) 
Incubator has positive influence upon 
startup formation 
VC availability 
Bray & Lee, 
(2000) 
 
value of equity sold 
from startup 
compared to return 
on average license 
Highest returns from equity come from 
high dollar sales in regions with high 
VC availability 
DiGregorio & 
Shane, (2003) 
# of startups (1994-
1998) 
VC availability in regional MSA has 
little effect on startup activity. 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005a) 
# startups & 
# of IPO events 
(1996-2000) 
regional venture capital availability 
facilitates startup formation  
Chukumba & 
Jensen, (2005) 
# of startups   
(1993-2002) 
VC investment in state has positive 
influence on startup activity, but less 
so when interest rates are high or 
returns to VC funding is high 
Entrepreneurial 
Density 
Powers & 
McDougall, 
(2005b) 
Average IPO events 
(96-00)  
Regional entrepreneurial density has 
positive influence on IPO events from 
startups/small company licensees 
 
Discussion 
This literature review set out to discover what the body of research on university technology 
transfer can tell us about various characteristics and attributes that influence the technology transfer 
process itself, the characteristics related to invention disclosure submission from research faculty as a 
primary input into that process, and if there are different characteristics and attributes that have an 
influence upon licensing activities versus the formation of startups. The research studies in this 
literature review provide information regarding the multi stage process of technology transfer, and the 
various university, TLO, and regional characteristics that have an influence on that process and its 
outcomes. Institutional and organizational characteristics of universities and the TLO, as well as some 
regional characteristics influence institutional efficiency and effectiveness. Institutional 
characteristics such as institutional size (as determined by numbers of faculty), private universities, 
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the presence of medical school are not necessarily determinants of efficiency or growth in technology 
transfer activities, this growth is more likely influenced by a changing entrepreneurial culture, 
willingness of faculty to engage, and university support from leadership (Thursby & Thursby, 2002, 
Thursby & Kemp, 2002). The smallest and largest universities are more effective than mid-range 
universities in working with disclosures, licenses and licensing revenue (Thursby & Kemp, 2002), 
suggesting mid-range universities may wish to evaluate whether the resources allocated to support 
technology transfer are appropriate. Larger TLOs are relatively more efficient in licensing activity, 
older more so with revenues (Siegel, et al., 2003). Growth in the TLO may decrease relative 
efficiency levels due to steep learning curve of new licensing staff (Thursby & Kemp, 2002) in 
developing knowledge of the university, its research base, and making contacts with industry. 
Business and commercialization skills in the TLO are noted in two qualitative studies as important to 
TLO effectiveness, influencing invention disclosures, licensing efforts and startup formation (Siegel, 
et al., 2003; Smilor and Matthews, 2004).  
Invention disclosures to the TLO are critical to and initiate the technology transfer process. 
Entrepreneurial culture, supportive leadership and increased participation by faculty all drive 
invention disclosure to the TLO (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Research funding levels are somewhat 
related to higher efficiency levels, and the number of science departments with graduate programs at 
a university has a positive relationship with the number of disclosures received by a TLO (Friedman 
& Silberman, 2003). Incoming disclosures have a strong positive influence upon a university‘s 
relative efficiency, suggesting the rate of disclosures per research funding levels may be an interesting 
characteristic to for further evaluation. Faculty quality and high federal and industry research funding 
levels have a strong positive correlation with invention disclosures, critical inputs into the technology 
commercialization process (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Siegel, et al., 2003; Jensen & Jones, 2011).  
Qualitative field work and case study analysis suggest relationships between the TLO and research 
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faculty may have a positive influence upon invention disclosure rates (Siegel, et al., 2003; Smilor & 
Matthews, 2004). 
Licensing efforts and their resulting revenue streams are influenced by many characteristics 
and attributes of universities, TLOs and regions. While institutional characteristics are not necessarily 
related to efficiency, the combination of a private university with a medical school is indicated as 
being able to generate more revenues than a public university without a medical school (Bulut & 
Moschini, 2009). Federal funding levels have a strong positive correlation with higher licensing 
revenues (Thursby & Thursby, 2007; Bulut & Moschini, 2009), and industry funding levels also have 
a positive influence on licensing activity, (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). Research funding is positively 
correlated with disclosure activity, and the quantity of disclosures in the technology 
commercialization pipeline have a positive influence upon licensing activities (Friedman & 
Silberman, 2003, Chukumba & Jensen, 2005), suggesting larger universities with higher levels of 
research activities in general may have more effectiveness in technology transfer overall due to the 
amount of research funds directed their way. Findings for incentive structures and royalty rate sharing 
policies are ambiguous for their influence on licensing activities; Friedman & Silberrnan (2003) find 
higher royalty sharing positively related to revenues during 1997-1999, while Markman, et al. (2009), 
find the opposite relationship for revenues in 2002, indicating faculty incentives for more recent 
entrepreneurial activities may be determined by factors outside of monetary incentives. Quality of 
faculty inventors, as measured by NRC rankings, has a strong correlation with licensing and licensing 
revenues (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005b; Markman, et al., 2009), while 
faculty citations in technology departments, used by Bulut & Moschini (2009), do not seem to be 
significantly related to licensing revenues. Faculty involvement in commercialization efforts signals 
their entrepreneurial orientation, and can increase the speed to commercialization (Markman, et al., 
2005a). Experience of the TLO (age) is positively related to licensing activity (Chukumba & Jensen, 
2005; Friedman & Silberman, 2003), and findings are mixed for revenues; some finding a positive 
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correlation (Powers & McDougall, 2005b), others finding no significant relationship between TLO 
age and licensing revenues received by the university (Markman, et al., 2005a; Markman, et al., 
2009). Larger TLOs are positively correlated with licensing activities, and can reduce 
commercialization time (Markman, et al., 2005a; Thursby & Thursby, 2007; Markman, et al., 2009). 
A prior history of success with licensing, measured via the revenue obtained from previous licensing 
(Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2007) has a strong positive correlation with both 
the number of licenses and current revenue streams, suggesting that historical success may have an 
influence on current activities rather than outright years of experience. Business and 
commercialization skills of the licensing staff within the TLO may increase speed to licensing 
(Markman, et al., 2005a), salary levels of the TLO, used as a proxy for higher skilled staff, are not 
significantly correlated with licensing efforts (Markman, et al., 2009). The structure of the TLO can 
also have an influence upon technology transfer outcomes. Markman, et al. (2005) find TLOs under a 
traditional structure within the university or those with low autonomy generate less licensing revenues 
(Markman, et al., 2005a; Markman, et al, 2009), suggesting TLOs separate from the university and 
able to work autonomously may be more effective in licensing university inventions. Regional 
industry research and development levels can also have a positive influence on licensing efforts and 
revenue generation (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Bulut & Moschini, 2009). 
Startup formation and the use of equity as a mechanism for academic licensing with startups 
has become more normalized (Jensen & Jones, 2011; Feldman, et al., 2002; Markman, et al., 2004), 
with more universities reporting the use of equity in licensing through the AUTM annual survey 
(AUTM, 2011). Institutional characteristics such as the influence of a medical school on startup 
formation is ambiguous, some studies indicate the presence of a medical can have a positive influence 
on startup formation (Markman, et al., 2004), and use of equity (Feldman, et al., 2002); while others 
find little significance upon startup formation (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011).  
Jensen and Jones (2011) also find that private and land-grant institutions form less startup companies 
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than public universities in their analysis of total startup formation from all universities reporting to 
AUTM 1990-2008. The size of the endowment, as a measure of wealth of the university is positively 
correlated with university startups reaching public status (Powers & McDougall, 2005a). The levels 
of federal research also have positive relationships with startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; 
Jensen and Jones, 2011), and use of equity in licensing (Bray & Lee, 2000; Feldman, et al., 2002; 
Markman, et al., 2004). The level of industry funding at the university is positively correlated with 
startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; 
Jensen & Jones, 2011) and promotes the use of equity as well (Feldman, et al., 2002). The level of 
invention disclosures in the technology transfer pipeline has a positive influence on startup activity 
and use of equity (Bray & Lee, 2000; Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005, 
Jensen & Jones, 2011). University policies and support for startup formation are also influential; the 
ability to use equity in licensing can support startup formation (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003), and 
university policies oriented towards startup licensing can positively influence IPO events (Powers & 
McDougal, 2005b). Faculty incentives in royalty rate sharing have a negative correlation with startup 
formation (Markman, et al., 2004, Markman, et al., 2009), suggesting higher royalty sharing rates 
may be a disincentive for entrepreneurial engagement. Faculty quality facilitates startup formation 
(DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & 
Jensen, 2005; Markman, et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011), and faculty size can have a positive 
influence on startup formation (Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Experienced 
TLOs form more startups (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Powers & McDougall, 2005a & 2005b; Chukumba & 
Jensen, 2005; Markman et al., 2005a; Markman et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011) and have higher 
use of equity (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Feldman, et al., 2002). Larger TLOs use more equity 
(Bray & Lee, 2000), and can have a positive influence on startup formation (Markman, et al., 2005; 
O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Markman, et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Experience levels of the TLO in 
working with previous licensing is negatively correlated with equity use (Feldman, et al., 2002), 
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suggesting that while age is positively correlated with equity use, prior engagement with licensing 
may lock-in a TLO to that commercialization path, and may be less willing to experiment with equity 
licensing. Previous success in working with startups can create a positive culture and influence upon 
subsequent startup efforts (Markman, et al., 2005b; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011), and 
previous success with licensing inventions can also have a positive influence on startup formation 
(Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). Business competencies within the TLO, measured by Markman et al. 
(2004, 2009) as salary levels of TLO professionals, have a strong positive correlation with startup 
activity, suggesting those with a broad combination of skills in technology commercialization, 
marketing, IP protection, and licensing support university startup efforts. TLO structure influences a 
universities propensity to form startups and utilize equity in licensing. Feldman, et al. (2002), find a 
self-sustaining TLO utilizes less equity than TLOs less reliant upon licensing revenues to fund their 
operations. A traditional TLO structure takes longer to form startups (Markman, et al., 2005a), and 
uses lower levels of equity in licensing deals (Markman, et al., 2005b); whereas a for-profit TLO 
structure is correlated with both increased startups and use of equity (Markman, et al., 2005b). TLOs 
with more autonomy are also able to form more startups than those with less autonomy (Markman, et 
al., 2009). Licensing strategies of the TLO can influence outcomes: licensing for sponsored research 
and cash licensing strategies are correlated with less startup activity, while equity licensing is 
correlated with more startup activity (Markman, et al., 2005b). Finally, regional characteristics also 
have an influence upon startup activity from research universities. Industry research and development 
levels (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), venture capital availability (Bray & Lee, 2000; Powers & 
McDougall, 2005a), and the presence of a university related incubator (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; 
Markman, et al., 2009) all have a positive relationship with startup formation. Chukumba & Jensen 
(2005) note that while venture capital availability has a positive relationship with startup formation, 
high interest rates for investment has a negative relationship, suggesting investors may look for more 
lucrative opportunities when returns are higher.  
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Continued analysis of these characteristics and their influence upon the academic technology 
transfer process and its outcomes will help those wishing to increase effectiveness in university 
technology transfer and stimulate entrepreneurial activities of faculty. An updated evaluation of the 
academic technology transfer process and outcomes can shed additional light on how characteristics 
of the university and TLO may influence licensing and startup efforts in the current environment.   
Gaps for Further Analysis  
Evaluation of technology transfer activities and outcomes in recent years can help to 
determine how university attributes in organization, policies, and TLO characteristics support the 
growing entrepreneurial activities in the university environment. As technology transfer efforts of 
research universities continue to grow across the US in response to expectations from national and 
regional policy makers and university administrators, other characteristics may be identified as having 
some influence upon technology transfer outcomes. From the studies included in this review, some 
gaps appear for further analysis. Many evaluate university policies, orientation and incentive 
structures for faculty entrepreneurship. The findings of negative relationships for inventor royalty 
sharing rates by Friedman & Silberman (2003) and Markman, et al. (2009) with licensing efforts, and 
startup formation (Markman, et al., 2004, Markman, et al., 2009) call for some additional analysis of 
drivers for faculty participation in academic entrepreneurship. Other university policies that govern 
faculty activities at research universities such as promotion & tenure policies can be analyzed for their 
potential influence on the technology transfer process, and faculty disclosure rates, licensing, and 
startup formation. If entrepreneurial activities do not factor into promotion and tenure decisions, 
monetary incentives may have little effect. This line of research may become more important as 
universities adapt promotion and tenure policies to recognize entrepreneurial activities and 
community engagement efforts of their faculty. Further review may help US research universities find 
the right balance of policies and organizational resources to incentivize the formation of startups 
(Markman, et al., 2004). 
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Friedman & Silberman (2003) suggest evaluation of other TLO organizational characteristics 
to extend the findings from their work, suggesting characteristics such as TLO funding and reporting 
structures, experience of the TLO director, and other regional characteristics.  Markman, et al., 
(2005a, 2005b & 2009) evaluate TLO financial and autonomy structures for their influence on startup 
formation, and licensing revenues, and Feldman, et al. (2002) include self-funded TLO structures in 
their analysis on university equity use. Other TLO organizational characteristics that may influence 
goals and objectives include the reporting relationship of the TLO, as the office to which the TLO 
reports may wish to set strategic commercialization strategies, influencing the overall technology 
transfer process and its outcomes at the university.  
Several have noted that TLO links to business networks and quality commercialization 
skillsets within the TLO are important in supporting entrepreneurial efforts of faculty (Powers & 
McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Markman, et al., 2005a). Staffing practices and 
business commercialization skillsets of the TLO function within the university environment are 
required for successful commercialization efforts (Siegel, et al., 2003; Smilor & Matthews, 2004; 
Markman, et al., 2004; Markman, et al., 2005a, Markman, et al., 2009). Recommendations for 
increasing technology commercialization skills include devoting more university resources to hiring 
skilled licensing staff or training TLO staff for improved commercialization skillsets (Siegel, et al., 
2003; Markman, et al., 2009). These studies each note a need for increased diversity in 
commercialization skills of the TLO to help identify the appropriate path for commercialization for 
academic innovations (whether licensing or startup), in addition to creating expanded networks with 
both entrepreneurs and industry contacts. Licensing capabilities, or access to a receptive industry 
network, shorten time to commercialization (Markman, et al., 2005a), and higher salaries of licensing 
professionals are positively related to startup formation and use of equity (Markman, et al., 2004, 
Markman, et al., 2009). Educational background and training of TLO staff and of the individual 
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tasked with managing the TLO may provide certain skills that can affect activities along the 
technology transfer process, providing opportunities for further analysis. 
Table 2.5 summarizes the full set of the academic technology transfer papers analyzed in this 
literature review. As noted, these studies are specific to those which evaluated characteristics of US 
research universities, their TLO offices and their regions. This line of research on academic 
technology transfer efforts is often limited to evaluation of self-reported survey and observational 
data to establish correlations and efficiency rankings in academic technology licensing. The causal 
implications of university and TLO characteristics and resources, regional attributes, and licensing 
mechanisms will continue to be difficult to determine due to the nested environments and 
indeterminate direction of causality between dependent and predictor variables. Additional data can 
strengthen the research by providing new observations and units of analysis, but the causality issue 
will remain. Alternative mechanisms in licensing practices, organizational structures and other 
characteristics of TLOS, and university incentive policies (such as promotion and tenure incentives to 
faculty and incentives to TLO licensing staff as well as royalty distribution policies) will be important 
to continue to monitor for their influence and effectiveness in supporting the technology transfer 
process. Additional analysis will be informative as institutional leaders and directors of academic 
technology transfer activity at US research universities continue to respond to regional and national 
expectations for technology transfer and pressures for economic impact.   
Policy Considerations  
Implications of this review from a policy perspective are important for academic leaders, 
TLO directors, and other practitioners of technology transfer or economic development. The policy 
considerations from this literature review are many. US universities are increasing their resource 
commitment to their technology commercialization functions and supporting startups created for the 
commercialization of academic inventions, as noted by the increased levels reported to the AUTM 
annual licensing survey each year (AUTM, 2011; Kim, 2013). Anecdotal evidence and assumptions, 
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along with high profile news stories and patent decisions, can sway decisions on university 
technology commercialization strategies and allocation of resources (Blumenstyk, 2008). Studies 
utilizing strong research methodologies with valid statistical inferences can inform decision-makers 
on how certain characteristics of universities and TLOs may influence the technology transfer 
process. Information grounded in empirical data analysis can be used to provide insight into effective 
alignment of organizational structures and skillsets to support licensing activities and entrepreneurial 
faculty.  
Invention disclosure, patenting activity, licensing and startup activities have all increased, as 
have revenue streams to universities from these activities. University administrators may wish to 
focus efforts upon specific commercialization outcomes; consequently an understanding of how 
university, TLO and regional characteristics may influence the academic technology transfer process 
provides information enabling alignment of characteristics to facilitate desired outcomes. University 
characteristics including faculty incentive policies, an entrepreneurial orientation of the university, 
faculty quality, amount and type of research funding, experience, and business capabilities of the 
TLO are all points to consider for universities evaluating their technology commercialization efforts 
for short and long term success. External characteristics such as venture capital availability and the 
concentration of related industry can be taken into consideration in developing policies regarding 
licensing, startup formation and the utilization of equity in licensing to startups.  
Positive shifts in efficiency and productivity of university technology commercialization 
efforts may be due to growing receptivity to technology commercialization and academic 
entrepreneurship (Thursby & Kemp, 2002; Thursby & Thursby, 2002). While relative efficiency is 
volatile year to year, US universities are becoming more efficient in their use of resources to facilitate 
commercial outcomes (Kim, 2013). Technology commercialization activities are not solely 
determined by input/output measures however, and many other organizational and regional 
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characteristics of the university influence technology commercialization efforts beyond relative 
efficiencies.  
Policies and procedures of the university supporting an entrepreneurial culture and invention 
disclosure are an important influence upon the commercialization process. Policies designed to attract 
and retain high quality faculty and support and incentivize entrepreneurial efforts can influence 
licensing activities, receipt of revenues, and startup formation. Royalty distribution policies can be 
balanced with other incentives if a university wishes to strategically influence a particular 
commercialization path (Markman, et al., 2005a). Providing appropriate organizational support, 
incentives and resources for the TLO in addition to training or hiring broad skills for the dual nature 
of licensing and startup formation, are all attributes that can be controlled at some level by research 
universities. Those under university control can be assessed for their alignment and support to the 
universities technology transfer goals, modifying those that make the most sense in light of 
institutional resources, goals and objectives, policies and procedures, and the regional environment in 
which they are located, where regional entrepreneurial, venture capital, industry R&D investment 
characteristics can all potentially influence the technology transfer process and its outcomes.   
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Table 2.5 Summary of Academic Technology Transfer Studies 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Bray & Lee 
(2000) 
 
University 
Revenues From 
Technology 
Transfer: 
Licensing Fees 
vs. Equity 
Positions  
Analyzes the financial return of 
universities‘ taking equity in 
their spin-off companies, and 
the prevailing attitudes toward 
taking equity. Compares 
differences in equity and direct 
licensing policies 
Interviews with 
licensing managers at 
10 U.S. university 
TLOs (seven private 
and three public 
universities). 
Comparative analysis:  
 
DV: value of equity sold in 
spin-off companies 
compared to return on an 
average license. 
Average value of equity sold from 
university startups companies, reduced by 
50% to account for startup failure rate, is 
still more than 10 times the average annual 
income from a traditional license, and sig 
higher than the amount usually received as 
a license issue fee. 
Thursby & 
Kemp, 
(2002) 
Growth and 
productive 
efficiency of 
university 
intellectual 
property licensing 
Model productivity change of 
technology licensing to 
determine whether increase is 
due to increased resource 
commitment to technology 
licensing or other factors  
57 institutions over a 6 
year period (1991-
1996) from AUTM 
survey 
Data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) & logit regression 
Outputs: disclosures, patent 
apps, industry sponsored 
research, licenses, & 
royalty income  
Size of the TLO, federal research $, 
faculty quality and size influence 
efficiency & outcomes. Schools w/smaller 
available inputs are more efficient.  
Licensing growth due to changing 
entrepreneurial culture, & increased 
industry interactions.  
Thursby & 
Thursby 
(2002) 
Who Is Selling 
the Ivory Tower? 
Sources of 
Growth in 
University 
Licensing 
Growth in invention 
disclosures, new patent 
applications and licensing 
agreements are modeled to 
identify sources of growth  
Asks if growth in invention 
disclosures may be due to 
reorientation of research faculty 
away from basic to applied 
64 universities, DVs 
and IVs from 1994-
1998 obtained from 
AUTM  
DEA: 3-stage process 
1. Disclosures; federal and 
industry research $, size of 
TLO are resource inputs.  
2. Patent applications; 
disclosures and faculty 
quality are inputs,  
3. Licenses; disclosures, 
patent apps are inputs 
Increased willingness for faculty 
disclosure, & university to patent (not 
reorientation of research), as primary 
sources of growth. 
Increased inputs w/o corresponding 
growth in Licensing TFP may be due to 
licensing lag or diminishing quality of 
disclosures.  
Feldman, 
Feller, 
Bercovitz, & 
Burton 
(2002) 
Equity and the 
Technology 
Transfer 
Strategies of 
American 
Research 
Universities 
Evaluates the intensity of a 
university's equity interests, 
related to behavioral and 
structural variables,  
 
Survey of 124 
Carnegie I and II 
research universities, 
verified by AUTM 
Survey. Responses 
from 67, Model N=62 
Lower-bound TOBIT 
model to estimate the use of 
equity as a function of the 
university's own 
technology-transfer 
experience.  
DV % of equity investment: 
total# of equity interests 
divided by total active 
licenses through 1998 
Growth over time in university use of 
equity in licensing – 1978 earliest date, in 
1994 40% of respondents had taken equity 
and in 2000 70%.  
Prior experience (TLO Age) positively 
related to the use of equity - older TLOs 
have greater use of equity.  
Cumulative licensing experience has a 
nonlinear relationship - universities appear 
more likely to use equity as they gain 
experience; but use decreases with high 
licensing activity.  
Self-supporting TLO is correlated with 
lower equity use 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Siegel, et al, 
(2003), 
Assessing impact 
of organizational 
practices on the 
relative 
productivity of 
university 
technology 
transfer offices 
Evaluate differences in 
university cultures, motives and 
incentives; and whether they 
contribute to capacity 
differences in technology 
transer, relative performance in 
technology transfer may 
depend on organizational 
practice 
Data for 80 US 
institutions from 
AUTM, 91–96, with 
interviews with 55 
technology transfer 
stakeholders, and NSF 
and the BEA 
(SFE) Cobb-Douglas form 
Licenses and $ = outputs 
Disclosures, TLO size, 
legal $ = inputs.  
Environ. factors: public and 
medical school indicators; 
TLO age. Regional: 
industry R&D intensity and 
state GDP 
Technical inefficiency comes from environ 
and organizational characteristics  
Invention disclosures critical.  TLO size 
facilitates licenses. Legal expenditures 
negatively related to licenses, positive for 
royalty revenues 
Environ: Older TLOs have higher 
revenues. Regional industry R&D density 
increases licensing. 
DiGregorio, 
& Shane 
(2003) 
Why do some 
universities 
generate more 
start-ups than 
others?  
University Policies (equity, 
royalty incentives),Incubator 
and Industry Research funding 
 
examine effect of MACRO-
level factors that vary across 
universities over time on rate at 
which new firms are created to 
exploit university inventions 
AUTM startup activity 
from 1994 - 1998 for 
116 universities, 
Venture Economics, 
Gourman Reports, 
USPTO, surveys  
Negative Binomial models 
in generalized estimating 
equations for panel repeated 
measures over multiple 
years 
 
DV: # of startups from a 
given university over a 5 
year period 
University policies - , & university's 
intellectual eminence, taking equity in lieu 
of IP and licensing costs, & low inventor‘s 
% of royalties positively affects startups. 
Find no effect on availability of VC 
availability in regional MSA or 
presence of university affiliated incubator, 
& limited support for commercial 
orientation of university research 
Friedman & 
Silberman 
(2003) 
University 
Technology 
Transfer: Do 
Incentives, 
Management, and 
Location Matter? 
Determine characteristics of 
research universities that 
influence Invention Disclosures 
submission, and evaluate 
influence of university policies 
and incentives, regional and 
local characteristics that affect 
licenses, startups, and use of 
equity 
86 universities 1997-
1999 for invention 
disclosures 
(AUTM) Annual 
Licensing Survey for 
data on the university 
technology transfer 
outputs, Milken Inst. 
for Tech-Pole Index 
Linear regression, 2-
equation recursive system: 
1st DV=Disclosures (ID), 
as a primary input into  
2nd equation DVs= 
licenses, start-ups, revenue, 
licenses with equity in 1999 
 
N=86, single year 
Faculty quality, # of departments, federal 
research & industry research funding all 
positively influence invention disclosure 
submission.  Previous disclosures, TLO 
Age, and Tech-pole index are strong 
influence on licenses executed in 1999 and 
on equity use in those licenses. Royalty 
sharing with departments is a negative 
influence on 1999 licensing activity. TLO 
Age and Tech-pole index positive 
influence on startups 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Markman, 
Gianiodis, 
Phan, Balkin 
(2004) 
Entrepreneurship 
from the Ivory 
Tower: 
Do Incentive 
Systems Matter? 
Determine whether incentive 
systems—monetary payments 
to inventors, their department 
or institution, or to university 
technology licensing office 
(UTLO) personnel—affect 
entrepreneurial activities at 
U.S. universities. 
128 US universities, 
1999 outcomes  
 
Data from AUTM 
Licensing Surveys 
(1999, 2000), 
interviews with UTLO 
directors, web-based 
searches of each 
UTLO‘s institution, 
and the USPTO 
Hierarchical regressions for 
each DV.  
1st step: TLO age, research 
grants, and medical school.  
2nd tested faculty and 
depts‘ incentives, TLO pay. 
DV: 1999 entrepreneurial 
activity (1) # equity 
licenses, (2) # of university 
business incubators, & (3) # 
startups. N=128 
Research dollars stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity. TLO age significant and 
unexpectedly negatively related to equity 
licenses & startups, payment to faculty 
departments not significant.  
Monetary incentives to scientists are 
significant but negatively related to the 
number of equity licenses  
UTLO salary is significantly and 
positively related to the # of equity 
licenses and to the # of new ventures 
Smilor & 
Matthews 
(2004) 
 
University 
Venturing: 
Technology 
Transfer and 
Commercializatio
n in Higher 
Education 
Identify forces and factors that 
have an impact upon 
technology transfer and 
commercialization activities 
from a set of peer institutions & 
identify best practices. 
Interviews with reps 
and TLOs from 5 
leading universities 
known for economic 
development impact 
and successful 
licensing, startup 
activity and use of 
equity 
Qualitative Comparative 
Study - "best practice" 
institutions with regional 
impact 
DVs: TLO(budget, staff, $, 
#licenses, #startups, equity 
use) royalty distribution 
Strong leadership and commitment to role 
of university, unequivocal and substantial 
support for TLO, faculty recognition and 
rewards for entrepreneurial behavior all 
have a positive influence on university‘s 
commercialization capabilities.  
TLO has dual focus - startups & licensing, 
needing skills in both areas. TLO will 
benefit from staff with commercialization 
skills & knowledge of university research.  
Links to bus development orgs are key 
O‘Shea, 
Allen, 
Chevalier, & 
Roche 
(2005) 
Entrepreneurial 
orientation, 
technology 
transfer and 
startup 
performance of 
U.S. universities 
Link attributes of University 
resources and capabilities, 
institutional, financial, 
commercial and human capital 
to university startup formation. 
141 US Universities 
1995-2001 (AUTM, 
faculty quality from 
NRC, R&D funding 
from NSF, Center 
Institute for University 
performance, Milken 
Institute, USPTO) 
Random Effect negative 
binomial method  
 
DV: yearly # of startups 
 
Controls: Med school, 
Institution type, industry 
infrastructure, endowment 
funds 
Tradition and history of TLO with 
previous startup activity, faculty quality, 
commercial capability  
Size of TLO and amount of science & 
engineering research funding are positive 
predictors of startup activity 
Not sig: public/land grant/medical 
school/endowment size/incubator/regional 
knowledge infrastructure 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Powers & 
McDougall 
(2005a) 
University startup 
formation and 
tech licensing 
with firms that go 
public: a 
resource-based 
view of academic 
entrepreneurship 
Relationship between level of 
industry research funding, 
faculty quality, patent 
importance, age of the 
technology office, and venture 
capital of a geographical area to 
# of start-up companies and # 
of IPO events.  
multiple archival 
sources on 120 
institutions 1996-2000 
classified as Research 
extensive and research 
intensive, SEC for IPO 
events 
Negative Binomial 
N=120 (1996-2000) 
 
DVs:  
TOTAL # startups (1996-
2000) (AUTM), & 
TOTAL # of IPO events 
(1996-2000) (SEC)  
Previous (93-95) levels of industry 
funding, faculty quality (93-95 citations), 
have strong influence on subsequent 
Startups and IPO events. 
Larger faculty size influences startups, & 
endowment influences IPO events 
Age of TLO strong positive influence on 
startups, somewhat with IPOs; level of VC 
in MSA also a positive predictor of both 
startup and IPO events 
Chukumba 
& Jensen 
(2005) 
University 
invention, 
entrepreneurship, 
and start-ups 
Determine factors related to 
commercialization.  
 
Evaluates characteristics of 
inventor, the TLO, invention, 
and the regional financial 
market. 
AUTM licensing 
surveys for 1993-2002. 
 
110 Universities, 
Panel, measures for 
each year: University 
i, in Time t.  
Negative Binomial 
  
N=951  
 
DVs are # of startups and 
licenses 
 
Private/Med school 
indicators not significant, 
size of TLO not significant 
# of disclosures has strong influence on 
licensing & startups – larger # disclosures 
increases commercially viable pool 
Past success (gross royalties) increases 
subsequent successful licensing 
AGE of TLO, ratio of industry/fed res$ & 
Inventor quality are positive influences on 
licensing, & startup activity 
Access to VC stimulates startups 
Interest rate & returns to VC have negative 
correlation with startup activity 
Powers & 
McDougall 
(2005b) 
Policy orientation 
effects on 
performance with 
licensing to start-
ups and small 
companies 
Evaluate university support & 
policy orientation towards 
licensing to startups/small 
companies or established firms, 
and interactions with regional 
entrepreneurial environment.  
Evaluates support policies 
(TLO & Licensing staff), 
selectivity policies, regional 
R&D activity and venture 
capital accessibility 
134 US research 
universities (1996 -
2000)  
 
AUTM Survey (2003)  
 
IPO events from 
prospectus ﬁlings - 
SEC. 
Hierarchical moderated 
regressions to test 
interactions between policy 
orientation and support of 
startup activity, & regional 
financial environment. 
DVs:  
Log Average IPO events 
(96-00) from licenses with 
small companies, & Log 
Avg revenues (99-00) 
TLO age and faculty quality are extremely 
important for IPO and royalty income. 
University selectivity and regional 
entrepreneurial density signiﬁcant positive 
predictors of IPO events.  
Univ. policies orientated in support of 
entrepreneurial activity & licensing to 
small companies stimulate more startups.  
Universities located in entrepreneurially 
dense environments have larger portfolios 
of IPO companies. 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Markman, 
Gianiodis, 
Phan, & 
Balkin 
(2005a) 
Innovation speed: 
Transferring 
university 
technology to 
market 
Evaluate time/speed to 
technology commercialization, 
and whether shortened 
commercialization time is 
associated with more positive 
outcomes (higher revenues and 
# of Startups).  
Determine importance of TLO 
structure, inventors, firms, 
degree of collaboration, and 
business competencies of TLO  
Structured interviews 
with 91 TLO directors 
AUTM data validated 
by interviews.  
 
 
Path Analysis with 
hierarchical regressions: 
N=91 
DVs: Logged # of startups 
&  
Logged revenues  
(2000 & 2002) 
Commercialization time significant: 
Inventor involvement/engaged faculty & 
TLO competency shorten time; complexity 
in collaboration increases time.  
Larger TLOs are better at startup 
formation,  
Traditional TLO structures has increased 
time to startups, less effective at 
generating revenues and startup formation, 
while for-profit decreases time to startup 
compared to non-profit structure. 
Markman, 
Phan, 
Balkin, 
Gianiodis, 
(2005b) 
Entrepreneurship 
and university-
based technology 
transfer  
Which TLO structure and 
licensing strategies are 
conducive to startup formation?  
How are these related to each 
other? 
Evaluates TLO Financial 
structure (Traditional unit 
within university, non-profit 
separate entity, or for-profit 
focused on venture creation) 
And TLO Licensing strategies: 
for sponsored research, cash 
licensing and equity licensing 
Data from interviews 
with 128 university 
TLO directors in 2002 
& content analysis of 
university policies 
Grounded theory:  
Long interviews, defining 
characteristics most likely 
to lead to startup formation 
 
N=128 
DV = Startups in 2002 
 
Used correlation matrix to 
identify linear relationships 
between TLO structure, 
licensing strategies, and 
startup formation 
Previous experience with startup activity 
has strong positive influence  
Traditional TLO structure: no correlation 
with startup, but likely to use equity, more 
likely to license for sponsored research;  
Non-profit (501)c3: no correlation with 
startup activity, less likely to license for 
sponsored research;  
For-profit: strongly correlated with 
startups & equity. 
TLO licensing strategies:  
Sponsored research & cash licensing have 
negative correlation with startups 
Equity use positively influences startup 
formation. 
Thursby & 
Thursby, 
(2007) 
University 
Licensing 
Evaluating the rational and 
goals behind university 
patenting and licensing efforts; 
the stage of academic 
inventions being licensed, the 
role of inventors; licensing 
practices of universities, and 
revenues generated from 
technology transfer activities 
Data from AUTM 
2004 survey and a 
supplemental survey 
of 65 TLO directors 
and 112 licensees of 
university inventions.  
 
OLS & Quintile tables.  
 
DV = Licensing revenue 
Logistic regression to 
evaluate inventor & 
university attributes on 
disclosure activity  
DV=1 if inventor disclosed 
# of Licensing professionals in the TLO, 
# of previous licenses generating income 
& research funding levels of the university 
all have a significant relationship in 
revenue generation of the TLO. Additional 
research funding increases disclosures, 
industry funds have strong influence on 
both disclosure & licensing 
More disclosures come from engineering 
than biosciences, from inventors with 
higher publications, high funding levels, 
inventors more likely to be male 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Markman, 
Gianiodis & 
Phan (2009) 
Supply-Side 
Innovation and 
Technology 
Commercial-
ization 
Explain technology 
commercialization outcomes as 
a function of TLO licensing 
strategies, the structure of the 
TLO, and incentives for 
scientists, departments, and 
TLO staff. 
Data from licensing 
surveys, interviews 
with 128 TLO 
directors in 2002 
 
AUTM (1999, 2002) 
Licensing Surveys; 
formal policies and 
statistics 
Hierarchical regressions 
 
Two DVs:  
Average annual licensing 
revenues (1999-2002),  
Average number of yearly 
spinouts from technology 
transfer activities (1998–
2001) 
TLO age: positively related to startups 
Size: greater revenues & firm creation 
Incubator: facilitates startups, Faculty 
quality: positive for revenues & startups 
Licensing for sponsored research 
negatively related to licensing revenues 
 
TLO Structure: low-autonomy negatively 
related to $$, ns for startups; high-
autonomy significantly & positively 
related to startups, not revenue 
Incentives: inventor incentives negatively 
associated w/ $$ & startups, TLO pay 
signif & positively related to startups 
Bulut, H., & 
Moschini, G. 
(2009). 
US universities‘ 
net returns from 
patenting and 
licensing: A 
quantile 
regression 
analysis. 
Assess potential of US 
universities in generating 
revenues from licensing 
activities given university 
characteristics 
148 US universities 
from 1998 to 2002, 
aggregated at the 
university level, using 
annual averages of the 
time-varying variables 
OLS & Quantile regression:  
 
Methods used to model and 
estimate net licensing 
revenues as linear functions 
of a set of characteristics of 
the university, faculty & 
region. 
 
DV = net revenues 
Public/Private/Medical: Private 
universities with a medical school obtain 
significantly higher returns than public 
without medical school (up to 2.5X) 
Research Size significant influence on 
licensing revenues (all but lowest quantile) 
Log of Faculty quality (citations) – not 
significantly correlated with net revenues  
Local industrial R&D – not strongly 
significant except for universities at high 
end of revenue distribution 
Jensen & 
Jones (2011) 
University 
Startups and 
Entrepreneurship: 
New Data, New 
Results 
Evaluating how university 
entrepreneurship has changed 
from 1994 to 2008.  Evaluating 
importance of university, 
department and regional 
characteristics, prior experience 
with startup formation 
AUTM data – all 
universities that 
reported to AUTM 
Licensing Survey from 
1994 – 2008.  
 
 
Negative binomial with 
random effects,  
 
Poisson and Logit methods 
as benchmarks 
 
DV = Startups 1994-2008 
N=912 with full model 
Academic entrepreneurship expands in 
tough economic times.  Quality of 
engineering, size of biological faculty are 
important after 2000 
Size of TLO has significant impact upon 
startup formation, an additional employee 
increases startup activity by about 7%  
Hurdle – prior experience with startup 
activity has strong influence upon 
subsequent startups – those with prior 
experience may have startup rate 1.5X 
greater than those universities without 
prior experience 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Author(s) Title Goals Data Methods & DV variables Findings 
Kim, (2013) The Ivory tower 
approach to 
entrepreneurial 
linkage: 
productivity 
changes in 
university 
technology 
transfer 
Evaluate whether growth in 
government funding for 
academic research (which 
increased by 50% from 1998-
2008) corresponds to an 
increase in efficiency in 
academic technology transfer 
activities.  
Panel data for 90 
universities (1999-
2007) obtained from 
AUTM annual 
licensing survey 
DEA –to estimate relative 
efficiency across 
universities.  
 
Invention disclosures, 
federal and industry 
research expenditures, TLO 
size = inputs 
Issued US patents, licenses, 
and license income = 
outputs 
Upward trend in efficiency growth: 
average TFP growth of 31% over 9 years 
Licenses grew avg of 4%/year, licensing 
income 28%/year, and patents remained 
steady.  
Universities vary in efficiency. 
inputs also increased; licensing staff grew 
an average of 11%/year, indicating 
growing commitment of resources 
Medical Schools & Private schools not as 
significant to TT activities as in past 
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Chapter 3. Collaborative Technology Transfer: A History of North Carolina’s 
Triangle University Licensing Consortium 
Introduction 
The Triangle University Licensing Consortium (TULCO) is an early example of three 
Research Triangle Park (RTP) universities (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), 
NC State University (NCSU), and Duke University) and working together to increase 
commercialization capacity and enhance technology transfer activities.
7
 University system and 
community leaders formed a TULCO governing board in 1986 to expand technology-licensing 
capacity, enhance entrepreneurial culture at the universities, and increase engagement in the RTP. 
The consortium‘s formally operated from 1988 through 1995, and it helped each of the Triangle 
Universities attain these goals. This paper documents TULCO‘s history, organizational structure, 
mission and goals, and overall outcomes of the consortium in licensing the inventions developed from 
academic research. This early experiment among these three regional research universities provides a 
potential model for other research universities considering pooling resources and working together to 
enhance technology commercialization. This case study attempts to discover why the three triangle 
universities decided to collaborate in a technology licensing consortia and how they set up that effort, 
how effective the consortium was in effecting the entrepreneurial cultures of the universities and 
licensing university inventions, and finally, why the consortium was disbanded. 
The history behind the formation of the consortium is evaluated in order to determine why the 
three regional universities decided to collaborate through a single licensing entity. To assess the 
                                                     
7
The term ‗technology transfer‘ is defined as the efforts undertaken towards converting academic and research 
based inventions into marketable products and services through licensing to industry or a university startup. 
These activities encompass applications for intellectual property protection, networking with industry contacts, 
market research, and license negotiation. 
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effectiveness of this early collaborative effort among the Research Triangle universities in expanding 
technology commercialization activities, the consortium is evaluated for its impact upon the licensing 
activities amongst the three universities, whether it had an effect upon the entrepreneurial culture 
within the universities through increased patent activities, and if the consortium helped the three 
universities expand networks with industry.  
A compelling case is found in support of technology licensing consortia where there is 
limited existing commercialization capacity at research universities. TULCO‘s history suggests that 
regional consortia can help to affect the internal entrepreneurial cultures, build capacity, create 
efficiencies, and expand industry networks for the universities involved. For universities without a 
strong internal entrepreneurial culture and existing infrastructure for technology licensing and 
commercialization, a consortium with others who have similar objectives and constraints can have a 
positive impact on technology transfer activities. The lessons learned from this study provide 
recommendations for future multi-university technology commercialization consortia. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections. National policies 
influencing the development of intellectual property at US research universities is presented, with 
recent calls for collaboration among universities at the federal levels. The theoretical background and 
framework on institutional organization, history, and culture is reviewed, which provides the 
motivation for the research questions going into this case study analysis. The subsequent section 
discusses the history around early technology transfer, the initial formation of TULCO and review the 
resources allocated to its operations. The disbanding of TULCO‘s operations is discussed and the 
adoption of the marketing and licensing function in house by each institution. The institutional 
cultural differences and TULCO‘s resource constraints are reviewed for their impact on the 
consortium‘s dissolution. The case study methodology is presented, followed by an analysis of 
TULCO‘s activities and a discussion of the trends that data might represent. Information collected 
from interviews and discussions with key individuals supplement the data, and provide additional 
information on the consortium‘s disbandment. A summary of the key findings from this case study is 
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presented, with an analysis of the pros and cons of the licensing consortium model. Key policy 
recommendations are presented with suggestions for research universities who may be considering 
this type of organization as a way to develop or enhance their existing technology licensing and 
commercialization efforts.  
National Policies 
The United States government has implemented several national level policies to enhance and 
promote technology transfer from its national labs, expand the use of government funded 
technologies (Bayh-Dole Act, P.L. 96-517, 1980), promote and encourage cooperation between 
universities and federal laboratories (National Cooperative Research Act, P.L. 98-462, 1984, 1993), 
and support small business‘s efforts in research and development and licensing technology under the 
Small Business Innovation Development Act (P.L. 97-219, 1982), which requires federal funding 
agencies to set aside 2.7% of their external funding budget to support small business engaging in 
research or research & development (NIH, 2013).
8
  The policies established in the 1980‘s specific to 
technology transfer efforts of US research universities have had a significant impact upon university 
patenting and licensing activities, and are increasing as the entrepreneurial culture expands within the 
academic environment (Bozeman, 2000, AUTM 2011). 
Bayh-Dole Act, (P.L. 96-517) 
Enacted in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act, (P.L.96-517) gave the universities the right to retain 
title to inventions created through research activities, and was designed to facilitate technology 
licensing and public utilization of inventions developed from federally funded research. The US 
research universities were permitted by this Act to hold title to these federally funded inventions, 
provided they engaged in best efforts to commercialize those inventions (P.L.96-517). The 
universities were expected to be more effective in translating the inventions and innovations into 
                                                     
8
See Bozeman, B., (2000) for a comprehensive list of major technology policy legislation 1980-1990. 
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public use. After the passage of this Act in 1980, US research universities began to increase their 
internal capacity for technology licensing and transfer and support of entrepreneurial activities 
(Nelson, 2001; Mowery, et. al., 2001; Shane, 2004). Now some thirty-three years after the passage of 
that act, critical evaluations of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act recognize its success, but also suggest 
a need to further enhance and facilitate those activities by developing alternative forms of service and 
support to the universities and the scientific researchers supported by federal grants (Nelson, 2001; 
Sampat, 2006; Rothaermel, et al., 2007). Discussions are taking place across the US on finding 
alternative mechanisms to efficiently and effectively stimulate technology transfer and 
commercialization of scientific research for the benefit of society and regional economic development 
(Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011). Siegel, Veugelers and Wright (2007) suggest the development of 
regional collaborations as one way to effectively leverage available resources for institutions that may 
not have a critical mass of research excellence and academic technology licensing expertise.  
Kaufman Foundation 
As part of those discussions taking place around the facilitation of academic technology 
transfer, the Kauffman Foundation has also proposed some alternatives, which include the creation of 
multi-university commercialization consortia to enhance academic entrepreneurship and create 
economies of scale. Kauffman researchers acknowledge the inherent difficulties due to lack of 
capacity and limited resources in technology licensing and commercialization efforts at smaller US 
research universities. The broad spectrum of specialized expertise required to commercialize the 
variety of academic inventions requires an investment in resources and specialized skillsets not 
possible at some schools (Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011). It‘s doubtful that any single technology 
licensing function will have personnel with a broad enough domain expertise to have knowledge of 
every area of research without having a large pool of technology licensing staff members. By 
combining resources in a consortium, regional universities could increase their domain of expertise 
and skillsets, potentially realizing greater efficiencies and economies of scale.  
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Current Federal Initiatives 
This consortium model proposed by the Kauffman Foundation was included in two bills 
proposed to the 112
th
 congress during 2012: the Startup 2.0 Act (S.3217), and the America Innovates 
Act (H.R. 4720). While both of these bills died in committee, they represent a desire to enhance 
entrepreneurial activities among the research universities across the nation. The Startup Act has been 
resurrected in a 3.0 version of the bill submitted to congress February 13
th
 and 14
th
 of 2013,
9
 and has 
an entire section devoted to the ―accelerated commercialization of tax payer-funded research‖ 
(H.R.714 and S.310), which authorizes a grant program through a diversion of a small percentage 
(0.15%) of federal research funding agencies‘ budgets specifically for the acceleration of technology 
licensing and commercialization of federally funded academic inventions. These funds are to be 
awarded yearly to institutions of higher education, ―including consortia of institutions of higher 
education,‖ for programs and initiatives designed to improve commercialization and transfer of 
inventions from research (H.R.714). Proposals for these funds must demonstrate a ―capacity for 
accelerated commercialization, proof of concept proficiency, and translating scientific discoveries and 
cutting-edge inventions into technological innovations and new companies‖ (H.R.714). Of particular 
interest are programs that could be replicated by other institutions of higher education if proven to be 
successful. The current versions of this bill have been referred to committees for evaluation.   
The America Innovates Act of 2012 (H.R. 4720)
10
 introduced in 2012, was to establish a 
‗Bank‘ directed to promote commercialization efforts of science and engineering inventions; 
providing grants, loans, and other assistance to eligible entities and individuals. The bank would have 
provided investment funds to eligible entities and individuals, including consortia of institutions. 
                                                     
9
A Bill introduced to the House of Representatives by Rep. Michael Grimm (R-NY) and Senator Jerry Moran 
(R-KS). The 2012 bills died in committee, and have been reintroduced as H.R. 714 and S. 310, Startup Act 3.0, 
presented to the 113
th
 congress February 2013 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr714, and 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s310  
 
10
A Bill introduced to the House of Representatives by Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) in 2012 ―To establish 
the American Innovation Bank, to improve science and technology job training, to authorize grants for 
curriculum development, and for other purposes.‖ Legislation died in committee. 
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Each of these proposals submitted to the US congress are designed to facilitate the commercialization 
of inventions from federally funded research by expanding programs and entities, including the 
creation and support of university technology licensing consortiums.  
The existing framework established in response to the Bayh-Dole Act has created an 
environment where universities are expected to engage in entrepreneurial and technology transfer 
activities. The additional recommendations put forward by the Kauffman Foundation are found in 
additional legislation being considered at the national level, and while these particular pieces of 
legislation did not move out of committee, they represent the desire to help academic inventions reach 
their applied outcomes more effectively and efficiently. The information from this analysis of an early 
stage licensing consortium can provide further evidence of how these collaborations can facilitate the 
commercialization activities of universities.  
Institutional Organization, History, and Culture 
“History matters… present and future are connected to the past by continuity of a society’s 
institutions” 
11
 
Previous academic research evaluating institutional organization, history, and culture provide 
a theoretical framework for the analysis of this early stage licensing consortium. TULCO evolved 
both in response to a growing regional need in the research triangle area, and the growing national 
incentives around technology licensing and commercialization from US research universities in the 
1980s. Regional and national expectations regarding the roles of academic research universities have 
continued to expand across the nation and globe, with universities becoming much more regionally 
engaged, expanding their technology commercialization efforts (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2006).  
                                                     
11North, 1990, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, p. vii 
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Douglass North‘s (1990) seminal work on institutions, institutional change and economic 
growth developed a framework demonstrating how institutional historical, environmental, and 
regulatory forces work to shape behavior and the direction of change of institutions, suggesting 
institutions change incrementally in response to economic incentives and performance. Formal forces 
and structures (legal and government regulations) and informal behaviors (norms, values, and beliefs) 
govern the institutional perspectives that act to shape behavior (North, 1990). Regional and national 
institutional frameworks have an impact upon the innovation processes of institutions (O‘Shea, et al., 
2008). Developing an understanding of the environment in which institutions reside and in which new 
ones are created becomes fundamental to understanding their development and growth, and their 
potential demise.  
Partnerships among research universities may facilitate technology commercialization efforts 
and outcomes by providing access to and leveraging additional resources. Partnerships among 
universities in consortia or otherwise provide an expanded network for technology licensing and 
commercialization of academic inventions (Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011). Closeness in industry-
university partnerships is developed through joint ownership of IP, co-location within a region, a 
long, stable history of interaction, further underpinned by institutional commonalities among 
participants, encouraging shared norms, attitudes, values and expectations across the partnership 
(Asheim & Coenen, 2006). Suggesting any type of technology licensing consortia may benefit from 
common norms, attitudes and expectations among the universities involved. Technology licensing 
and commercialization is a ‗contact sport;‘ as such, it is quite important to build relationships and 
expand personal and professional networks to effectively commercialize inventions (Carlsson & 
Fridh, 2002). Technology licensing consortia among universities may facilitate relationship building 
in addition to combining and leveraging resources for effective technology licensing. Linkages among 
the national innovation and business systems and regional innovation systems all influence the long-
term technology licensing strategies of research institutions (Asheim & Coenen, 2006).  
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These prior studies provide the foundation and framework for this analysis on the technology 
licensing consortium among Duke, NCSU and UNC. They suggest that a strategic focus upon 
creating licensing consortia with appropriate resources among regional research universities may 
facilitate capacity building and long-term success in technology commercialization efforts.  
History of TULCO 
Early Technology Transfer Efforts  
In the years following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act on December 12
th
, 1980 (P.L. 96-
517)
12
, leaders of the UNC system and the Research Triangle recognized that inventions generated at 
the triangle universities lacked identifiable commercialization pathways, or effective mechanisms for 
getting these inventions to industry and thus into public use (Little, 1986). There was a general lack of 
knowledge on which industries might be interested in the research outcomes (Fordham, 1985), and 
without an established industry network, no mechanism existed to develop that knowledge. Siegel, 
Waldman, Atwater, and Link note that technology transfer activities are those that ―facilitate 
commercial knowledge transfers through the licensing to industry of inventions or other forms of 
intellectual property resulting from university research‖ (Siegel, et al., 2004, p 116). Little capacity 
existed at the triangle public universities to facilitate these types of activities at the time, and their 
leaders were committed to building this capacity. 
UNC System President William Friday established a technology transfer committee in 1983 
to evaluate the existing technology transfer efforts of the UNC system‘s institutions as a way to grow 
support for scientific research and expand upon university outreach and public service efforts 
(Fordham, 1985). The Technology Transfer Committee, with support from the UNC General 
Administration and the Microelectronic Center of North Carolina (MCNC – a quasi-public 
technology development organization in the Research Triangle), commissioned a study from 
                                                     
12
For a thorough discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act, see http://www.autm.net/Bayh_Dole_Act1.htm 
  86 
Cambridge Associates Inc. in September of 1984 to evaluate and make recommendations towards 
improving the effectiveness of technology transfer activities at the UNC system schools. The scope of 
work written by this committee for the consultant‘s study noted: 
“The development and transfer of technology are important to the constituent universities and 
to society because they result in the development of new products and the enhancement of 
existing ones, facilitate the creation of jobs, improve productivity, and provide the foundation 
for additional research. The University institutions are therefore committed to encouraging 
the diffusion of the technological innovations from their laboratories to the marketplace 
through direct research relationships with the industrial community and through effective 
transfer of the products of their research to the public.
13
” 
Resources committed to technology transfer efforts at the public research universities in the 
Research Triangle region lagged behind similar research institutions (Clough, 1985). The UNC 
institutions were understaffed; benchmark institutions utilized in the study for comparison maintained 
at least one full-time professional staff member for technology licensing activities per $40-60 million 
in research funding dollars.
14
 The two UNC research campuses located in the triangle area, with 
research funding between $54-75 million in 1984 (NSF WebCasper, 2013), each had a single 
individual investing only 50% of their time towards technology transfer activities (Clough, 1985).  
UNC and NCSU were building their technology transfer capabilities, and Duke had a small 
but established program (Fordham, 1985). NCSU, with a strong engineering program, had started 
some technology transfer efforts in 1982, formally establishing an internal office in 1984, when the 
                                                     
13
Clough, Thomas N. (1985) The University of North Carolina Technology Transfer Study, Pub., Cambridge 
Associates Incorporated, 1985, p. 6 
 
14
Stanford University was utilized by Cambridge Associates as a benchmark for comparison, as they had 
committed solid resources to their technology transfer operations at the time of this study. The level and quality 
of sponsored research, their network of industry relationships, entrepreneurial approach to licensing, 
specialization of TLO staff, industry aided evaluation of inventions, and the promotion and support of these 
activities from university leadership all contributed to Stanford‘s successes in licensing research-based 
technologies (Clough, 1985). Strong differences existed between Stanford‘s environment and that of the triangle 
universities, most notably in levels of research funding and interactions with industry. Stanford also had less 
organizational constraints in working with industry than those faced by the public universities of the Triangle. 
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consortium was being considered.
15
 UNC, the public flag ship of the university system, hired a lawyer 
within the sponsored research office in 1985 to support patent protection activities, but had no 
internal technology marketing or licensing capabilities.
16
 Duke University, a private university with 
engineering and medical schools, had some internal technology transfer capabilities (e.g., patenting 
activity starting as early as 1974) due to engaged faculty and established industry research 
relationships. Duke committed a full time individual to technology transfer activities in 1985 
according to AUTM, and formally established and fully staffed an office 1986-87.
17
  
Cambridge Recommendations  
The Cambridge Associates Report: The University of North Carolina Technology Transfer 
Study, provided several recommendations to help improve the technology-licensing capabilities 
across the 16 constituent institutions of the UNC system, focusing upon the two largest, UNC and 
NCSU. The findings of this study highlighted the nascent entrepreneurial culture and limited 
infrastructure supporting technology commercialization at the two public universities. Policies and 
procedures had been established for disclosing inventions, protecting intellectual property, and 
ensuring compliance with federal regulations. Patent committees at each of the universities provided 
open, visible mechanisms for decision making on intellectual property protection; and royalty-sharing 
policies with inventors had been established (Clough, 1985). Barriers to commercialization of 
research based inventions at the universities included a lack of effective marketing resources or 
capabilities within the institutions, an absence of a ―culture of technology transfer‖ (i.e., relationships 
                                                     
15
The Association of University Technology Manager (AUTM) Database from annual surveys of US research 
universities (for years 1991-2011) asks in which year the university hired a full time professional dedicated to 
technology transfer. This database has two dates for the start of NCSU‘s Technology transfer Office, 1982 when 
some technology transfer activities started, and 1984 when their first full-time Director was hired, per interview 
discussions.  
 
16AUTM‘s database has UNC Chapel Hill‘s start date as 1985; when they hired counsel to manage their patent 
portfolio. 1995 was when their first official Director of Technology Transfer was hired and a full office 
established. 
 
17
Reflecting two different dates in the AUTM database, 1986 being the year the office was fully staffed, per 
interviews. 
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between academic researchers and industry were minimal), an absence of a clear link to the missions 
of the universities, and no incentives for faculty participation (Clough, 1985, p.14).  
The recommendations provided by Cambridge Associates included institutional level 
suggestions such as developing partnerships with industry and government to create new and 
enhanced products and services from academic research and to develop long-term collaborations with 
private industries to expand the ―vitality and scientific quality‖ of university research (Clough, 1985, 
p.10). The recommendations included suggestions that the universities ―avoid building rigid 
constraints into policies and procedures and … retain as much flexibility as possible in negotiating 
license agreements and industry-sponsored research contracts,‖ while preserving the ―integrity and 
quality‖ of research programs and minimizing potential conflicts of interest (Clough, 1985, p.22). A 
strong emphasis upon a research driven approach to innovation—the creation of new knowledge—
must clearly remain the primary mission of the institution, with intellectual property creation a 
valuable by-product. In order to avoid conflict of interest, recommendations included that clear 
separation be maintained between university research projects and work done in collaboration with a 
company, recognizing the close ties with industry required to effectively commercialize inventions 
(Clough, 1985). Incorporating non-financial incentives and rewards in promotion and tenure metrics 
for entrepreneurial activities was suggested as a way to increase legitimacy with research faculty 
(Clough, 1985).  
The relevance of these recommendations continues today for any institution wishing to 
enhance a culture of acceptance towards technology transfer. For the technology transfer functions 
specifically, the consultants recommended three primary quantitative objectives: 1) maximize the 
number of inventions that can be licensed or will result in industry-sponsored research, 2) maximize 
revenues derived from those licensed inventions, and 3) provide responsive service to the faculty and 
administration regarding any issues around the management of intellectual property belonging to the 
university (Clough, 1985). These three objectives were considered by the consulting group to be the 
primary goals of academic technology transfer efforts. 
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The consulting group proposed two alternatives for the institutions to consider in expanding 
their commitment to technology transfer activities: a) each institution could independently commit 
resources and efforts, or b) could combine recourses through a single entity. An independent 
approach at each institution would allow more direct administrative control and maximize contact and 
communication amongst research faculty, licensing professionals and internal patent offices. 
However, research budgets would only justify the hiring of a single licensing professional, limiting 
the scope of specialization and interaction with industry. Recognizing limitations due to culture, size, 
funding, and resources available to North Carolina‘s public research universities, the consultants 
noted that unless there was a pooling of resources, there would be an inability to achieve the degree of 
specialization required in staffing technology-licensing functions at the individual triad universities 
(Clough, 1985). A cooperative approach, combining resources with a single entity handling all 
invention disclosures, would allow for greater specialization of the licensing professionals who could 
focus efforts and build credibility with faculty and industry experts. This would lead to more effective 
marketing of inventions, efficient use of resources, and development of economies of scale in 
technology licensing activities (Clough, 1985).  
A commercialization partnership would focus upon increasing licenses and options with 
industry partners; maximizing licensing revenues; expanding industry partnerships for research; and 
providing responsive service to faculty inventors and university administrators (Clough, 1985). The 
proposed cooperative entity would provide marketing and licensing services for the inventions 
developed from academic research, while the universities maintained intellectual property 
administration and management in-house. An internal intellectual property management office would 
emphasize the university‘s commitment to technology licensing and commercialization efforts to the 
research faculty (Clough, 1985). This cooperative licensing entity was expected to address the 
underdeveloped marketing and licensing capabilities of the universities and establish an effective 
mechanism for extending inventions developed from academic research activities to industry 
(TULCO Agreement, 1986). The consulting firm strongly recommended a 5 to 10 years commitment 
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to a technology licensing collaboration to build needed infrastructure, gain required levels of 
expertise, develop long-term partnerships, and properly evaluate outcomes (Clough, 1985).  
Duke University‘s participation in any triangle licensing consortium was considered 
necessary by the Cambridge Associates group for successful implementation of a regional technology 
licensing partnership. ―Cooperation among all three major research institutions in Research Triangle 
would provide even better opportunities for specialization,‖ and take advantage of any additional 
linkages in research among the three (Clough, 1985, p.37). A licensing entity representing all three 
universities would draw upon the ―national and international image of the Research Triangle‖, and 
provide a single, visible organization while increasing accessibility to university inventions (Clough, 
1985, p.38).  
With recommendations from their board in January of 1986, the administration of Duke 
University determined it was in their institutions best interest to participate in the cooperative 
licensing effort in its initial stages and committed to joining the consortium (McDonald, 1986). 
Forming a consortium including all three research institutions across the triangle provided access to 
funding from the Research Triangle Foundation, an organization formed in 1958 to manage and 
control land and resources associated with the Research Triangle Park, and distribute those assets to 
the three triangle universities for educational, research, and other purposes ―for which said institutions 
were founded‖ (Link, 1995 p.78). The cooperative approach was expected to provide significant aid 
in the achievement of the universities‘ technology transfer goals as part of their research and public 
service missions. Additionally, the consortium could aid in enabling the universities and private 
industry to work together for the ‗good of the public,‘ a major goal of the Research Triangle 
(Ehringhaus, 1986). 
There were three primary operational objectives for the consortium: 1) interactions with 
faculty inventors to develop invention summaries; 2) marketing and licensing the research based 
inventions to industry contacts as each university‘s licensing agent; and 3) negotiations for 
technology options and license agreements in conjunction with university representatives (Fordham, 
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1985). Patents rights remained at each university, with each maintaining their own intellectual 
property policies. Each university continued to maintain internal operations to handle invention 
disclosure receipt, facilitate industry research agreements, manage patent application processes, and 
oversee distribution of any revenues. Authority for all decision making regarding allocation of 
resources and adherence to policy remained with each campus (Fordham, 1985). TULCO‘s staff 
could not approve deals without the express involvement of the university, whose representatives 
approved and finalized any license agreements. 
TULCO Funding and Formation 
The three leaders of the universities, Chancellor Bruce Poulton of NCSU, President H. Keith 
H. Brodie of Duke, and Chancellor Christopher Fordham III of UNC, formed a Board of Directors to 
establish the governance and oversight of the licensing organization. The Board comprised three 
members from each of the participating universities appointed by the President or Chancellor: a 
senior research officer or administrator, a faculty member, and a member from each university‘s legal 
counsel‘s office. Organized as a 501(c)3 organization, TULCO‘s operations were kept under the 
control of the universities by the appointed Board members. The Board placed the operations of 
TULCO under the fiscal and organizational policies of Duke University, taking advantage of its 
hiring, benefits, purchasing, and related systems (Little, 1986). This arrangement helped keep 
overhead costs to a minimum, providing cost-savings, and flexibility in administering funds and 
employment policies.  
A funding proposal for the consortium was developed and submitted to the Triangle 
Universities Center for Advanced Studies, Inc. (TUCASI), an organization created by the Research 
Triangle Foundation and incorporated November 21, 1975 (Link, 2002) to support collaboration 
among the three universities and increase their participation and presence in the Research Triangle 
Park. TUCASI represented ―the nation‘s first three-university corporation designed to plan and 
develop joint research and educational activities in a major research park whose creation was based 
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on the existence of nearby universities‖ (Link, 2002, p.73 ). TUCASI was focused upon increasing 
their participation and presence in the Research Triangle Park. As TULCO was a cooperative 
enterprise among the three triangle universities, the consortium fit with TUCASI‘s overall mission 
(TUCASI History, last accessed 2-11-2013). Duke‘s involvement with the consortium may have been 
strongly promoted due to the existence of TUCASI and its support of initiatives among the three 
universities. Duke‘s participation opened up a source of operating funds otherwise unavailable to the 
consortium. A five-year funding proposal was submitted in 1985 to establish infrastructure and 
provide for operational and employment funding for the consortium. TUCASI agreed to fund the first 
five years of operations at a rate of $360,000 per year, $1.8 million, and expressed willingness to 
provide funding for the subsequent five years at a more limited rate if needed. The leaders of all three 
of the universities anticipated that TULCO would need less financial assistance from TUCASI as 
proceeds received by the universities from TULCO‘s licensing activities increased over time 
(Fordham, 1985). The consortium was expected to provide significant long-run returns to the 
universities in the form of increased research relationships with industry, an expanded industry 
network, and additional capacity building for technology licensing.  
On June 30
th
, 1986, an agreement was signed among the three universities formally 
constituting the licensing consortium ―for the purpose of facilitating the licensing of intellectual 
property submitted to the consortium‖ by the three universities ―and other non-profit educational, 
scientific and research organizations‖ (TULCO Agreement, 1986, p.1). This organization was 
formally named the Triangle University Licensing Consortium, and often referred to as TULC or 
TULCo in early correspondence and ultimately known as TULCO. The scope of TULCO‘s overall 
mission was limited, as the agreement specifically noted the consortium was being formed solely to 
provide technology licensing services for each of the three universities, enhance their existing internal 
capacity, and realize significant efficiencies and cost savings (TULCO Agreement, 1986). Duke 
served as the consortium‘s home university to ―receive, hold, and administer the funds awarded by 
TUCASI (TUCASI Board minutes, 4-1986).‖ While recommended that the consortium also assist 
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other affiliated members of the UNC system with technology commercialization, initial operations 
were limited to the three research universities in the triangle to ensure establishment of the 
consortium as the primary licensing arm of the universities (TUCASI Board minutes, 3-1987).  
From the outset, Duke‘s involvement with the licensing consortium was expected to be time-
limited. Duke‘s president expressed the desire to be bound to the consortium for the initial five years 
of operations, reviewing their licensing needs independently of the other two universities at the end of 
that initial period.
18
  Dr. Brodie expressed two objectives for Duke‘s cooperation with the proposed 
consortium: relief for the general fund used to manage their Patent Office, and improved 
professionalism and expertise in commercializing the inventions produced by their faculty.  
Geographic Location 
The Research Triangle Park, in central North Carolina and delineated by the three research 
universities, provided a unique opportunity to leverage their co-location within a region. The 
geographic proximity of the three had allowed inter-institutional collaborations and research 
partnerships among the three, providing a fairly stable history of interaction among research faculty, 
despite other competitions across the universities. This proximity to each other provided an important 
element for collaboration, the ability to develop face-to-face relationships and interactions between 
TULCO licensing staff, faculty, and industry contacts were an important aspect in being able to 
successfully license the academic inventions.   
The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) in the Research Triangle Park, provided space for the 
consortium free of charge for occasional assistance with technology commercialization activities. The 
space provided by RTI comprised of three small offices for the licensing professionals, some 
administrative space, and a small conference room. This space was perfect for TULCO‘s inception, as 
it was centrally located to the three universities, limiting travel time to get to each campus, and 
                                                     
18Memorandum from H. Keith H. Brodie to TULCO‘s Board, 1-23-86 
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provided enough office space for TULCO‘s staff. Expansion, however, was not possible, and limited 
the consortium‘s ability to meet the growing needs of each university.  
TULCO Operations 
The Board hired TULCO‘s sole Executive Director Mr. William Riley, in April of 1987.19  
Riley immediately started outreach efforts and discussions with inventors at the three universities. 
Staffing levels for TULCO comprised the executive director, two associate directors, three licensing 
professionals, and two administrative staff members. With backgrounds in bioscience, materials, 
electrical and biomedical engineering, TULCO‘s licensing professionals had a broad range of 
technical backgrounds with which to handle the spectrum of technologies disclosed by the 
universities, each bringing with them a network of industrial contacts from their prior history (Annual 
Report, 1988). TULCO began marketing and licensing activities upon the formal submission of the 
invention disclosure by a university representative. A representative from TULCO‘s licensing staff 
would hold face-to-face meetings with the inventors to build rapport, become familiar with the 
technology, and craft summaries for marketing. These meetings identified any constraints under 
which TULCO would have to operate, (i.e. commitments to research sponsors, or public disclosures). 
Close relationships developed with the campus liaisons from each of the three universities, with 
TULCO functioning as an extension of the university‘s offices. Direct personal contact with 
university liaisons, inventors, and industry representatives expanded TULCO‘s reach and industry 
network. TULCO staff could negotiate license terms within the constraints dictated by the university, 
obtaining consent for any deviation. Special attention was given to companies located in North 
Carolina, leveraging existing state resources such as the North Carolina Small Business Technology 
Development Center (SBTDC) and the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC) in identifying 
companies interested in developing new technologies (Annual Report, 1988). 
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Formal operations of the consortium began January 1988, and all data, reports and information obtained on 
TULCO‘s operations are from fiscal years 1988 through 1995, fiscal years running July 1 through June 30. 
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TULCO‘s licensing staff‘s time and efforts were divided across several activities: working 
with the invention disclosures, expanding industry networks, and providing advisory services. 
Significant time (about 50%) was spent working with university administrators, meeting with faculty 
inventors, providing educational seminars, and learning the research capabilities of each institution. 
TULCO staff members attended university patent committee meetings in an advisory capacity to help 
enhance the entrepreneurial culture and faculty acceptance of technology licensing. Campus visits 
helped to educate the university researchers on TULCO‘s objectives in licensing research based 
inventions, and helped to uncover additional potentially licensable inventions.
20
 TULCO staff 
members also attended university patent committee meetings in an advisory capacity to learn about 
inventions being considered for patentability, increase awareness of TULCO‘s services, and enhance 
faculty acceptance of technology licensing. The licensing staff remained active in professional 
organizations including the Association for University Technology Managers (AUTM) and the 
Licensing Executive Society (LES), providing access to industry networks.  
Initial reactions to TULCO‘s establishment were favorable by all parties. Following the first 
year of operations, the universities were unanimous in acknowledging TULCO‘s capabilities and 
resources had increased licensing inventions from their campuses, and had helped to expand the reach 
of industrial interactions. The feasibility to engage with this level and array of expertise in technology 
transfer functions on a campus-by-campus basis would not have been possible without the creation of 
the consortium.
21
 Into the second year of formal operations, the inventions submitted for licensing 
continued to be primarily from biomedical fields (reflecting the relative research bases of the 
participating institutions). Licensing personnel attempted to contact the university inventors for their 
active submissions at least once a month, even as activity levels increased. By the third year, 
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Discussed in several of the interview sessions, with both licensing staff and faculty inventors; conversations 
with TULCO‘s licensing personnel helped inventors consider other potentially patentable inventions for 
submission. 
 
21
This was a common theme reiterated throughout interviews with each university representative. 
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biomedical technologies continued to dominate invention disclosures, expanding to include biological 
sciences, engineering, materials and instrumentation, and computer science (Annual Report, 1990). 
Some institutional, cultural, and organizational, differences surfaced during their third year of 
operations, in addition to differing expectations among the three universities.
 22 
 These issues 
contributed to the organization‘s eventual demise, and are explored further. TULCO staff members 
adapted procedures and worked with each university to address the unique needs of each campus. 
TULCO continued to establish relationships with industries in RTP and across the nation. 
They achieved widespread recognition, increasing international licensing. During the fourth year, 
negotiations were being conducted with companies based in England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and Sweden (Annual Report, 1991). Developing a personal business relationship with industry 
contacts contributed to TULCO‘s international expansion of their industry network. Over 600 
national and international companies had been contacted in licensing efforts by this fourth year, and 
TULCO‘s international network was one of their most valuable assets. In 1991, each of the 
universities reported record licensing activities, acknowledging TULCO‘s significant contribution 
(Board minutes, 9-1991).  
Continued efforts were made by TULCO‘s staff to focus on NC companies to assist with 
business growth across the state, attending university patent committee meetings, expanding outreach 
efforts and working with regional venture capital groups. In its fifth year of operations, TULCO 
continued to experience expanded demands upon its time and resources, with increased invention 
disclosures and continued personal contacts with inventors and over 700 businesses. This continued 
expansion caused stress on TULCO‘s time and resources, creating bottlenecks, and fueling discontent 
within the universities where they felt their needs were not being properly addressed.  
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Gradual Disbanding of TULCO 
Experiencing some levels of success and frustrations from its initial five years, transition was 
inevitable for the consortium. Duke made it clear they were pulling all licensing activities in-house by 
the end of calendar year 1992, reorganizing its technology transfer efforts. The initial campus liaison 
to TULCO had left Duke, changing the dynamic of the relationship between their technology 
licensing operation and the consortium. Personnel and other changes taking place at Duke‘s medical 
school in the early 1990‘s and their desire to find alternate licensing arrangements for inventions from 
specific technology areas contributed to this decision. The successes from TULCO‘s licensing efforts 
helped Duke realize that an internal full service technology licensing office was needed to effectively 
support their faculty inventors. 
During the sixth year of formal operations (1992-1993), the original grant from TUCASI was 
fully expended, Duke had formally left the consortium to pursue commercialization strategies 
separately, and TULCO experienced several changes in licensing and administrative personnel; 
contributing to the changing dynamics between the universities and the consortium. A second 
proposal to TUCASI for funding years six through ten had been developed and submitted, but was 
withdrawn once it became apparent that Duke would no longer be participating (TULCO Funding 
Proposal, 1991). TUCASI‘s mandate was to support joint efforts among all three triangle universities, 
so funding was not available without Duke‘s involvement. The two remaining universities, UNC and 
NCSU, continued TULCO‘s operations, and regrouped with an agreement between them (NCSU and 
UNC Agreement, 1994). Duke contracted separately with TULCO during 1993-1995 for licensing 
support in exchange for their continued maintenance of TULCO‘s finances and employment contracts 
(TULCO and Duke Contracts, 1993-1995).  
While disclosures from Duke fell off after their exit, submissions continued to increase from 
the other two universities, continuing to exert demands on TULCO‘s time and efforts. The licensing 
staff remained at three individuals after some personnel changes, despite increased disclosure 
submissions and a growing active case load stretching the limits of available resources. No plans were 
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made to increase personnel capacity, as TULCO was constrained by the allocated office space 
provided by RTI.  
This more limited arrangement between UNC and NCSU terminated in 1995 as NCSU 
eventually followed Duke, expanding internal capacity and pulling all licensing activities in house. 
NCSU cited several reasons for leaving TULCO, including lack in growth of adequate resources at 
TULCO (space, personnel, expertise) needed for their rapidly expanding caseload (both in size and 
complexity), growing information management needs, pressure for new business development from 
the university, and an increased need for ongoing maintenance of relationships with their licensees. 
NCSU‘s industry relationships had expanded into areas such as computer science and information 
management, with no corresponding licensing capabilities added to TULCO‘s services. NCSU also 
expressed a need to expand their networks with venture capital firms, business development 
professionals, professional organizations, government agencies, economic development 
organizations, and other service providers, and a desire to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the 
early stage evaluation process (NCSU Challenges and Opportunities, 1995). With NCSU‘s departure 
from the consortium, UNC had to increase their internal technology licensing capacity as well, and 
hired their first technology transfer Director in September of 1995. This new director worked with 
TULCO to finalize licensing projects, eventually making all licensing activities internal, allowing 
UNC to address their expanding entrepreneurial and commercialization needs of their faculty.  
Some of TULCO‘s intangible assets were captured by the triangle universities as TULCO 
disbanded. Two of the three (the TULCO Director retired) licensing personnel were brought into 
technology licensing offices within Duke and NCSU, retaining some resources, knowledge, and 
industry network cultivated during TULCO‘s operations. These intangible assets: the people, their 
experience, tacit knowledge, and personal networks developed during their TULCO experience were 
a boon to the institutions able to retain them, and helped with the smooth transfer of licensing 
activities. During the transfer of licensing activities back to the university, active projects early in the 
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commercialization process were pulled back into the universities. TULCO‘s agents completed those 
close to finalization of an agreement. 
Cultural and Resource Constraints Contributing to Dissolution 
The differing cultures of each institution, and the growing resource constraints at TULCO 
had a large contribution towards the eventual disbandment of the consortium. Differences in 
institutional culture, organizational processes, and expectations of TULCO surfaced during their third 
year of operations. The unique characteristics and circumstances of each university required some 
adaptability in TULCO‘s licensing approaches, while retaining the basic mission of the consortium to 
commercialize the inventions disclosed from the universities. Cultural and historical differences, 
adaptability in license negotiations and terms, differences between public vs. private institutions, and 
differences in policy environments were all issues that had to be accounted for in the operations of the 
consortium. The board and staff members of TULCO recognized these differences among the three 
universities and tried to work with each to ensure the special needs of each were appropriately 
addressed. 
At the time of TULCO‘s formation, Duke was (and continues to be) a prestigious private 
research university, with strong research activities and industry partnerships in their medical school, 
NCSU a strong public agricultural land grant university, with engaged faculty in agricultural, 
engineering, and information management research, and UNC a prestigious public research 
university, with research strengths in chemistry, pharmacy, and a burgeoning computer science 
department. Subsequently, each university had very different cultural environments and histories, 
creating instances where TULCO‘s licensing staff had to adapt their licensing strategies to meet the 
differing needs of the universities.  
NCSU‘s documented struggles with meeting the growing technology licensing and 
commercialization needs for their expanding research and industry research partnerships are 
additional indicators of a lack of adequate expansion in licensing personnel and other services within 
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TULCO to keep up with the rapidly expanding marketing and commercialization needs of each of the 
triangle universities. The increasing research diversity and invention disclosure activity levels, 
without additional corresponding resources allocated to TULCO‘s operations diminished their ability 
to provide unique marketing, licensing and commercialization efforts for the universities. Physical 
space constraints were a key barrier to expanding resources at the time. The consortium acted as a 
catalyst, transforming the internal infrastructures of each research university to meet a growing need 
in support of technology licensing and commercialization.  
Methodology 
In light of the fact that regional consortia are being advocated in national level policy 
discussions, TULCO is analyzed here as a case study of one regional licensing consortium effective 
in helping institutions increase their technology licensing effectiveness. This collaborative entity is 
studied from its inception to conclusion, providing historical context of its operations and 
effectiveness in licensing the academic inventions from the three universities. This case study project 
was designed to answer the following questions regarding this early technology licensing consortium: 
How and why did the three triangle universities decide to collaborate in a technology licensing 
consortia? How effective was TULCO in effecting the entrepreneurial culture within the universities 
and expanding the commercialization capacity in the Research Triangle universities? And finally, 
why was TULCO disbanded?   
This case study utilized qualitative analysis through semi-structured interviews and archival 
document review as sources of evidence to study this technology licensing consortium in the RTP. 
Interviews and conversations were held with eight individuals who had worked directly with TULCO 
in various capacities, employees of the consortium, inventors, board members, and the three 
university representatives or liaisons to TULCO. Interviews followed an open ended discussion guide 
(Appendix A), to encourage interviewees to talk about their experience with TULCO, providing 
insightful information on TULCO‘s operations and explanations of its eventual demise. Interviews 
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led to the identification of archived documents; TULCO‘s Annual Reports, board meeting minutes, 
and other materials held by Duke‘s legal counsel‘s office. Access to those materials was graciously 
granted by that office, and allowed a fuller analysis of the yearly ongoing licensing activities of 
TULCO. Information from TULCO‘s annual reports on disclosures received, confidentiality 
agreements, license negotiations (initiated and finalized), and active, open case files at the end of each 
fiscal year was pulled from those annual reports to allow quantifiable analysis of yearly activities. 
Data on the triangle universities patenting activities were obtained from the USPTO for a 24 year 
period, the 8 years prior to TUCLO‘s formation, 8 years during, and 8 years post operations. Data on 
NC patents issued (from each year in which the patent applications were filed during TULCO‘s 
operations) was provided by Dr. Maryann Feldman who received cleaned and verified USPTO patent 
data for North Carolina from Dr. Deborah Strumsky at UNC Charlotte. This patent data is evaluated 
to understand TULCO‘s impact upon the universities propensity to engage in intellectual property 
protection during this time frame. Licensing activity and royalty income for each of the universities 
was obtained from the Association of University Technology Manager‘s Statistics Access for Tech 
Transfer (STATT)
23
 database, available from 1991 onward.  
These multiple sources of data and information on the operations of TULCO from archived 
annual reports, board meeting minutes and other records, interviews, and patenting data of the three 
universities provide insight into the daily operations of the licensing consortium. Interview 
discussions are validated by information contained in the archived documents (board meeting 
minutes, annual reports, and correspondence), further validated by the increased patenting activity of 
the three institutions as evidenced from the USPTO. AUTM data post TULCO for the three Research 
Triangle universities indicate the continued growth of technology licensing activities at the three 
universities after the licensing consortium was disbanded. This quantitative data combined with 
insights obtained from interviews allowed a chronological time series analysis of TULCO‘s activities 
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Statistics Access for Tech Transfer (STATT): a searchable database of academic licensing data collected by 
AUTM from participating research universities and other research institutions. 
  102 
over its eight year time span, and evaluation of TULCO‘s impact upon entrepreneurial cultures and 
technology licensing activities at each of the universities.  
Analysis of TULCO Technology Transfer Activities  
Records from TULCO‘s operations and communication between Board members indicate a 
significant increase in licensing of the three universities‘ inventions during the 8 years of TULCO‘s 
operations. Information gathered in interview sessions indicated TULCO may also have had an 
additional impact upon patenting activity at its outset, as faculty inventors were encouraged to think 
about the applied outcome of their research, and disclose other research results not previously 
considered. Initial faculty interviews with TULCO‘s licensing professionals often generated other 
invention disclosures from active research faculty
24
. Information was collected from TULCO‘s annual 
reports on the numbers of disclosures received, confidentiality agreements started and finalized, 
license negotiations started and finalized, and active, open case files at the end of each fiscal year 
(table 3.1). Some records are missing from this set of archived materials; however enough 
information could be obtained to provide a full picture of TULCO‘s activities and the constraints 
under which they operated. Analysis of these documents helped identify TULCO‘s success and some 
missteps of this licensing consortium. Interviews supplemented and supported the data.  
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This was another recurring theme across interview discussions with TULCO stakeholders. 
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Table 3.1 TULCO Activities 
Year 
Invention 
Disclosures 
CDA 
Started 
CDA 
Signed 
Licenses 
Started 
Licenses 
Completed 
Active 
Files 
Total 
Patents 
Issued
25
 
1988* 98 76 48 41 11 81 37 
1989 111 133 105 63 20 131 25 
1990 142 112 88 84 41 168 34 
1991 120 101 85 70 42 205 40 
1992‡ 146 107 88 63 34 216 91 
1993 114 97 67 46 52 236 77 
1994 131 132 115 42 35 255 117 
1995† 47 35 30 11 21 297 151 
Totals 909 793 626 420 256  572 
* 6 months of official operations, activities started with hire of Exec Director in 1987 
‡ Duke left consortium at end of 1992 
† Data only available for 1st quarter of fiscal year. 
 
Trends in Disclosures and Active Projects 
Disclosure submissions were not distinguished by university each year in TULCO‘s annual 
reports, but show growth in the initial three years as the consortium developed its internal capabilities 
and infrastructure. Submissions grew by 45% during the first three years as the consortium got 
underway, indicating a pent up supply of inventions developed from research. The submission rate 
leveled off after this initial period, indicative of a point of equilibrium being reached. Over its first 
seven years of operations, TULCO averaged 123 submissions per year, quite a number considering its 
licensing staff of three people (TULCO Annual Report, 1994). While the disclosure submissions from 
the triangle universities leveled off somewhat after the first three years, the active open case load for 
marketing and licensing efforts continued to increase over the duration of TULCO‘s operations. As 
disclosure submissions continued at a steady rate with no corresponding increase in personnel, space 
or other resources allocated to the operations, TULCO‘s capacity limitations became apparent. 
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These numbers are total for all three triangle universities, and are those patents issued from the patent 
application filings in each year of TULCO‘s operations. 
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Confidentiality Disclosure Agreements 
Confidentiality Disclosure Agreements (CDAs) are submitted in advance of discussing any 
technical specifications of inventions with prospective licensees. As such, these agreements to keep 
the underlying functions and mechanisms of the innovations confidential could be viewed as leading 
indicators of TULCO‘s subsequent licensing negotiations. Licensing negotiations with an industry 
representative would not proceed without such an agreement in place. A total of 793 of these CDAs 
were submitted to industry contracts who expressed interest in learning more about the academic 
inventions during the eight years of TULCO‘s operations, 626 of those were signed (79%). These 
finalized CDAs demonstrate TULCO‘s licensing staff‘s effectiveness in outreach efforts to potential 
licensing partners and in building a strong international network of contacts with industry. Figure 3.1 
below includes a trend line which indicates the positive trends for both submitted and completed 
confidentiality discussions with industry.  
 
Figure 3.1, TULCO Confidentiality Agreements, Submitted and Signed 
 
* 6 months of official operations, activities started with hire of Exec Director in 1987 
‡ Duke left consortium at end of 1992 
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Licensing Negotiations 
Over the eight years of TULCO‘s operations, 420 license agreements were initiated with 
industry partners, with 256 of those being successfully finalized; about 61% (table 3.1). During the 
first three years of TULCO‘s operations, the licensing professionals dealt with the pent up supply and 
demand for academic technology licensing in the triangle region. The number of licensing discussions 
started with potential industry partners grew by 105% during that brief time frame, with the number 
of those finalized increasing from 11 the first year to 41 in the third. After that initial growth, the 
number of negotiations initiated with companies declined each subsequent year, potentially reaching a 
point of diminishing returns upon the resources of the licensing staff. Finalized licenses each year 
continued at a steady rate, dropping with some uncertainty in 1992, increasing again in 1993, 
TULCO‘s licensing professionals completed an average of 40 licenses per year with industry.  
Figure 3.2 below represents the initiated and completed license negotiations from 1988 
through 1994 (complete data was not available for 1995). Linear trend lines show the relative decline 
in negotiations initiated over TULCO‘s time span, and the relative increase in license negotiations 
finalized with industry licensees. The steady increasing rate of finalized licenses each year is 
indicative of the licensing staff‘s continued efforts and success in getting research based inventions 
into the commercial pipeline. This trend is supported by conversations from several interviews, 
licensing staff were committed to building and maintaining relationships with industry contacts, and 
those relationships in turn facilitated successful licensing negotiations and opened doors to other 
contacts; expanding TULCO‘s reach and industry network.  
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Figure 3.2, TULCO Licensing Negotiations, Initiated and Finalized 
 
* 6 months of official operations, activities started with hire of Exec Director in 1987 
‡ Duke left consortium at end of 1992 
 
While it would have been beneficial to compare this activity to similarly funded research 
institutions across the US, the appropriate data are not available. AUTM data are only available after 
1991 so a comparison to similar institutions that operated individually is not possible. Still there is 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that technology transfer activity of the three triangle universities 
increased under TULCO.  
The active open caseload for marketing and licensing efforts continued to increase over the 
duration of TULCO‘s operations, growing to almost 300 unlicensed invention disclosures in 1995 
(table 3.1). This increasing level of open cases over TULCO‘s operations reflect the maturing of the 
portfolio and the long-lead time (from initial disclosure to a successful license) typically experienced 
for early stage academic inventions. As disclosure submissions continued at a steady rate with no 
corresponding increase in personnel, space, or other resources allocated to the operations to address 
the increasing caseload, TULCO‘s capacity limitations became apparent.  
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Submission Proportion for each University 
Duke and NCSU utilized the consortium as an extension of their existing technology 
licensing operations, retaining disclosures they had internal capacity to handle, sending those 
inventions that could benefit from their expanded expertise and network, while TULCO functioned as 
UNC‘s sole licensing operation.26 Yearly disclosure submission data was not available for each 
university from TULCO‘s Annual Reports, as the consortium reported all disclosures together. 
However, minutes from Board meetings provided data points indicating the relative invention 
disclosure submission percentages from each of the universities (Board minutes 9-1994). By Fall of 
1994, the triangle universities were reassessing their technology licensing needs and capacity, UNC 
was the primary beneficiary of TULCO‘s services, as their invention disclosures comprised almost 
half (47%) of all total disclosures received by the consortium, with Duke submitting 24%, and NCSU 
29%. These latter numbers also reflected Duke‘s withdrawal in 1992 (figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3, Disclosure Proportion by University 1988-1994 
 
UNC‘s utilization of TULCO‘s operations for all invention disclosures indicates their lack of 
any internal marketing or licensing skills. This data may also provide some indication why Duke and 
NCSU felt they were not receiving a fair share of the services provided by TULCO‘s operations to 
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continue their participation in the consortium, justifying their internal capacity expansion to meet the 
growing demand from their research faculty.  
Patenting Trends 
To evaluate TULCO‘s impact upon the inventive capacity of each institution, data was also 
obtained on issued patents that were applied for during the eight years prior to TULCO‘s operations 
(1980-1987), the eight years in which TULCO was in operation (1988-1995), and the eight years 
following its demise (1996-2003) (See figures 3.4-3.6 in Appendix B, Issued Patents). Prior to 
TULCO‘s formation, applications for patents that were subsequently issued during 1980-1987 were 
nonexistent, or in the single digits. Patenting increased slightly at each university in the mid 1980‘s, 
driven by the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act; following a national trend of increased patenting activity 
across US research universities (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2001). During TULCO‘s 
eight year time frame, 1988-1995, the patenting activity at each of the three universities saw 
significant growth (table 3.2). Issued patents from those filed for the three universities during 
TULCO‘s eight years increased dramatically as seen in figure 3.5, reflecting a confluence of several 
initiatives to increase the commercial potential of academic inventions, nationally and within the 
triangle region. Table 3.2 includes reported royalty income to AUTM after 1991, Duke‘s royalty 
income reporting starting in 1993. 
 
Table 3.2, Issued Patents, and reported Royalties, 1988-1995 
Year* 
Duke 
Issued Pat 
Duke 
Royalty $ 
UNC 
Issued Pat 
UNC 
Royalty $ 
NCSU 
Issued Pat 
NCSU 
Royalty $ 
1988 13 
 
10 
 
14 
 
1989 10 
 
6 
 
9 
 
1990 6 
 
11 
 
17 
 
1991 10 
 
11 393 19 818 
1992 36 
 
15 414 40 1,101 
1993 27 641 17 575 33 1,543 
1994 52 1,556 30 886 35 1,632 
1995 48 1,790 68 983 35 1,823 
*Patents issued from application year, $ amounts in thousands 
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Technology protection and licensing functions had become more fully developed at each of 
the universities by the mid-1990s, stimulated by the technology licensing consortium and the growing 
entrepreneurial culture at each university. Data available on issued patents and royalty income for 
each university for the subsequent 8 years (table 3.3) after TULCO‘s demise indicates the expanding 
entrepreneurial culture and internal resource capability growth at each institution to meet expanding 
needs of the research faculty. 
 
Table 3.3, Issued Patents, and reported Royalties, 1995-2003 
Year* 
Duke 
Issued Pat 
Duke 
Royalty $ 
UNC Issued 
Pat 
UNC 
Royalty $ 
NCSU 
Issued Pat 
NCSU 
Royalty $ 
1996 36 
 
26 1,389 37 
 
1997 32 1,520 52 1,684 25 3,165 
1998 51 1,319 30 1,890 30 4,281 
1999 53 1,600 36 1,706 37 7,761 
2000 38 4,329 48 953 49 2,558 
2001 48 5,719 36 1,227 53 3,545 
2002 48 4,977 43 1,284 53 3,720 
2003 43 2,794 33 3,863 45 4,603 
*Patents issued from application year, $ amounts in thousands 
 
With commercialization of academic inventions an expressly stated national policy goal, 
infrastructure and incentives were aligning to create an entrepreneurial culture at each of the 
universities. TULCO was instrumental in meeting that need for the triangle research universities, 
expanding knowledge and helping expand acceptance of entrepreneurial and innovative activities 
across each campus. Campus visits and participation in seminars helped faculty inventors think about 
the potential applied outcomes of their research, and invention disclosures were submitted that might 
not have without TULCO‘s involvement.  
The existence of TULCO allowed the three research universities surrounding NC‘s Research 
Triangle Park to share resources, allowing more effective and efficient transfer of the academic 
inventions to industry than would have been accomplished had each campus acted individually. The 
presence of this early licensing consortium provided a short-term mechanism to address a growing 
need when technology licensing infrastructure and capabilities within each campus were in short 
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supply. The discussion and analysis of trends in the data on invention disclosures, confidentiality and 
license agreements, patents issued, and royalty income to the universities during TULCO‘s timeframe 
suggest that the formation of this licensing consortium among the three triangle universities had a 
significant impact upon the internal culture of entrepreneurship at each of the institutions involved. 
Each of these technology transfer related activities grew substantially during TULCO‘s timeframe. 
Acceptance of technology licensing and commercialization with the research faculty at each of the 
institutions grew in response to TULCO‘s activities and engagement, enabling the successful 
licensing of 256 inventions to industry from the three universities. 
Evidence from Interviews 
Interviews were held with eight individuals who had worked with the licensing consortium in 
various capacities: the three university representatives who worked directly with the consortium 
during its initial operations, members of TULCO‘s licensing staff, a board member, and a faculty 
member who had worked with the consortium both as an inventor and through the university‘s 
internal patent committee. Perspectives from these interviews provided some supplementary 
information unavailable from the annual reports and board meeting minutes, highlighting differences 
in culture, research functions, flexibility, and expectations of TULCO at each of the universities in 
addition to the constraints faced by the licensing staff. Identities of these individuals remain 
confidential; titles are utilized when permission was given to do so. 
Cultural and Institutional Differences 
The differences in history and culture at each of the universities became clearer throughout 
the conversations with the individuals involved with TULCO. Recognition of these institutional 
differences was expressed in TULCO‘s third Annual Report (1990). All three were high research-
intensive universities, with research funding levels at about $120-150 million dollars (NSF 
Webcasper). Confirmed in the interviews, Duke University, already engaged in industry research, had 
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more experience and internal cultural acceptance of entrepreneurial activities, and as a result, had 
high expectations from TULCO‘s licensing staff in engaging industry to license their inventions. 
UNC, as a flagship institution of the North Carolina University System, had high levels of research 
activities, but a non-existent internal entrepreneurial culture, and no internal experience or capabilities 
for technology marketing and licensing. UNC‘s lack of cultural acceptance towards entrepreneurship 
and technology commercialization required significant engagement by TULCO‘s licensing staff for 
educational seminars and informational sessions. Finally, NCSU, as a land grant university and 
another flagship of the North Carolina University System, had strong programs in engineering, 
textiles and agriculture, and some experience with industry partnerships, resulting in more cultural 
acceptance for entrepreneurial activities on their campus.  
Each university filled a different niche in their research environments and capabilities, shaped 
by their cultural environment, funding, and faculty research; providing limited opportunities for 
bundling inventions among them for commercialization. These institutional cultural and historical 
differences, differing expectations and internal directions of burgeoning research areas led each of the 
triangle universities to pull all technology licensing and commercialization activities in-house to meet 
the expanding faculty needs as internal cultural acceptance of entrepreneurial activities grew.  
Existing Internal Capacity 
Internal capacity at the universities for technology transfer at the time was reactive, 
responding to pressures from engaged faculty, and capacity growth was needed. NCSU was hiring a 
new director of technology transfer in 1984 to increase their internal technology licensing capacity 
beyond the university counsel‘s office when the consortium was being considered, and Duke was 
hiring a director in 1986 to take over their technology licensing office when TULCO was formalized. 
Duke and NCSU had higher levels of faculty acceptance toward entrepreneurial activities. There was 
some concern expressed of overlapping functionality with the new director hired at NCSU while 
TULCO‘s formation. The consortium was recognized however, as helping to expand the availability 
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of commercialization services available at NCSU. UNC utilized external resources for all marketing 
and licensing efforts for the few invention disclosures they received prior to TULCO‘s formation. 
Once TULCO was established, UNC utilized their services for all marketing and licensing activities, 
creating a sense that the public flagship university used TULCO‘s resources disproportionately.  
Working with TULCO 
Each of the university representatives to the consortium noted their respective universities 
benefitted from TULCO‘s presence in helping the universities gain capacity in marketing and 
licensing their inventions, and in educating faculty members. An early member of TULCO‘s licensing 
staff expressed great pleasure with the initial operations of TULCO, and felt the consortium kick-
started marketing and licensing activities at UNC, and enhanced existing activities at Duke and 
NCSU.  
During discussion and review of patenting data for each of the universities, one interviewee 
suggested that the combined effect of TULCO‘s impact upon the entrepreneurial culture at each 
university, the encouragement for faculty to disclose inventions, and the fact that the marketing and 
licensing functions were being paid for by an external source, all strongly influenced the 
receptiveness and willingness of the research faculty at each university to bring research results 
forward for potential patenting and commercialization. With limited resources on their individual 
campuses, the university representatives all noted that TULCO‘s services enhanced and helped 
expand their technology commercialization capacity beyond what they would have been able to do 
individually. While each of these university representatives indicated TULCO‘s enhancement of their 
technology licensing activities, there were some indications during these interviews that the 
universities received different levels of service from TULCO based upon their needs. Towards the 
end of the consortium‘s operations, when internal commercialization capabilities at the universities 
had developed sufficiently to meet the growing demands of their research faculty, it made sense at 
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each university to bring the provision of marketing and licensing services in-house to meet faculty 
inventors needs more effectively and efficiently. 
Concerns 
These discussions with individuals who had worked with TULCO confirmed the expanding 
submission rate and active projects with no corresponding expansion in available resources during the 
last three years of operations had a detrimental impact upon the ability of TULCO to meet the 
established expectations at each university. Staff changes within the universities and TULCO also 
changed existing relationship dynamics. TULCO‘s operations were run from their RTI offices in 
RTP, and while fairly close to each of the triangle universities, TULCO‘s licensing staff spent 
considerable time and effort to interact with the research faculty in face-to-face meetings, particularly 
as demands grew for TULCO‘s licensing and commercialization services. The increased volume of 
invention disclosures and technology licensing activities and the inability of TULCO to meet the 
expanding needs of the three universities warranted either an enhanced investment in the licensing 
consortium, or an expansion of the existing internal technology licensing operations within each of 
the triangle universities, particularly as faculty embraced the growing entrepreneurial culture. 
Communication breakdowns at the end of TULCO‘s operations caused some friction. One director of 
an internal technology licensing function felt TULCO‘s management had not fully understood they 
were being replaced by the growing internal capabilities within each university.  
Discussion 
The history of TULCO presented above provides some background on how and why these 
three triangle universities decided to collaborate through a technology licensing consortium. Pressures 
to provide access to the results of federally funded academic inventions were increasing from regional 
legislators, and entrepreneurial faculty members at each university were beginning to tax the existing 
limited internal capabilities at each institution. Institutional responses to the increased pressures from 
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entrepreneurial faculty were more reactive than proactive, and there were limited internal capabilities 
for technology licensing. The formation of the consortium allowed the three regional institutions to 
leverage their geographic location and proximity to each other, utilize existing internal capabilities, 
expand access to marketing resources and subject matter domain skills, and increase each university‘s 
network with industry for successful licensing.  
As evaluated above, the activities engaged in by TULCO‘s licensing staff promoted the 
successful licensing of at least 256 inventions from the three universities, and contacts with regional, 
national and international industries expanded business networks. Interviews with key stakeholders 
all suggested early successful licensing efforts would not have happened without TULCO‘s efforts in 
expanding industry networks. In response to activities by TULCO licensing staff in engaging with 
academic researchers on each campus, additional invention disclosures were brought to TULCO for 
potential licensing. TULCO‘s efforts in working with research faculty helped to enhance the 
entrepreneurial culture within the universities, increasing demand and desire for technology 
commercialization and industry engagement. The commercialization capacity in the Research 
Triangle universities developed over time as the entrepreneurial culture expanded and technology 
licensing needs grew. Since TULCO was not able to expand space or add licensing staff or other 
resources in response to the growing needs and expanding research focus areas of each of the 
universities, internal licensing capabilities, processes and structures grew at each university in 
response to the increased needs of their research faculty.  
Some cultural differences among the three triangle research institutions became apparent a 
few years into the consortium, as well as differing expectations of the consortium from each 
university. The consortium attempted to respond to the individual expectations of each university, but 
was unable to expand its own capacity to meet the rapidly expanding research areas and growing 
technology commercialization needs. As each of the universities expanded internal capacity to meet 
growing needs of entrepreneurial faculty members, the need for TULCO‘s services began to diminish. 
NCSU and Duke University each developed specific processes in support of their individual needs to 
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more effectively support their research faculty and growing institutional needs. As each of these two 
universities pulled technology commercialization activities in house, TULCO was eventually 
disbanded and UNC subsequently formalized their technology internal commercialization efforts, 
staffing a full office in 1995.   
TULCO provided an expansion of commercialization functionality in the Research Triangle 
as each university was constrained by its history and culture, funding limitations, lack of incentives, 
and slowness to adapt to the increasing need for technology commercialization, characteristics 
identified in previous studies as limitations to success in commercializing academic inventions 
(O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Link & Scott, 2005; Renault, 2006). TULCO was initially successful in 
addressing a growing regional need to expand technology licensing and commercialization of the 
academic inventions from the three triangle universities. The licensing consortium was effective in 
expanding the entrepreneurial culture across each of the three institutions, increasing acceptance of 
research faculty for technology commercialization efforts. These three research universities were able 
to have an impact throughout the regional economic environment through this technology licensing 
consortium and the successful licensing of 256 university inventions to regional, national and 
international industry partners. The growing receptiveness to entrepreneurial activities on each 
campus increased each institution‘s needs beyond TULCO‘s capabilities to meet, which in turn 
enabled each institution to expand their internal capabilities to meet the growing needs of research 
faculty.  
Recommendations 
Recommendations for technology licensing consortia have been put forward by the Kauffman 
Foundation, and have appeared in federal bills introduced to Congress, including the America 
Innovates Act of 2012 (H. R. 4720), and Startup Act 2.0 (S. 3127), both introduced to the 112
th
 
congress. While these federal bills stalled in committee and were not successful in becoming law, 
discussions are still maintained at the national level on accelerating technology transfer from federally 
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funded research, with the reintroduction of the Startup Act 3.0 (H.R. 714 and S. 310) introduced 
February 2013, and continuing discussions regarding technology licensing efforts among research 
universities and joint research institutions to facilitate technology transfer from research universities 
across the US.
27
  
Each individual interviewed for this paper agreed that forming a technology licensing 
consortium helped the triangle universities move the academic inventions towards commercialization 
more efficiently and effectively, established a broader domain expertise in licensing staff, helped 
build infrastructure and capacity, and increased acceptance of an entrepreneurial culture with the 
faculty at the universities involved. Some recommend technology-licensing consortia as an alternative 
technology commercialization mechanism for smaller research universities. Their recommendations 
contribute to this section. 
A regional licensing consortium may be considered as a potential blueprint by smaller 
universities, or state systems with smaller schools that might benefit from combined resource 
capabilities. The TULCO model may be most effective for regional research universities with limited 
internal licensing capacity and funding for technology licensing. By engaging in a consortium or 
partnership, universities may broaden their domain in subject matter expertise and specialization of 
staff by leveraging each other‘s knowledge and experience in technology licensing with minimal 
impact upon budgets. As with TULCO, having an organization function as a single point of contact 
for multiple organizations may produce efficiencies for prospective industry partners; perhaps with 
them being more willing to take a look at academic inventions through a single licensing portal. 
Universities contemplating such a consortium would benefit from similar research goals, and 
similar initial attitudes toward faculty entrepreneurial and engagement activities. Complementary and 
overlapping research portfolios can build advantage. Institutional histories, regulatory environments 
and social norms and cultures of the universities joining in such a consortium need to be compatible 
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or complementary to each other to facilitate growth and change (North, 1990). Outside entities 
forming a consortium for a group of research universities that are not familiar with their internal 
cultures will find it harder to be effective.  
To be successful, each university involved must be fully committed to partnership in the 
consortium, with full buy-in by all involved, and with strong internal champions from the leadership 
of the universities actively supporting the initiative. Faculty researchers must feel supported and 
incentivized by university leadership in their entrepreneurial initiatives, and to be sure those activities 
do not detract from career advancement. 
The existence of consortium must serve the mission of the participating universities solely, 
not to perpetuate itself. Metrics, reports, and other public information must be evaluated at the 
university or institutional level, in order to accurately measure whether the consortium is being 
effective for the universities involved. Employees must understand the organization is working for the 
universities and is not an agent on its own. Staff members of any licensing consortia among 
universities must be closely aligned with the mission and culture of the universities involved in order 
for the needs of those universities to be understood and met.  
High-touch or high engagement is important in technology licensing, and successful 
partnerships come with the development of personal relationships. The relationships established 
between TULCO staff and the campus liaisons facilitated the technology commercialization processes 
for all involved. Physical proximity during the time of TULCO‘s operations was considered 
extremely important, as licensing and technology transfer is considered a ‗contact sport‘ requiring a 
lot of personal interaction, a lot of face-to-face, handshakes, and being together. Closeness in 
industry-university partnerships develops over time, those relationships strengthened through shared 
norms, attitudes, values and expectations (Asheim & Coenen, 2006). Technology licensing requires 
strong engagement with faculty inventors and industry networks alike to help build trust and rapport 
that enables successful commercialization.  
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Meaningful incentives must be in place for the licensing staff of a consortium to promote all 
inventions. Employment compensation cannot be tied to royalty income for technology licensing 
efforts, as focus will turn to those inventions with the highest revenue generating potential, leaving 
orphans behind. If the goal is to move inventions forward to the benefit of the public rather than 
generate revenue, an appropriate compensation plan can help ensure all disclosed inventions are given 
equal treatment. TULCO‘s model was considered a successful one in this area–their licensing staff 
members received no percentage of licensing income, and were judged on metrics beyond any income 
received from their efforts.  
A strategic focus upon creating technology-licensing consortia between research universities 
can facilitate capacity building and long-term successes in commercialization efforts if it is 
appropriately resourced. The consortium‘s long-term outcome must be kept firmly in mind, to fully 
understand where funding will come from over time, and to know what to do when there is no longer 
a need for a collaborative organization. A good exit strategy will have an orderly plan for capturing 
all of the tangible or intangible assets once the consortium is no longer needed. This follows 
recommendations from previous studies; technology commercialization and licensing efforts need to 
be driven by long-term goals, provided with sufficient resources (human and financial) to achieve 
these objectives, and monitored over time for performance to determine how resources can be 
realigned (Siegel & Phan, 2005). 
Conclusion 
This analysis of an early stage regional licensing consortium provides valuable insights and 
an opportunity to evaluate its potential applicability for a regional model among US research 
universities. Economies of scale and scope were realized as the consortium hired licensing 
professionals with a variety of backgrounds that reflected the diversity of research at the universities, 
enabling them to effectively engage with inventors and industry contacts in each of the research areas. 
The net result was an increased disclosure submission rate at each campus, increased patent 
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applications (and subsequent issued patents), successful licensing of languishing university based 
inventions, and an expanded industry network. The consortium helped the universities realize 
efficiencies in technology licensing through deeper domain expertise and economies of scale in 
sharing three licensing professionals among them.  
This is a single case study analysis of an early stage regional licensing consortium in NC‘s 
RTP, and therefore there are limitations in its applicability. However, this study can provide guidance 
for those considering the development of technology licensing consortia between regional research 
universities. This model may be considered as a potential blueprint by smaller universities, or state 
systems with smaller schools that cannot fund internal technology licensing functions. With the 
knowledge and recommendations gathered from this single case-study, technology licensing consortia 
being considered or initiated by regional research universities have knowledge of TULCO‘s successes 
that could be replicated and potential pitfalls to be avoided in their approach to a similar 
collaboration. If this model is adopted by other research universities across the US and 
internationally, continued evaluation of new consortia can provide further information for analysis of 
how this model may work to address current technology marketing and commercialization needs for 
inventions created from the academic environment.   
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Chapter 4. US University Organizational Characteristics and Technology 
Transfer Performance 
Introduction 
Moving academic innovations into the public sector, the ‗technology transfer process‘ is 
increasingly considered a source of unencumbered revenues by university administrators and of 
economic development by regional legislators (Siegel, 2012).  Increased expectations for the 
commercialization of university research outcomes have prompted universities to look for ways to 
become more entrepreneurial and effective in technology transfer (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2006; 
Audretsch, 2013). The university‘s technology licensing office (TLO) is the organizational unit 
responsible for protecting (via patent, copyright, trademark), marketing, and commercializing 
innovations with commercial value, a requirement set in place with the passage of the federal Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-517). Considerable attention is paid in prior analyses to the growth in 
university patenting, licensing, revenue generation and startup formation, as well as the many factors 
and university characteristics that influence the technology transfer process (Siegel, Wright, & 
Lockett, 2007; Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, 2007; Bradley, Hayter & Link, 2013). Siegel and others 
suggest technology licensing offices may not be optimally configured to achieve their goals, with 
potential barriers including a lack of business and commercialization skills in the TLO (Siegel, 
Waldman & Link, 2003; Siegel, Veugelers & Wright, 2007; Markman, et al., 2005a; Litan & Cook-
Deegan, 2011). Some have noted it would be useful to understand whether disparities in technology 
transfer outcomes reflect differences in organizational structure, staffing and other resources, or if 
certain characteristics may be counterproductive (Merrill & Mazza, 2010, p. 43 & 45). This study 
helps to address these questions.  
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The organizational structures of TLOs can have an impact upon the technology transfer 
process; several have determined the TLOs financial organization can influence licensing and startup 
efforts (Markman, et al., 2005a), and use of equity in licensing (Feldman, et al., 2002; Markman, et 
al., 2005b). The autonomy of the TLO to work with licensees and university startups and to leverage 
external resources and business networks also has an influence upon a university‘s success in startup 
formation (Markman, et al., 2009). The reporting structures of university TLOs (the organizational 
characteristic evaluated in this study) vary across universities and can include: 1) reporting directly to 
the chancellor or president of the institution, 2) reporting to an office of research, 3) reporting to an 
economic development office, or 4) reporting to multiple offices (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010). We 
study the influence of organizational reporting characteristics on three commonly reported technology 
transfer measures: invention disclosures received by the TLO, licenses to industry, and startups 
formed for the commercialization of university inventions. We find some TLO reporting structures 
more effective at certain technology transfer outcomes than others. For example, TLOs reporting 
directly to the university leader or to an economic/business development office may be more effective 
in university startup formation than TLOs reporting to an office of research. TLOs reporting to 
multiple functions may be more effective in licensing activities than TLOs reporting directly to the 
office of research or to an economic/business development office, but less effective at startup 
formation than TLOs reporting to the institutional leader. Comparisons of each structure to the others 
are further analyzed below. 
Characteristics of the individual charged with running and managing the efforts of the TLO 
may also have an influence: the last educational degree and job tenure of the TLO directors in the 
sample are evaluated to determine their influence upon disclosure activity, licenses and startups. We 
find that different educational backgrounds of TLO directors can influence the technology transfer 
process and its outcomes, providing support for those who suggest an expansion of commercial 
expertise in the TLO may have a positive effect (Siegel, et al., 2007, 2008, 2012; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; 
Swamidass, 2013). Specifically, we find TLO directors with an MBA degree to be more effective in 
 122 
obtaining invention disclosures and working with startups than TLO directors with a PhD, and more 
effective at licensing activities than TLO directors with a Juris Doctor (JD) degree. Our analysis finds 
TLO directors with JDs to be less effective in licensing outcomes than all other educational 
backgrounds, providing some support for Siegel, et al.‘s (2003) implication that legal wrangling may 
reduce university licensing efforts.  
The process of academic technology transfer is presented in the subsequent section with a 
discussion of how organizational and educational characteristics of the university TLO may impact 
that process. Past studies provide a framework for the predictions for this analysis. The data and 
methodology are presented, followed by results and discussion of the findings from the quantitative 
analysis. The specific contribution of this current study and the resulting policy implications are 
considered in the final section.   
 
Figure 4.1 Internal University Technology Transfer Process  
 
Process of Technology Transfer 
The TLO bridges the academic and commercial worlds to move research inventions into 
public use; this analysis focuses upon the internal mechanisms of the technology transfer process 
(figure 4.1), and the influence TLO organizational characteristics may have upon that process.
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Many other models exist which demonstrate the complexity and flow of technology transfer (see for example, 
Swamidass & Valusa, 2009; and Bradley, Hayter & Link, 2013). We adopt a general linear model, similar to 
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general understanding of the underlying process helps to understand how different characteristics may 
influence the various technology transfer activities. Technology transfer in the academic environment 
is lengthy; years may pass between submission of an invention disclosure, protection and marketing, 
and execution of a license (Swamidass & Vulasa, 2009). Invention disclosures are a critical input 
(Siegel, et al., 2003; Friedman & Silberman, 2003), driven by faculty engagement and the 
entrepreneurial culture of the university (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Disclosures from faculty 
entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of startups (Jensen & Jones, 2011), and institutions with higher 
disclosure levels engage in more licensing activity and have higher licensing revenues (Feldman & 
Bercovitz, 2010). The timeline between invention disclosure and commercialization creates a pipeline 
effect–disclosures received in one year may be patented (or not) in a subsequent year and licensed to 
an existing company or a startup formed in yet another year.   
Inventions developed at the university can only be commercialized for the benefit of the 
institution if they are first disclosed to the TLO (step 1 in figure 4.1 above). The formal process of 
disclosing an invention to the TLO starts with an invention disclosure report, which contains critical 
information about the invention and establishes its conception date (McGee, 2007). Such disclosure is 
specifically required by the Bayh-Dole Act when the invention results from federally funded research, 
but many inventors may not heed or even be aware of this requirement (Siegel, Waldman, Atwater & 
Link, 2004). TLO staff must engage with faculty researchers and the campus community to build 
awareness of this federal requirement as well as the university policies and practices regarding 
technology transfer (McGee, 2007). Higher levels of TLO engagement with university researchers 
has a positive influence upon invention disclosure submission (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010), 
suggesting TLOs able to effectively engage with individual researchers and coordinate with other 
campus functions may have a positive influence upon this metric. 
Prior studies indicate that invention disclosures are correlated with higher research funding 
and faculty quality at the university; the quality of the inventor a key determinant in both disclosure 
submission rates and later successful patenting and commercialization efforts (Thursby & Kemp, 
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2002; Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, 2003; Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Powers & McDougall, 2005a 
&b; Jensen & Jones, 2011). University inventors will bring disclosures to the TLO if such technology 
transfer efforts are supported by the policies and culture of the university, and the inventors feel they 
can benefit from that interaction (Markman, Phan, Balkin & Gianiodis, 2004 & 2005a; Chukumba & 
Jensen, 2005). Perceptions of the commercialization capabilities of the TLO are critical (Bercovitz & 
Feldman, 2008); inventors must have confidence the TLO has the necessary capabilities to conduct 
thorough commercial and intellectual property (IP) analyses of their inventions and to make 
connections with industry to facilitate licensing (McGee, 2007).  
Once a disclosure is received by the TLO, an evaluation is done for commercial marketability 
of the invention and to determine if IP protection can bring additional value (step 2 in figure 4.1). 
Understanding technical details and how the invention relates to other work in the field is critical in 
determining if the invention is patentable, and how it might enter a commercial market (McGee, 
2007). This initial analysis gathers information on how the invention might be utilized and its value in 
the marketplace, and on potential licensees (MacWright & Ritter, 2007). TLO access to information 
that enables proper commercial evaluation, and the skills and capability to take advantage of that 
information are vital for successful licensing and startup efforts (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003, p. 
1707). Subject matter expertise within the TLO may contribute by providing knowledge of 
connections to industry and professional networks, facilitating market evaluation and potential 
subsequent licensing efforts. TLO ability to quickly conduct market analysis and identify licensees 
speeds time to licensing and increases revenues (Markman, et al., 2005a), indicating the importance 
of a broad array of business skills in quickly moving a university invention through the technology 
transfer process. 
If an invention is determined to be commercially viable, the TLO engages in efforts to 
identify and protect any IP to aid in the commercialization process (step 3 in figure 4.1), which may 
consist of any combination of patents, copyrights, trademarks, or trade-secrets. Siegel, Veugelers and 
Wright (2007) recommend TLOs ensure IP is ―clean, well defined, and protected‖ before marketing 
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and licensing the invention (p. 655), minimizing potential financial risk to licensees of university 
inventions for IP infringement. Marketing activities in this third stage may include outreach and 
communication with inventor networks. Networking and marketing skills are helpful in engaging with 
inventor networks and targeted industry sectors, and to connect with prospective licensees and pitch a 
licensable technology (Hersey, 2007). Legal expertise is necessary for the various forms of 
intellectual property protection and to address the federal, state and local regulations governing the 
university‘s commercialization efforts (O‘Connor, Graff, & Winickoff, 2010). Subject matter 
expertise within the TLO helps differentiate the invention for patent protection and identify its value 
to potential licensees (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003). All of these skills discussed above are important 
in protecting and commercializing university inventions, and may have an influence on different 
technology commercialization outcomes.  
When a party expresses interest in commercializing an invention, licensing discussions begin 
(step 4 in figure 4.1). There is a wide variety of contractual and legal obligations, rights and 
considerations that form licensing agreements, requiring business, legal, and financial knowledge 
(Bobrowicz, 2007). Negotiation, business strategy and financial skills similar to those found in 
venture capital firms are important for understanding commercialization goals and in finalizing 
licensing deals (Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011). If the licensee is a university startup, business 
development skills in the TLO may be helpful for crafting business plans, procuring investment 
capital, and providing assistance in building management teams; described as the three critical 
elements for successful startups (Merrill & Mazza, 2010). TLOs may be able to increase potential for 
both academic as well as commercial success if appropriately staffed and organized (Siegel, et al., 
2007; Siegel, 2012; ipHandbook, 2012), suggesting a variety of educational backgrounds and skills in 
business commercialization may influence the technology process and its outcomes in different ways.  
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Organizational Characteristics in Technology Transfer  
Organizational structures generally reflect processes of decision making, coordination and 
behavioral routines of individuals (Lam, 2000), suggesting the reporting structure of the TLO and 
individual skills may reflect the office‘s capabilities and coordination with other units across the 
university. Previous studies on TLO organizational characteristics find reporting structures and 
coordinating capabilities of the TLO enable relationship building with other functional units within an 
organization (Bercovitz, et al., 2001; Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010), positively influencing TLO 
outcomes. A TLO with an autonomous organizational structure and ability to coordinate with external 
resources facilitates startup activity (Markman, Gianiodis & Phan, 2009); suggesting the office which 
drives the coordination capability of the TLO is potentially an important influence on commercial 
outcomes.  
Specialized knowledge and skills developed through educational programs and experience 
have a positive influence upon an individual‘s job responsibilities (Rodan & Galunic, 2002); 
suggesting different educational backgrounds of TLO directors may have an influence upon the 
various stages of the technology transfer process and its outcomes. As the tenure of a TLO director 
increases, prior work suggests their integration within the university expands, creating a positive 
influence upon invention disclosure submission (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010). Specialized knowledge 
developed over time is embodied in tacit knowledge (Galunic & Rodan, 1997), and experiential 
learning may facilitate activities of the TLO as commercialization activities become routine. Past 
successes have a positive influence on subsequent outcomes (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001), 
suggesting prior experience and successes in licensing and startup formation may have a positive 
influence upon subsequent activities of the university TLO.  
Institutional characteristics can also contribute to differences among universities in 
technology transfer outcomes. Indicators for private/public, the presence of a medical, engineering or 
law schools, and research funding levels are used in previous studies to account for institutional 
differences that may have an influence on invention disclosure and university technology transfer 
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efforts (Thursby & Thursby, 2002; Carlsson & Fridh, 2002; Jensen et al., 2003; Feldman & 
Bercovitz, 2010). Industry sponsored research at universities has a positive influence upon startup 
activity (Powers & McDougall, 2005a; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005). The age and size of the TLO can 
also influence technology transfer outcomes; however previous research findings are mixed. Some 
find positive correlations between older TLOs and licensing and startup formation (Friedman & 
Silberman, 2003; Powers & McDougall, 2005a & 2005b; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; O‘Shea, et al., 
2005), while others find older TLOs less effective at startup creation (Markman, et al., 2004). 
Findings for TLO size are also varied; some studies show larger TLOs may be less effective or have 
little influence upon licensing and startup formation (Thursby & Kemp, 2002; Chukumba & Jensen, 
2005); while others show larger TLOs to be more effective at licensing and generating revenues and 
startups (Siegel, et al., 2003; Siegel, et al., 2008; Markman, et al., 2009; Jensen & Jones 2011). 
Institutional characteristics are included with this analysis; indicators for private universities, the 
presence of medical and law schools as well as the age of the TLO as a proxy for experience.  
Organizational Structure 
Organizational reporting structures of the TLO may have an influence upon various 
technology transfer outcomes. The degree of centralization of an office has an impact of the 
organizational effectiveness and ability of the office to manage information flow (Zheng, Yang, 
McLean, 2010); this suggests that how a TLO is organized within the university, and its ability to 
make decisions regarding licensing negotiations, may have an effect upon technology transfer 
outcomes.  Decision and coordination structures identified from the field of organizational science 
and previously used to study TLOs: centralized, decentralized, and matrix/multiple, respectively 
(Bercovitz, et al., 2001), evaluate how different TLO reporting structures may coordinate efforts with 
the larger university environment. The increased integration and coordination capacity of a TLO with 
a matrix decision structure can have a positive effect on invention disclosures (Bercovitz, et al., 
2001), and effective TLO integration with other university functions even with lower autonomy of the 
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TLO can have a positive influence on licensing activity (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010). Financial 
organizational structures of TLOs are analyzed in another study to determine their potential influence 
upon licensing and startup activity (Markman, et al., 2005a). Three financial structures are 
considered: whether organized and supported as an integral unit within the university (the traditional 
structure), organized as an external non-profit (501(c)3 organization, or as a for-profit structure 
focused upon economic development and university startups. The study finds different financial 
structural forms of TLOs can have an influence upon technology transfer outcomes and the speed at 
which they are transferred to the public. Traditional forms of TLOs have a negative relationship with 
both revenues and startup formation when compared to the non-profit TLOs; the for-profit form of the 
TLO had no significant direct relationship; however this latter form did have a significant influence 
upon reducing time to a startup formation, while a traditionally organized TLO significantly increased 
time to a startup formation (Markman, et al, 2005a). In evaluating use of equity as a licensing 
mechanism, Feldman, et al., (2002) find that self-funded TLOs are less likely to utilize equity as a 
licensing mechanism than otherwise funded offices, potentially due to the short term focus upon 
obtaining a revenue stream to meet obligations for operating budgets. Markman, et al., (2009) note 
the choice of organizational form can pose dilemmas for university administration; centralization of a 
university TLO provides standardization and reliability, but may restrict the ability of the TLO to 
negotiate licensing contracts in response to dynamic market conditions. Their study finds low 
autonomy structured TLOs are negatively related to licensing revenues, while high autonomy TLOs 
are significant and positively related to startup formation (Markman, et al., 2009), suggesting the 
ability of TLOs to coordinate with external resources and form independent ties with the local 
industry, entrepreneurs, investors and other resources may have a positive influence on startup 
formation. These prior studies provide support for further evaluation of different TLO organizational 
reporting relationships for variation in technology transfer outcomes. We analyze the specific 
reporting structure of the TLO, as the office to which the TLO reports is likely to have say in the 
goals and objectives of TLO, and may have an influence upon its outcomes.  
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When TLOs report to the institutional leader, the importance of technology transfer is 
emphasized, sending strong signals of legitimacy to the campus. This type of centralized reporting 
structure for the TLO can benefit from strong leadership driving coordination efforts (Bercovitz, et 
al., 2001), potentially influencing all stages of technology commercialization. A TLO reporting to a 
research office may be focused upon coordinating with other research support units, academic 
researchers and funding agencies; increasing awareness of the TLO with academic researchers, with a 
potential positive influence on invention disclosure activity. TLOs organized under the office of 
research may have access to industry networks from industry support of research, increasing 
opportunities for licensing. A TLO organized under an economic or business development office 
structure may be able to coordinate efforts with other externally focused departments (such as alumni 
offices or public relations) as well as entities and resources outside of the university. A TLO focused 
on economic development activities, with high autonomy in decision making can have a positive 
influence upon startup formation (Markman, et al., 2009); potentially through access to external 
business and entrepreneurial support mechanisms. A TLO reporting to multiple operations may 
positively influence technology commercialization outcomes through increased visibility and 
coordination efforts. The effectiveness of the TLO in managing the increased complexity generated 
from multiple reporting relationships (Bercovitz, et al., 2001) may moderate that influence. The 
different organizational structures may focus efforts of the TLO on strategic technology 
commercialization outcomes, and suggests there may be some variation in commercialization 
outcomes further described in table 4.1 below: 
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Table 4.1 Predicted relationships between reporting structure and technology transfer outcomes 
 Reporting Structures 
  Research Leadership Econ/Bus Dev. Multiple 
In
p
u
t 
Invention 
Disclosures  
+  
Increased coordination 
with research faculty and 
funding sources 
+ 
Strong signal in 
support of tech 
transfer  
- 
Potential less direct 
interaction with 
researchers 
+  
Increased coordination 
activities may increase 
interface with inventors 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 p
at
h
 Licenses 
+  
Coordination with 
faculty researchers 
provides access to 
increased network for 
licensing 
+ 
Depends upon 
strategic direction 
of leadership, 
expect positive 
relationship 
- 
Less coordination with 
researchers may reduce 
access to networks and 
funding agencies 
+  
Increased coordination 
with internal & 
external entities may 
create opportunities for 
licensing 
Startups 
-  
Less coordination with 
external organizations 
may limit access to 
entrepreneurs and 
investment 
+ 
Depends upon 
strategic direction 
of leadership, 
expect positive 
relationship 
+ 
Increased coordination 
with units focused on 
econ development, 
access to external 
support  
+ 
Increased coordination 
with multiple units 
may provide increased 
opportunities for 
startup activities 
Educational Background 
The technology transfer process requires a variety of skills: knowledge of university research, 
business marketing and commercialization skills, networking and links to bus development 
organizations (Siegel, et al., 2003; Markman, et al, 2005a; McGee, 2007).  Identifying professional 
degrees and skillsets that influence the technology transfer process and its outcomes can inform those 
who wish to strategically align skills of the TLO with other university characteristics, in order to 
target particular outcomes. Educational training provides expert understanding on how resources can 
be managed and leveraged in industry (Galunic & Rodan, 1997); suggesting educational background 
differences among TLO directors may promote certain activities over others. To date, there has not 
been an examination of the TLO director‘s education as an influence on technology transfer activities 
reported in the literature. Several studies identify TLO business and commercialization skills as 
important to academic technology transfer efforts, particularly for startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 
2005; Siegel & Phan, 2005; Siegel, et al., 2007; Swamidass, 2013), but for licensing efforts as well 
(Markman, et al., 2005a). Many business and commercialization skills may be developed through 
specific educational training, or through experience working with industry, entrepreneurs, or 
investment managers. The importance of hiring personnel in the TLO with a variety of these key 
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business qualifications is important for successful commercialization efforts (ipHandbook, 2012). 
High salaries of TLO licensing professionals, used as a proxy for commercialization skillsets in the 
TLO, in Markman, et al.‘s (2009) analysis finds that higher salaries for those individuals charged with 
licensing the university‘s intellectual property have a positive relationship with both licensing 
revenues coming into the university and startup formation. Suggesting highly skilled licensing 
professionals who are able to command higher salaries may provide broad-based commercialization 
skills that can positively influence outcomes from the technology transfer process. A deficit of 
commercialization skills, (specifically financial, technical, commercial industry linkages and 
entrepreneurial backgrounds) is identified as a potential barrier to successful academic technology 
transfer activities (Metz, et al., 2000; Siegel, et al., 2004; 2007; 2012; Markman, et al., 2005a; Litan 
& Cook-Deegan, 2011, Swamidass, 2013). The findings from these previous studies provide 
justification for evaluating the variety of skillsets of the individuals responsible for managing TLOs; 
their educational degree is used as a proxy for this difficult to measure characteristic. 
Calls in the literature for an expansion of business and commercialization skills suggest a 
TLO director with an MBA degree may facilitate commercialization efforts due to training in 
strategic and business planning, financial management, asset valuation and other business related 
skills, which may facilitate both licensing and startup activity. Dissimilar cultural and educational 
norms (Zheng, Yang & McClean, 2010) may create a barrier for a TLO director with an MBA in 
obtaining invention disclosures from PhD research faculty, while a TLO director with a PhD may be 
able to positively influence invention disclosure submission. Subject matter expertise developed 
through a PhD in the scientific field of an invention may provide access to industry or practitioner 
networks, potentially increasing licensing outcomes. TLO directors with legal degrees (JD) may have 
advanced IP & legal contract skills, which may not be an advantage for licensing efforts if those skills 
result in a tougher negotiation stance as suggested by Siegel, et al.‘s (2003) field research. The 
presence of a law school is shown to have a positive relationship with university startup activity 
(Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010), suggesting there may be some positive correlation between TLO 
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directors with a JD and startup formation. A JD may be able to help university startups with business 
legalities and contractual work that can facilitate university startup formation. TLO directors who 
have a bachelor‘s degree are presumed to be in leadership positions due to experience and skills that 
make those individuals appropriate for director responsibilities; such experiential skills may also have 
a positive influence on all stages of technology commercialization activities. TLO directors with 
different educational backgrounds may have variation in commercialization outcomes further 
described in table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Predicted relationships between TLO Director‘s education and outcomes 
 TLO Director‘s education 
  PhD Legal (JD) MBA BS 
In
p
u
t Invention 
Disclosures 
+  
Direct interaction 
with researchers, 
common educational 
foundation 
-  
Less coordination 
with research faculty, 
skills related to IP 
protection 
- 
Dissimilar cultural 
and educational 
norms from research 
faculty 
+ 
Coordination with 
research faculty, 
previous 
experience 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 p
at
h
 Licenses 
+  
Scientific domain can 
facilitate placement 
with industries best 
capable of utilizing 
invention 
-  
Increased legalities in 
agreements add 
difficulties in getting 
to license 
finalization.  
+ 
Marketing skills, 
industry contacts, 
and financial 
knowledge 
+ 
Depends on 
previous licensing 
experience, 
industry networks 
Startups 
+  
No ‗broad based‘ 
commercial skills; 
scientific knowledge 
can facilitate transfer 
to startup 
+ 
Access to contractual 
and legal resources 
may facilitate startup 
activity 
+ 
Market, financial and 
commercialization 
knowledge, access to 
entrepreneurs and 
investment 
+  
Depends on 
previous 
entrepreneurial 
experience, 
networks 
 
Model 
In order to evaluate the relationships between TLO characteristics and technology licensing 
outcomes, each dependent variable is modeled as a linear function: 
                                     
Where     is the dependent variable being measured: invention disclosures, licenses and startups for 
each university (i), for each year (t).      is a vector of university and TLO variables that change over 
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time: total research expenditures, industry funding density, age and size of the TLO.      is the vector 
of institutional and TLO fixed variables that do not change over the years of this analysis: indicators 
for private schools, the presence of medical, engineering and law schools and the historical measure 
of each dependent variable. The tenure of the TLO director is included in      to evaluate how 
experience on the job may influence technology licensing activities.    is the vector of fixed 
indicators for organizational reporting structure of the TLO (institutional leadership, research office, 
economic or business development, or multiple reporting structure) as reported by the universities in 
the study in 2007. We use this indicator to compare the reporting structure‘s influence on technology 
commercialization activities from 2008-2010.    is the vector of fixed indictors for the TLO director‘s 
most recent terminal degree: bachelor‘s (BS) degree, MBA degree, Law (JD) degree, or PhD.   
Data & Method 
In evaluating the TLO characteristics on technology transfer metrics, data are used from two 
survey instruments: the AUTM annual licensing survey and Feldman and Bercovitz‘s (2010) survey 
of AUTM respondents, collected in 2007. Data for analysis is collected for 76 universities for a 3 year 
period (2008-2010) to analyze the influence of the reporting structure and TLO director‘s educational 
background in 2007 on subsequent invention disclosure, licensing and startup activity. We limit data 
to a three year period to minimize potential variability that may be introduced by TLO 
reorganizations due to administrative or other changes (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010). The AUTM 
annual licensing survey provides yearly measures for the dependent variables and information on total 
research funding, industry funding, TLO age and size. Industry research funding divided by total 
research dollars provides a percentage of industry funding, and a ratio of licensing staff per million of 
total research funding provides a normalized variable to control for the size of the university and the 
size of the TLO. Feldman and Bercovitz‘s (2010) survey of AUTM members in 2007 provides the 
independent variables of interest: the TLO reporting structure, last educational degree of the TLO 
director, and the directors‘ tenure in their position. This survey also provides institutional controls 
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indicators for private universities and the presence of medical and law schools. Feldman and 
Bercovitz‘s (2010) study provides some understanding of how heterogeneity in organizational 
structures and capabilities of university TLOs might influence the technology transfer process; this 
current study builds upon their findings. Additional primary research via university websites and 
social media validates and expands the data; filling in missing variables. A list of the dependent and 
independent variables of interest for this current study is included in table 4.3 below, with descriptive 
names, the percentages for each structure and education, the variable type, and source of the data. A 
full set of descriptive statistics for all variables included in this analysis is included in table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.3 Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable Percentage Type Source 
Dependent variables (yearly measures):    
Invention Disclosures Invention Disclosures received  Continuous 
(logged 
averages) 
AUTM STATT Licenses Executed Licenses  
Startups Startups from the university  
Independent variables:    
Reporting Office    
Report to Research Research Office 47 (62%) 
Binary 
Feldman and 
Bercovitz survey, 
independent 
verification 
Report to Leader Chancellor/President 12 (16%) 
Report to Econ/Bus Economic/Business Development. 11 (14%) 
Report to Multiple Off. Multiple Offices 6 (8%) 
Education & Experience    
Director PhD PhD degree 30 (40%) 
Binary 
Feldman and 
Bercovitz survey, 
independent 
verification 
Director Lawyer Law degree 14 (18%) 
Director MBA MBA 18 (24%) 
Director BS/BA Bachelors 14 (18%) 
Director Tenure Years in current position  Continuous 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables of this study include invention disclosures received, licenses 
completed, and startups formed. Patents are not included in the regression analysis as decisions 
regarding intellectual property protection can be driven by many factors including budget availability, 
patenting strategies, decisions by patent committees and licensee expectations, among others (Livne, 
2007). The dependent variables change from year to year and across universities, both within the 
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current sample as well as across the population of university respondents to the AUTM annual 
survey. For the representative universities in our sample from 2008-2010, annual invention disclosure 
submissions ranged between 6 and 513, US issued patents between 1 and 155, licenses between 1 and 
104, and startups between 0 and 19; providing some indication of the range of research universities 
included in this analysis. When compared to the AUTM population, the 76 universities included in 
this study seem to reflect the general characteristics of the population of AUTM respondents. 
Between 2008 and 2010, an average of 148 different US research universities participated in the 
AUTM annual licensing surveys. Within those participating institutions, annual invention disclosures 
ranged between 1 and 744, US issued patents between 0 and 180, licenses between 0 and 214, and 
startups between 0 and 33. Comparisons between the AUTM population of research universities and 
the sample evaluated in this analysis on the dependent variables and independent variables analyzed 
in this study are further described below in table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4 Study Sample Comparisons to AUTM Population, 2008-2010 
 
AUTM Population Study Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Min Max Obs Mean Min Max 
Invention Disclosures 148 110.19 1 744 76 111.02 6 512.67 
Licenses 148 23.15 0 214 76 24.98 .67 103.67 
Startups 146 3.46 0 33 76 3.63 0 19 
Issued US Patents 147 20.57 0 180 75 25.42 1 155 
Licensing Staff/Total 
Research Funding ($M) 
145 0.03 0 0.18 76 0.025 0.006 0.11 
Licensing Staff 145 5.38 0 60 76 5.90 0.5 60 
Total Research ($M) 147 $291 $3 $2,547 76 $327 $16 $1,518 
Industry Research % 147 7% 0% 38.5% 76 10.8% 1.0% 34.7% 
TLO Age 147 20.89 0 85 76 20.89 1 82 
 
Independent Variables 
Organizational reporting structures for the university TLOs in this current study consist of 
four reporting types: 1) to the university research function, 2) to an economic or business 
development function, 3) to the leadership of the university, and 4) to multiple offices. Forty-seven 
university TLOs report to the research function within the university, 11 report to an economic 
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development or business development function, 12 report directly to the leader of the university, 
while 6 report to multiple university functions (figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: TLO Organizational Reporting Structure 
 
 
Average invention disclosures received, licenses completed and startups formed for each of 
the four organizational structures evaluated in this study are presented in table 4.5 below.  On average 
from 2008-2010, TLOs reporting to the office of research received 114 invention disclosures per year, 
those reporting to the institutional leader received 151, those reporting to an economic/business 
development office 108, and those reporting to multiple offices 147. In licensing activity, TLOs 
reporting to the office of research successfully completed an average of 23 licenses each year, those 
reporting to the institutional leader completed 27, those reporting to an economic/business 
development office 23, and those reporting to multiple offices 40. Startup activity is most for TLOs 
reporting to the office of research; those offices able to startup about 3 each year, while those TLOs 
reporting to the institutional leader started an average of 4, those reporting to an economic/business 
development office an average of 5 each year, and those reporting to multiple offices an average of 
about 3 per year.  
 
62% 16% 
14% 
8% 
Office of Research
Institutional Leader
Economic/Business Dev
Multiple
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Table 4.5 Data Statistics by TLO Organizational Structure, 2008-2010 
 Invention Disclosures Obs Mean Min Max 
Office of Research 47 114 13 513 
Leader 12 151 11 338 
Econ/Bus Dev. 11 108 6 311 
Multiple 6 147 33 357 
Licenses Obs Mean Min Max 
Office of Research 47 23 1 104 
Leader 12 27 2 81 
Econ/Bus Dev. 11 22 2 69 
Multiple 6 40 13 50 
Startups Obs Mean Min Max 
Office of Research 47 3 0 18 
Leader 12 4 0 11 
Econ/Bus Dev. 11 5 0 19 
Multiple 6 3 0 4 
 
The multiple educational backgrounds of the TLO directors analyzed in this study reflect the 
widespread and multidisciplinary nature of university commercialization efforts, and the range of 
multidisciplinary skills that can support the technology transfer process. Thirty TLO directors in the 
current sample have PhDs, 14 have legal degrees (JD), 18 have MBA degrees, and 14 TLO directors 
have BS degrees (figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: TLO Director Education 
 
 
Average invention disclosures received, licenses completed and startups formed for each of 
the TLO director‘s different educational backgrounds from 2008-2010 are presented in table 4.6. On 
average from 2008-2010, TLO directors with MBA degrees received 145 invention disclosures per 
40% 
18% 
24% 
18% 
PhD
JD
MBA
BS
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year, TLO directors with JDs received an average of 119, TLO directors with PhDs an average of 
118, and TLO directors with bachelor degrees averaged 100 per year.  In licensing activity, averages 
are highest for TLO directors with bachelor‘s degrees, at an average of about 30 licenses per year, 
TLO directors with MBA degrees averaged about 28 licenses per year, JDs averaged about 23 per 
year, and an average of 22 licenses for TLO directors with PhDs. Average startup activity is highest 
for TLO directors with MBAs, at about 5 startups formed per year, while those TLO directors with 
JDs average 4, and TLO directors with PhDs and bachelor‘s degrees averaged about 3 per year.  
Average length of job experience in the position for TLO directors is greatest for those with bachelor 
degrees at about 10.5 years, second for those with MBA degrees at 9.78 years; PhDs had about 7.1 
years of average job tenure experience, and TLO directors with JDs average about 6.25 years in their 
position.   
 
Table 4.6 Data Statistics by TLO Director Education, 2008-2010  
Invention Disclosures Obs Mean Min Max 
MBA 18 145 12 513 
Lawyer 14 119 32 357 
PhD 30 118 6 359 
BS 14 100 13 450 
Licenses Obs Mean Min Max 
BS 14 30 1 104 
MBA 18 28 2 69 
PhD 30 22 2 49 
Lawyer 14 23 2 81 
Startups Obs Mean Min Max 
MBA 18 5 0 19 
PhD 30 3 0 10 
Lawyer 14 4 1 11 
BS 14 3 0 9 
Job Tenure Obs Mean Min Max 
BS 14 10.5 3 26 
MBA 18 9.78 2 23 
PhD 30 7.1 3 13 
Lawyer 14 6.25 2.5 13 
 
Between the organizational reporting structure and the TLO director‘s education, there are 16 
possible combinations that could result. The two most common organizations in this study are TLOs 
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reporting to an office of research with a PhD director (15), or TLOs reporting to an office of research 
with an MBA director (15). The different combinations of TLO organizations are shown in table 4.7 
& figure 4.4. We compare the two most commonly found organizations with the other to determine if 
there may be any significant difference the most common TLO structures and any of the others.  The 
results from this comparison are further discussed below.  
 
Table 4.7 Combinations of Organizational Structure and Director‘s Degree 
Reporting Office/ 
Director’s Educ. Multi EDBD Leader Research N 
PhD 0 6 9 15 30 
Law 4 1 2 7 14 
MBA 0 3 0 15 18 
BS 2 1 1 10 14 
N 6 11 12 47 76 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Combinations of Organizational Structure and Director‘s Degree 
 
 
The two most commonly organized structures are TLOs organized under the office of 
research, with a TLO director who has a PhD education, or a TLO director with an MBA. These two 
dominant structures are compared against all others to determine if there is any statistical difference 
Multi
EDBD
Leader
Research
0
5
10
15
PhD
Law
MBA
BS
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between the two most commonly found TLO organizations and the remaining in obtaining invention 
disclosures from faculty, licensing to industry, or forming startups. The results of these comparisons 
are discussed in the results section below.  
Controls 
Other institutional characteristics such as private versus public status and the presence of a 
medical school and law school are included to help control for any influence they may have upon TT 
efforts in addition to controlling for university differences. Many previous studies have included 
public or private indicators to control for differences and their potential influence on licensing and 
startup activity (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Markman, et al., 2005a & 
2009; Bulut & Moschini, 2009). Medical schools are often included in prior analysis due to the high 
volume of biomedical research that has garnered the attention of industry and produced high revenue 
generating licenses for universities (Bulut & Moschini, 2009). We include an indicator for the 
presence of a law school due to the positive correlation found by Feldman and Bercovitz (2010) 
between the presence of a law school and university startup activity, and the potential accessibility to 
on-campus legal resources which may assist the technology transfer process and its outcomes. The 
presence of an engineering school was also considered for potential inclusion; however tests for 
significance indicated this characteristic had little direct impact upon disclosure activity, licenses or 
startups for these 76 universities. Twenty-one universities in the current study (28%) are identified as 
private institutions. Fifty (66%) have a medical school, and 34 (45%) have a law school. Twenty-
seven (36%) have both academic programs, while 23 (32%) have a medical school without a law 
school, and 7 (9%) have a law school with no medical school.   
The annual research levels of the 76 universities range from about $16 million to about $1.5 
billion, while the full set of universities participating in the AUTM annual licensing survey during 
this same time frame ranges from $3.2 million to about $5.4 billion in research funding, indicating the 
sample in the current study is missing the highest and lowest funded universities in this analysis (see 
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table 4.4). A ratio of the number of full-time licensing staff per million in research funding 
normalizes the resource commitment for technology transfer. This ratio stands at 0.03 for the AUTM 
population, indicating on average, there is a licensing staff member in the TLO for every $33 million 
in research funding. For the sample in this analysis, this ratio stands at 0.025 or about 1 licensing staff 
member for every $40 million in research funding. Industry sponsored research percentages (industry 
research$/total research$) for the universities in the current study average about 10.8% during 2008-
2010, ranging from 1% to 34.6%, similar to the AUTM population, which averaged about 7% 
industry funding, ranging from 0% to38.5%. Industry research percentages suggest the study sample 
includes universities with both high and low percentages of industry funding across US universities 
and reflect the AUTM population. The age of the TLO provides additional controls for general 
experience in academic technology transfer, and ranges from a single year to 82 years of operation in 
the current sample; the AUTM population ranges from 0 to 85.   
Previous experience of the TLO can facilitate subsequent efforts (Friedman & Silberman, 
2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011); suggesting measures of previous activities can be 
useful for the current analysis. Lagged averages for invention disclosures and licenses from 2003-
2006 are included to model the pipeline process flow of academic technology transfer as identified in 
figure 4.1. Invention disclosures from 2003-2006 are included as historical inputs for licensing 
activity and startup formation. In estimating startup formation, historical license activity from 2003-
2006 is also included to evaluate how prior licensing activity might influence subsequent startup 
efforts. The historical variables are logged to address over dispersion, normalize the data and reduce 
variable variance, and minimize multicollinearity. The control variables and their sources are further 
described in table 4.8 below with descriptive names, type of variable, and percentages. 
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Table 4.8: List of Controls 
Control Variables: Percentage Type Source 
University Controls: 
Private Indicator  21 (28%) 
Binary 
Feldman and 
Bercovitz survey 
Medical school Indicator  50 (66%) 
Law school Indicator  34 (45%) 
Technology Licensing Office Controls: 
TLO Age Experience  Count 
AUTM Statistics 
Access for Tech 
Transfer (STATT) 
# Licensing staff per 
million in research $ 
Ratio 
 
Continuous 
Industry research % Industry % of research  Continuous 
History and Pipeline Controls: 
Past Invention Disc. & Logged Averages  
(2003-2006) 
 
Continuous STATT 
Past Licenses  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables utilized in the model (table 4.9) help to understand the 
variety of institutions included in the current study. The dependent and historical variables for 
invention disclosures, licenses, and startups are averaged to account for internal unobserved 
university characteristics, and logged to address any non-linearity issues.  
 
Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Range Frequency 
Log Avg. Inv. Disclosures 2008-2010 76 4.401166 0.9566012 1.95-6.24  
Log Avg. Licenses 2008-2010 76 2.810995 1.022706 0.511-4.65  
Log Avg. Startups 2008-2010 76 1.279339 0.6927406 0-2.995  
Log Avg. Disclosures 2003-06 75 4.318397 0.9007889 2.3-6.22  
Log Avg. Licenses 2003-06 75 2.812711 1.02229 0.69-5.12  
Research Office 76 0.1578947 0.3670652 0-1 47 
Institutional Leader 76 0.6184211 0.4890018 0-1 12 
Economic or Business Dev. 76 0.1447368 0.3541731 0-1 11 
Multiple Reporting 76 0.0789474 0.2714484 0-1 6 
PhD 76 0.3947368 0.4920419 0-1 30 
Lawyer 76 0.1842105 0.3902316 0-1 14 
MBA 76 0.2368421 0.4279695 0-1 18 
BS/BA 76 0.1842105 0.3902316 0-1 14 
Director years at job 76 8.190789 4.917294 2-26  
Private 76 0.2763158 0.4501462 0-1 21, 55 public 
Medical school 76 0.6578947 0.4775669 0-1 50 
Law School 76 0.4473684 0.500526 0-1 34 
Average Industry Res % 76 0.1077797 0.0809665 0.01%-34.66%  
TLO age 76 20.89474 14.37273 1-82  
Licensing Staff /Total Res. $M 76 0.025 0.0183156 0.006-0.11  
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Table 4.10 below provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent and the 
independent variables of interest. Table 4.24 in Appendix C provides the Pearson correlations for all 
variables included in the model, including the logged historical averages and additional institutional 
and TLO controls. The technology licensing outcomes are positively related to each other; 
specifically invention disclosures are highly correlated with both licensing and startup activity, 
highlighting the pipeline effect of the technology transfer process, and of invention disclosures as the 
primary input into this process; no other commercialization activity happens without this critical first 
step (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Tests for multicollinearity after each regression suggest an 
absence of strong correlation between most of the independent variables, with variance inflation 
factors less than 10 for each. The historical averages are highly correlated with each other and the 
dependent variables (see table 4.24 in Appendix C).   
 
Table 4.10 Pearson Correlations, Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
(a) (b) (c)  (d) (e)  (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
Log Avg. Inv. Disc (a) 1 
           Log Avg. Licenses (b) 0.79 1 
          Log Avg. Startups (c) 0.75 0.55 1 
         Office of Research (d) -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 1 
        Institutional Leader (e) 0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.55 1 
       Economic/Bus. Dev. (f) -0.07 -0.06 0.14 -0.52 -0.18 1 
      Multiple Reporting (g) 0.11 0.24 0.00 -0.37 -0.13 -0.12 1 
     Director PhD (h) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.20 0.31 0.13 -0.24 1 
    Director JD (i) 0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 -0.10 0.36 -0.38 1 
   Director MBA (j) 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.25 -0.24 0.03 -0.16 -0.45 -0.26 1 
  Director BS/BA (k) -0.10 0.05 -0.20 0.09 -0.11 -0.10 0.11 -0.38 -0.23 -0.26 1 
 Director tenure (l) 0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.18 -0.19 -0.19 0.18 0.22 1 
 
Method 
The current study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to model each metric (invention 
disclosures, licenses and startups) as a function of university and TLO characteristics, including the 
variables of interest: the organizational structure of the TLO, educational background, and tenure of 
the TLO director. Historical measures for are included to model the pipeline effect and evaluate how 
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past efforts might influence subsequent activities. Regression results for one set of base-line 
comparisons are provided in table 4.11 below, additional tables can be found in Appendix C.  
The averaged variables are transformed (increased by 1 and logged) to normalize the data and 
to correct for skewness and over dispersion. Logging variables is a common transformation practice 
in normalizing data; adding one to the transformation on the dependent variable (ln(1) = 0) allows the 
inclusion of any observations of zero for that metric. Detailed summary statistics and histograms of 
the dependent variables are included in Appendix C for both original and logged forms. Interpreting 
the coefficient estimates for the independent variables when the dependent variables are log 
transformed requires a reverse transformation to understand how changes might affect the different 
commercialization outcomes. With a log transformed dependent variable, the effect size can be shown 
by 100(      , to measure the impact of a 1 unit increase in the independent variable on each of the 
technology transfer outcome measures (Cameron & Triveldi, 2010, Wooldridge, 2006). For the 
logged historical averages, the coefficients      are elasticities, and measure the expected percentage 
change for each of the dependent variables associated with a potential 1% increase in the lagged 
historical variable (Green, 2003). The transformations are included in the tables and indicate the 
effect sizes for a one unit change in each of the independent variables. 
Results 
The results suggest the different TLO reporting structures and different educational 
backgrounds of the TLO director may have an influence upon academic technology 
commercialization outcomes. Results presented in table 4.11 utilize the office of research reporting 
structure and a TLO director with a PhD educational background as initial baseline characteristics for 
comparison. Results comparing each TLO organizational structure and educational background of 
TLO directors to others are presented in tables 4.12 and 4.13 below.  The results show how the 
different reporting structures and educational characteristics may influence activities along the 
technology transfer process relative to the others. OLS results tables for the remaining baseline 
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comparisons can be found in Appendix C. Implications of the findings for university administrators 
coordinating the technology transfer process at US research universities and those legislators involved 
in policy discussions regarding academic technology transfer follows discussion of the results. 
 
Table 4.11 Regression Results, Office of Research Reporting & PhD held as comparison 
OLS (08-10) (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Disclosures  Licenses  Startups  
Institutional Leader 0.171 18.65% 0.186 20.44% 0.310* 36.34% 
 (0.300)  (0.204)  (0.142)  
Economic/Bus. Dev. -0.394 -32.56% -0.0288 -2.84% 0.257+ 29.30% 
 (0.329)  (0.226)  (0.143)  
Multiple Offices 0.205 22.75% 0.664+ 94.25% -0.0640 -6.20% 
 (0.305)  (0.354)  (0.211)  
Director JD -0.0579 -5.63% -0.455* -36.56% 0.117 12.41% 
 (0.294)  (0.203)  (0.178)  
Director MBA 0.451* 56.99% 0.0380 3.87% 0.295+ 34.31% 
 (0.216)  (0.209)  (0.168)  
Director BS 0.0833 8.69% 0.359 43.19% 0.238 26.87% 
 (0.280)  (0.273)  (0.171)  
Director tenure -0.0237 -2.34% -0.0103 -1.02% -0.0115 -1.14% 
 (0.0185)  (0.0147)  (0.0127)  
Private 0.393* 48.14% -0.349* -29.46% -0.237* -21.10% 
 (0.186)  (0.154)  (0.106)  
Medical School 0.556* 74.37% -0.170 -15.63% 0.0831 8.67% 
 (0.212)  (0.206)  (0.122)  
Law School 0.334+ 39.65% 0.0868 9.07% 0.269* 30.87% 
 (0.172)  (0.178)  (0.114)  
Licensing Staff/ M$ 
Research Funding 
-12.24* -1.00% -6.574 -1.00% -4.966+ -0.99% 
 (5.300)  (4.873)  (2.605)  
Industry Research % 2.303* 9.00% -0.110 -0.10% 1.463+ 3.32% 
 (0.924)  (0.884)  (0.874)  
TLO Age 0.0307*** 3.12% 0.0000600 0.01% 0.00729 0.73% 
 (0.00684)  (0.00535)  (0.00447)  
Log Avg Inv. Disc.T1   0.859*** 0.858% 0.659*** 0.658% 
   (0.0938)  (0.126)  
Log Avg Licenses T1     -0.235+ -0.234% 
     (0.135)  
_cons 3.291***  -0.500  -1.303***  
 (0.380)  (0.458)  (0.343)  
N 76  75  75  
R
2
 0.524  0.711  0.679  
adj. R
2
 0.424  0.643  0.597  
F 10.38  27.80  10.12  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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A summary of results for the analysis of TLO organizational structures in table 4.12 provides 
a comparison of the effectiveness of each structure in relation to the others. No significant difference 
is indicated for invention disclosures receipt between any of the different TLO structures, suggesting 
other characteristics outside of the TLO may influence disclosure rates. The different structures are 
found to influence licenses and startup formation, however. The results from the current study finds 
the economic/business development reporting structure may be 23-29% more effective at startup 
formation than a TLO reporting to an office of research, all else being equal. When the 
economic/business development reporting structure is compared to a TLO reporting to the leader of 
the university, no significant difference is indicated for licensing and startup formation. When 
compared to a multiple reporting structure, the TLO reporting to an economic/business development 
office is found to be significantly less effective at licensing efforts, potentially 50-100% less effective 
at licensing the invention disclosures received than those TLOs reporting to multiple offices, all else 
equal.  TLOs reporting to the institutional leader are also shown to be more effective at startup 
formation than TLOs reporting to the office of research, potentially 27-36% more effective; and more 
effective than TLOs reporting to multiple offices, potentially 31-45% more effective, all else equal.  
TLOs reporting to multiple offices may be more effective at licensing than TLOs reporting to an 
office of research, potentially 49-94% more effective, all else equal.   
 
Table 4.12 Organizational Structure Comparison 
Comparison 
Structure (Base line) 
Alternate Structure Effectiveness 
Office of Research Econ/Bus Dev. Leader Multiple 
Office of Research -- 
Startups: 29.30% 
(p<0.10) 
Startups: 36.34% 
(p<0.05) 
Licenses: 94.25% 
(p<0.10) 
Econ/Bus Dev. 
Startups: -22.66% 
(p<0.10) 
-- NS 
Licenses: 99.97% 
(p<0.10) 
Leader 
Startups: -26.66% 
(p<0.05) 
NS -- 
Startups: -31.20% 
(p<0.10) 
Multiple 
Licenses: -48.52% 
(p<0.10) 
Licenses: -49.99% 
(p<0.10) 
Startups: 45.35% 
(p<0.10) 
-- 
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The increased effectiveness of the economic/business development TLO reporting structure 
for startup formation, when compared to the TLO reporting to an office of research, provides some 
support for Markman, et al.‘s (2009) finding that ability of the TLO to coordinate with external 
resources has a positive influence on startup formation. This analysis also finds TLOs reporting to the 
institutional leader have a positive influence upon startup formation, more so than a TLOs reporting 
to an office of research or multiple offices, suggesting TLOs reporting directly to the institutional 
leader may have a strategic focus upon startup formation, or have access to similar resources that can 
facilitate startup activity. We find TLOs reporting to multiple offices more effective in licensing 
activities during 2008-2010 than either the office of research or economic/business development 
reporting structure, but less effective at startup formation than TLOs reporting to an institutional 
leader, suggesting TLOs under multiple reporting structures may be strategically focused upon 
licensing, or may have access to resources that can facilitate licensing efforts.   
The summary of the analysis of educational backgrounds of TLO directors in table 4.13 
compares the influence of different educational backgrounds to each other for each of the technology 
transfer outcome measures. When compared to all other TLO directors with different educational 
backgrounds, directors with a legal background (JD) are less effective in licensing university 
inventions; potentially 37-58% less effective than those TLO directors with a PhD, potentially 39-
64% less effective than TLO directors with a MBA, and potentially 56-125% less effective than TLO 
directors with a bachelor‘s degree, all else being equal. We find TLO directors with MBA 
backgrounds more effective at obtaining invention disclosures and at startup formation than TLO 
directors with PhDs, about 36-57% more effective at invention disclosure receipt, and 26-34% more 
effective at startup formation, all else equal. No significance difference is indicated between TLO 
directors with bachelor‘s degrees and TLO directors with PhDs or MBAs for any of the outcome 
measures. The negative relationship between TLO directors with JDs and licensing efforts when 
compared to all TLO directors with alternative educational backgrounds provides support for Siegel, 
et al.‘s (2003) finding from their analysis of external legal expenditures and qualitative interviews that 
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suggest legal wrangling from lawyers may have a negative influence upon licensing efforts. Further 
analysis might consider the relationship between TLO directors with a JD and revenue streams 
received by the university, considering Siegel, et al.‘s (2003) finding that external expenditures are 
correlated with higher licensing revenues.  
 
Table 4.13 Educational Background Comparison 
Comparison 
Education (Base line) 
Alternate Education Effectiveness 
PhD MBA BS JD 
PhD -- 
Inv. Disc.: 56.99%  
(p<0.05) 
Startups: 34.31% 
(p<0.10) 
NS 
Licenses: -36.56% 
(p<0.05) 
MBA 
Inv. Disc.: -36.30% 
(p<0.05) 
Startups: -25.55% 
(p<0.10) 
-- NS 
Licenses: -38.92% 
(p<0.05) 
BS NS NS -- 
Licenses: -55.69% 
(p<0.01) 
JD 
Licenses: 57.62% 
(p<0.05) 
Licenses: 63.72% 
(p<0.05) 
Licenses: 125.69% 
(p<0.01) 
-- 
 
Based on this analysis, TLO directors with an MBA educational background seem to be more 
effective in obtaining invention disclosures and forming startups when compared to TLO directors 
with a PhD, and more effective at licensing than TLO directors with legal backgrounds. This finding 
provides additional support for those suggesting a need for expanded commercialization skillsets in 
university TLOs (Metz, et al., 2000; Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011; Siegel, et al., 2007, 2012; 
Swamidass, 2013), through hiring individuals with strong licensing, technical and commercial skills 
and entrepreneurial backgrounds that can facilitate licensing and startup activity (Siegel, 2012).  
The estimate for the TLO director‘s tenure variable indicates a slight negative relationship 
with invention disclosures, licensing and startup activity, but is not significant. Indicators for private 
institutions suggest that private institutions may be more effective than public at obtaining invention 
disclosures (48%, p<0.05), however private universities may be less effective than public at licensing 
(-29%, p<0.05) or forming startups (-21%, p<0.05) from the disclosures received by the TLO. The 
presence of a medical school is also shown to have a positive influence upon invention disclosure 
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receipt (74%, p<0.05), but is not significantly related to licensing or startup formation. The indicator 
for the presence of a law school is shown to have a positive relationship with invention disclosure 
receipt (40%, p<0.10), and is positive and strongly significant for startup activity (31%, p<0.05). This 
supports Feldman and Bercovitz‘s (2010) previous finding that the presence of a law school can have 
a positive influence on startup formation.  
Findings from previous studies indicate universities with high research funding are able to 
work with more invention disclosures (Thursby & Kemp, 2002; Friedman & Silberman, 2003), and 
are effective at licensing and startup formation (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Markman, et al., 2004; Thursby 
& Thursby, 2007; Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Findings from several studies also 
indicate larger TLOs facilitate licensing and startup activities (Markman, et al., 2005a; Thursby & 
Thursby, 2007; Markman, et al., 2009; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011). Larger 
universities may also have larger TLOs to facilitate the technology transfer process, and these two 
variables are highly correlated with each other (>0.73) in the current sample. In order to address this 
potential multicollinearity, we create a ratio of the number of licensing staff per million in total 
research funding. The estimate for this ratio is significant for invention disclosure receipt (-1.00%, 
p<0.05) and startup formation (-0.99%, p<0.10), but not for licensing activities. This negative 
relationship is expected, as adding more licensing staff to support technology transfer activities does 
not make sense without a corresponding expansion in research funding. The universities in this 
current study have on average about 1 licensing staff member for every $40 million in research funds. 
The estimate on the licensing staff/research funding ratio suggests that universities with higher ratios 
of licensing staff to research dollars are less effective at obtaining invention disclosures and forming 
startups. The effect change indicates a 1% positive change in the ratio of licensing staff to research 
funding may reduce invention disclosure receipt by 1%, suggesting the universities with largest staff 
to research funding ratio may wish to consider their allocation of resources for their levels of research 
funding. An interesting follow up question would be to determine the best ratio for a university to be 
most efficient and effective in technology commercialization efforts; to find the saturation point at 
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which adding additional licensing staff creates diminishing returns. The estimates on the percentage 
of industry sponsored research are significant and positive for invention disclosure activity (p<0.05) 
and startup formation (p<0.10) and suggest a one unit change in the percentage of industry funding at 
the university may positively influence invention disclosure submission by 9%, and startup activity 
by 3.32%, all else equal. This finding confirms findings from previous studies on the influence of 
industry sponsored research on invention disclosure receipt (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), on 
licensing activities (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005), and on startup formation (Powers & McDougall, 
2005a; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011). The finding for industry funding from this 
current study and others suggests that university-industry interactions may have a positive influence 
upon a university‘s entrepreneurial efforts and culture of support for faculty collaborations with 
industry partners.  
TLO experience is controlled for its number of years in existence, and is found to be positive 
and strongly significant for invention disclosure receipt (p<0.001), each additional year potentially 
increasing disclosure activity by 3.12%, suggesting older TLOs may be more experienced and 
effective at obtaining invention disclosures than TLOs with less experience. Older TLOs, who have 
more experience working with faculty members for commercializing their inventions, may have a 
positive influence due to previous successes (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2007). 
The significance indicated for the age of the TLO may also reflect universities with more time 
cultivating cultural acceptance towards faculty entrepreneurship rather than direct engagement of the 
TLO. The age of the TLO is not shown to have a significant relationship with either licensing activity 
or startup formation. This supports findings by some (Markman, 2005a; Markman, et al., 2009), that 
the age of the TLO is not significantly related to licensing revenues. However, this finding of non-
significance is opposite those of other studies (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Powers & McDougall 
2005a & 2005b; Jensen & Jones, 2011), that TLO experience gained over time has a positive 
influence upon startup activity. As TLO age has a somewhat positive correlation with both research 
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expenditures (>0.48) and licensing staff (>0.6), the ratio of licensing staff to research expenditures 
may have removed some multicollinearity. 
Previous technology transfer activity activities and historical pipeline inputs show positive 
and significant relationships with commercialization outcomes. The elasticity estimates on the logged 
average historical metrics from 2003-2006 indicate that prior commercialization activity can have a 
significant influence upon subsequent activity. Each estimate for the pipeline inputs is positive and 
strongly significant (p<0.001). The elasticity estimate for prior invention disclosure (0.858) for 
licensing activity suggests a high positive relationship between invention disclosure in 2003-2006  
and subsequent licensing efforts; not one-to-one, but a positive influence nonetheless. The elasticity 
estimate for prior invention disclosure (0.658) for startup formation indicates a positive relationship 
between invention disclosure receipt in 2003-2006 and subsequent startup formation, supporting 
findings by Jensen & Jones (2011) that invention disclosures are a critical input for university startup 
formation. The elasticity coefficient for previous licensing efforts in the startup regression indicates a 
negative relationship between previous licensing efforts and subsequent startup formation (-0.234%, 
p<0.05), the estimate indicating a 1% increase in prior licensing activities may reduce subsequent 
startup formation by 0.23%. This suggests university TLOs who have had success in the past with 
licensing efforts may be strategically focused upon licensing rather than startup formation. This 
finding provides support for Chukumba & Jensen‘s (2005) suggestion that university TLOs who have 
success in past licensing activity may be locked into that activity, and not be focused upon startup 
formation; potentially using that commercialization path as a last resort. This also provides some 
additional support for the finding by Bercovitz, et al., (2001), that equity use as a licensing 
mechanism to startups is diminished with higher prior licensing activity. 
As seen above in table 4.7 and figure 4.4, the two most prevalent combinations of 
organizational structure and educational background of TLO director in this study are TLOs reporting 
to an office of research, with either a TLO director with a PhD, or a TLO director with an MBA 
educational background. When these two most prevalent structures are compared with the remaining 
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structures, only one, the TLO reporting to an office of research with an MBA directing the office, is 
shown to be more effective than the remaining 15 structures at obtaining invention disclosures. No 
significance is indicated for either licensing activity or startup formation between these two common 
structures and the others. Results from the comparison of the TLO reporting to an office of research 
with an MBA director are included below (table 4.14).  The combination of the two characteristics 
together does not significantly alter the estimates on the other variables in the regression, however the 
significance of industry sponsored research levels on startup formation is dropped.  
 
Table 4.14 Regression Results, Comparing TLOs Reporting to an Office of Research with an MBA 
Director to All other TLO Arrangements 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
Invention 
Disclosures 
 Licenses  Startups  
Report to Research & 
Director MBA 
0.450* 56.83% -0.242 -21.49% 0.0760 7.90% 
 (0.215)  (0.230)  (0.170)  
Director tenure -0.0179 -1.77% 0.0117 1.18% -0.0132 -1.31% 
 (0.0169)  (0.0157)  (0.0134)  
Private 0.452* 57.15% -0.274+ -23.97% -0.158 -14.62% 
 (0.176)  (0.146)  (0.122)  
Medical School 0.564* 75.77% -0.259 -22.82% 0.122 12.98% 
 (0.213)  (0.230)  (0.111)  
Law School 0.364* 43.91% 0.0268 2.72% 0.229* 25.73% 
 (0.160)  (0.172)  (0.105)  
Licensing Staff/ M$ 
Research Funding 
-11.17* -1.00% -7.829 -1.00% -3.161 -0.96% 
 (4.885)  (5.311)  (2.230)  
Industry Research % 2.309** 9.06% -0.822 -0.56% 1.184 2.27% 
 (0.851)  (0.942)  (0.822)  
TLO Age 0.0294*** 2.98% -0.00418 -0.42% 0.00728+ 0.73% 
 (0.00652)  (0.00577)  (0.00420)  
Log Avg Inv. Disc.T1   0.914*** 1.49% 0.657*** 0.93% 
   (0.0943)  (0.115)  
Log Avg Licenses T1     -0.224+ -0.20% 
     (0.113)  
_cons 3.218***  -0.542  -1.154***  
 (0.397)  (0.486)  (0.295)  
N 76  75  75  
R
2
 0.501  0.658  0.637  
adj. R
2
 0.441  0.611  0.580  
F 12.12  31.96  12.84  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Discussion 
This paper initiates a line of inquiry in response to the call for more in-depth evaluation of 
TLO capabilities, structure, educational skillsets, and activities that can influence the technology 
transfer process and its outcomes (O‘Shea, et al., 2008; Lockett & Wright, 2005). Organizational 
decision making and financial characteristics of university TLOs are shown to influence technology 
transfer activities (Bercovitz, et al., 2001; Markman, et al., 2005b; Markman, et al., 2009; Feldman & 
Bercovitz, 2010). This project contributes an evaluation of the TLO reporting structure and 
educational skillsets of the TLO director and their influence upon technology transfer metrics. 
Considerable diversity exists across universities in TLO organization (Siegel, et al., 2003), and in 
coordination levels with other university units (Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010). The organizational 
structure alignment of the TLO and the skillsets of its staff members may provide opportunities and 
resources via collaboration and coordination efforts with parties internal and external to the 
university. We find 16 different potential combinations, with the two primary structures being TLOs 
organized under an office of research with either a PhD director or an MBA director. In comparison 
with others, we find the TLO organized under the office of research with an MBA director to be more 
effective at obtaining invention disclosures from academic researchers, but not significantly different 
in either of the outcomes. The other most commonly organized TLO, reporting to the office of 
research with a PhD director, did not have any significant difference in any of the three metrics when 
compared to other TLOs. 
The findings on the educational background of the TLO director suggest commercialization 
skills taught through an MBA program may be beneficial in obtaining invention disclosures, licensing 
efforts, and forming university startups. Commercialization skills of the TLO director developed 
through experience may also facilitate startup formation; but is quite difficult to measure in practice. 
The current study provides some evidence of a positive relationship between business and 
commercialization skills taught through an MBA educational degree and increased disclosure and 
startup activity when compared to TLO directors with a PhD, and in licensing efforts when compared 
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to a TLO director with a JD.  Our findings from this analysis provide some support for prior studies 
which suggest universities invest in hiring TLO licensing professionals with advanced business skills 
(Markman, et al., 2009) or in educational opportunities or programs designed to increase the broad-
based commercialization skillsets of the TLO (Siegel, et al., 2007; Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011).  The 
finding of a negative between TLO directors with JDs and licensing activity is considerable in this 
analysis, indicating a TLO director with a JD may be less effective than TLO directors with all other 
educational backgrounds in licensing university inventions. This finding would indicate that while 
legal knowledge is an important element for the technology transfer process in intellectual property 
protection and contractual language, legal wrangling in negotiation practices may limit successful 
licensing opportunities.  
Results from a number of (but not all) previous studies on university institutional and 
historical characteristics are supported by this study. The presence of a law school has a positive 
relationship with both invention disclosure and startup activity. The finding of a positive relationship 
with startup activity is consistent with and supports previous finding by Feldman & Bercovitz (2010), 
the positive relationship with invention disclosures suggests a relationship that may benefit from 
further exploration. The findings for private schools suggest private institutions may be effective in 
obtaining invention disclosures from research faculty, but less effective at licensing and startup 
formation than public institutions. The presence of medical school is shown to be a positive influence 
upon invention disclosure receipt, but not for licensing or startup efforts, suggesting medical schools 
may have high rates of invention disclosures, but those inventions may not necessarily turn into 
commercial opportunities at any higher rate than disclosures from other departments. The finding for 
medical schools confirms those of Kim (2013); medical schools had no significant influence on the 
licensing activities of 90 universities between 1999 and 2007. The influence of the medical school on 
commercialization outcomes may have lessened as other institutions increase their commitment to 
technology transfer. Bulut & Moschini (2009) find the combination of a medical school and a private 
university has a positive relationship with licensing revenues, suggesting this combination of 
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characteristics may have a larger pipeline of disclosures with which to work, and may be able to 
negotiate a higher rate of return with successful licensing efforts.  
Corroborating previous studies, this analysis finds the effects of experience and history have 
a strong influence upon an institutions‘ ability to successfully commercialize academic innovations 
(O‘Shea, et al., 2005). Prior TLO invention disclosure history is shown to have a strong influence 
upon subsequent licensing and successful startup formation, as noted in previous studies (Friedman & 
Silberman, 2003; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; DiGregorio & Shane, 2003); 
confirming the criticality of invention disclosure for the technology transfer process. Prior licensing 
activity has a negative relationship with subsequent licensing efforts, suggesting universities may be 
locked into licensing from past successful efforts. The findings from this analysis of TLO 
characteristics suggest that the technology transfer activities of US research universities continue to 
evolve and expand, and correspondingly the influence of university characteristics on 
commercialization outcomes will continue to change. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study is an initial inquiry into the impact of TLO organizational structure and TLO 
director‘s educational skills on specific university technology transfer commercialization metrics. 
This evaluation leverages heterogeneity in TLO reporting structure and TLO director educational 
background across 76 US universities in an attempt to highlight characteristics that influence 
commercialization outcomes. While this study has some limitations, it contributes an empirical 
analysis to the discussion of how heterogeneity in TLO characteristics across universities helps to 
explain differences in commercialization outcomes. This analysis indicates a correlation between 
specific TLO characteristics and technology commercialization outcomes, and provides motivation 
for further exploration of university infrastructure and capabilities of the TLO over time.  
Limitations in this current study include the small number of TLOs reporting to multiple 
offices in this analysis; 6 out of the 76 universities included in this study are organized under this 
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reporting relationship. Further analysis with additional TLOs under multiple reporting structures may 
help to properly evaluate this structure‘s influence upon commercialization outcomes. Some care 
should be taken with interpretations of this analysis, as relationships between organizational 
structures may be contingent upon the type of institution, its size, research funding levels, and the 
existence of various schools within the institution. The sample evaluated in this analysis is from 76 
research universities, not an extremely large set to be able to effectively compare the 16 different 
possible organizational structures to each other. There may also be endogeneity in the model in that 
the reporting structure may have evolved at the university in response to the culture, history, and 
needs of the institution, and hiring of the TLO director may have been influenced by the same 
characteristics. There may be a causal loop between organizational characteristics of the TLO and 
technology commercialization metrics. For example, universities more highly engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities in the past may have purposely aligned their office with an economic or 
business development function to facilitate those activities. Therefore, while a relationship is 
indicated between some of the different organizational structures of the TLO and commercialization 
outcomes, no causal direction can be inferred.  
As indicated in the technology transfer processes in figure 4.1, a variety of skills and 
experience are needed to facilitate the different stages of the technology transfer process and 
commercialization outcomes. The last educational degree of the TLO director is a rough proxy for 
knowledge and skills of the TLO director, however it does not enable quantification of broad-based 
commercialization skillsets that are developed outside of the educational experience, and may not 
capture the full set of skillsets of these individuals. Accordingly, estimates need to be interpreted with 
some caution. They do provide a starting point for a conversation regarding the breadth and depth of 
skills required in technology commercialization activities. Further evaluation is needed to determine 
if there are better proxies for TLO director educational knowledge base, commercialization 
experience, and on the job skill development. A more thorough and detailed analysis can help to 
evaluate the many different types of skills needed in academic technology commercialization 
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activities and to discover the full set of educational, experience, skills and other knowledge 
characteristics needed for the technology transfer process. Further analysis is needed to explore the 
negative relationship between licensing activity and TLO directors with a JD, particularly to evaluate 
the relationship between this educational background and revenues received from successful licensing 
efforts.  The estimate on the licensing staff/research funding ratio suggests that adding an additional 
staff member may potentially have a negative influence if research funding is not also expanding. 
This finding calls for further analysis to determine the best ratio of licensing staff per research 
funding levels before reaching levels of diminishing returns. 
Also missing from this current study are measures of faculty quality, as previous studies find 
quality of institutional faculty influences the number and quality of invention disclosures received by 
the TLO (Thursby & Kemp, 2002; Friedman & Silberman, 2003; O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Powers & 
McDougall, 2005a; Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Markman, et al., 2009), as well as subsequent 
commercialization activities (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; Powers & McDougall, 2005b; Jensen & 
Jones, 2011). Faculty quality indicators were not readily available for this analysis; subsequent 
research may benefit from including such a measure due to the strong influence faculty quality can 
have on invention disclosure submission, required for any subsequent commercialization efforts 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). 
Contribution of Study 
This study advances the existing body of literature regarding characteristics of entrepreneurial 
universities and the organizational structures of technology licensing offices, contributing to research 
analyzing university and TLO characteristics and capabilities. Rothaermel, Agung, and Jiang (2007), 
in their thorough review of academic entrepreneurship studies note a common thread among the 
conclusions of studies in their review: a great need for barrier elimination (such as lack of appropriate 
commercialization skills in the TLO) in the technology transfer process to increase TLO efficiency 
and effectiveness. The current analysis of organizational structure and educational skillsets within the 
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TLO provides additional insight into characteristics that can be strategically aligned to reduce 
potential barriers to technology transfer.  
University Implications 
Results from this study provides key information to university leaders regarding the strategic 
implementation of their technology transfer processes, and how internal organizational structure and 
skillset alignment in the TLO can facilitate technology transfer outcomes. The information provided 
by this study highlights the importance of the role that organizational structure and various 
educational skillsets available to the TLO play in supporting university technology commercialization 
goals. Universities may benefit from establishing a strategic approach to the commercialization of 
academic inventions as suggested by Siegel, et al., (2007), addressing commercialization skill 
deficiencies in the TLO and supporting organizational structures that can more readily access 
technology commercialization resources. Choices of commercialization goals and priorities, 
allocation of resources, organizational structure, skill development in the TLO, and policies to 
incentivize faculty disclosure of inventions fall to institutional leadership (Siegel & Phan, 2005). 
University leaders and TLOs make strategic decisions regarding commercialization pathways of 
inventions (Rothaermel, et al., 2007); and alignment of organizational configurations and other 
characteristics under the control of the university may increase potential for success. University 
leaders may wish to focus efforts on specific technology transfer outcomes, and developing an 
understanding of the characteristics that influence those strategic choices can be beneficial. 
Institutional leaders can ensure appropriate policies are in place to create or enhance a culture of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, and to support and incentivize invention disclosure from university 
researchers (Siegel, et al., 2007; ipHandbook, 2012). Incentive policies can increase the likelihood of 
inventions resulting from academic research activities to be disclosed to the TLO; increasing the 
critical input into the commercialization pipeline and opportunities for success technology transfer 
(Siegel, et al., 2007).  
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Skillsets within the TLO are important and can provide support for the various steps along the 
technology transfer process. This study indicates that commercialization skills associated with an 
MBA degree may have a positive influence upon invention disclosures and startup formation when 
compared to a TLO director with a PhD, and a positive influence upon licensing activities when 
compared to a TLO director with a JD.  This finding supports previous suggestions universities invest 
in commercialization training for their TLOs and entrepreneurial faculty (Siegel, et al., 2007). While 
legal expertise is quite important for intellectual property protection, evaluating federal, state and 
local laws, and verifying legalities of terms in agreements (O‘Connor, et al., 2010), increased legal 
wrangling in licensing negotiations may have a negative influence as suggested by Siegel, et al. 
(2003), raising important implications for university administrators in determine appropriate 
alignment of skills to facilitate the universities strategic goals for successful transfer of university 
inventions to industry. ―Success begets success,‖ a history of achievement in technology transfer can 
increase faculty awareness and have an impact upon the university‘s entrepreneurial culture (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2001, p 111). Aligning organizational structure and educational skillsets within the 
university environment to facilitate technology transfer activities can provide increased opportunities 
for successful commercialization of university inventions. 
Policy Implications 
This study also provides timely data and information for legislators who view university 
entrepreneurship and technology transfer as an important form of economic development across the 
US. The information provided in this and other recent studies on university TLO commercialization 
activities is important to consider as US research universities address increased federal and state 
expectations for commercialization of research results and economic development impact. This line 
of inquiry will be helpful for policy advocates to consider as initiatives designed to enhance 
university technology commercialization outcomes are being reviewed by federal committees 
(specifically the Science, Space & Technology Committee), and draft legislation is being discussed to 
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support innovative approaches to academic technology commercialization efforts (H.R. 2981, & 
H.R.714).
29
  
Results from this research improve the understanding of how university TLO organizational 
structures and educational skillsets influence certain academic technology commercialization 
activities and outcomes. These unique reporting structures and educational characteristics can affect 
the coordination efforts and focus of the TLO within the university and its environment, as well as the 
technology transfer process itself, which can in turn influence the eventual commercialization of 
academic inventions. This research provides valuable information for university leaders and 
interested policy makers evaluating institutional goal and capability alignment for the organization of 
university technology licensing operations. 
 
                                                     
29
Subcommittee on Research and Technology–Improving Technology Transfer at Universities, Research 
Institutes and National Laboratories: http://science.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-research-and-technology-
improving-technology-transfer-universities-research 
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Chapter 5. Discussion and Policy Implications  
Introduction 
A changing economic environment, increasing budget constraints for research activities, and 
growing expectations regarding the university‘s role in economic development has prompted a 
reevaluation of the university technology transfer process and its outcomes (Leigh & Teece, 2013). 
US research universities work to enhance their technology commercialization efforts while also 
maintaining the integrity of the original educational and basic research missions of the research 
university (Breznitz & Feldman, 2012). Success in technology commercialization efforts depends 
upon many factors, including regional characteristics, entrepreneurial culture, university leadership, 
the strategic focus of the university on technology commercialization, the availability of investment 
funding, as well as the organization and capabilities of the TLO function within the university (Leih 
& Teece, 2013). When leaders of US research universities contemplate the potential for their 
institution to have an impact upon their economic development through their technology transfer 
efforts, characteristics and attributes across all of these areas are important to consider.  
The three projects contained within this dissertation project provide information on a variety 
of university and TLO characteristics that are shown to have an influence on the academic technology 
transfer process and that may also influence any potential collaborative efforts for technology 
commercialization consortia. Universities can have an impact upon regional economic development 
through a variety of channels, including new business creation, collaborative engagement with 
industry research, and by increasing the transfer and commercialization of academic inventions from 
the university to industry partners (Audretsch, 2013). These research projects address issues relevant 
to these channels. The first, a literature review, synthesizes findings from prior studies on 
characteristics related to growth in technology transfer efforts at US research universities. 
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Characteristics of universities and TLOs are evaluated for how they may influence invention 
disclosure from faculty; licensing activities, revenue generation, startup formation, and use of equity. 
The influence of regional characteristics on these activities is also considered. Gaps in analysis of 
certain university and TLO characteristics are identified for further review. The second project 
comprises a case study evaluation of an early stage licensing consortium in North Carolina‘s 
Research Triangle Park; TULCO. This case study analysis provides background and history of the 
consortium, its day to day operations, and the consortium‘s influence upon patenting and licensing 
activities of the three universities, and of circumstances leading to TULCO‘s eventual demise. The 
case study on TULCO provides some context for current conversations at the national and regional 
policy levels regarding potential academic technology licensing consortia. The third project provides 
an analysis of specific TLO organizational reporting structures, educational background and job 
tenure of the TLO director, and how these characteristics factor into the technology transfer process. 
The empirical study evaluates data from 76 US research universities to explore relationships between 
these characteristics on invention disclosure receipt, licensing and startup formation, finding that 
differences in configurations of TLOs can influence the technology transfer process and its outcomes. 
These findings indicate there may be some potential for characteristic alignment in support of certain 
activities along the technology transfer process and its outcomes. 
Literature Review 
Selected studies are evaluated to better define university characteristics that may help to 
explain heterogeneity across US research universities in technology commercialization outcomes. US 
universities have become more efficient in technology commercialization efforts, but see year to year 
volatility (Kim, 2013), illustrating the dynamic nature and pipeline aspect of the academic technology 
transfer process and its outcomes. Faculty quality and higher research funding levels are found to be 
strongly positively correlated with invention disclosures, determined by several studies to be critical 
inputs into the technology commercialization process (O‘Shea, et al., 2005; Friedman & Silberman, 
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2003; Markman, et al., 2005). Smaller universities with less available resources to use towards 
technology licensing may be applying those resources more efficiently than larger universities 
(Thursby & Kemp, 2002). Universities with larger TLOs are more efficient at licensing and startup 
activity compared to those with smaller offices (Siegel, et. al, 2003 & 2008), but there may be some 
diminishing returns in efficiency with growth in the TLO (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Older TLOs 
are generally associated with higher licensing revenues, which may be a function of successful 
historical licensing efforts (Siegel, et al., 2008). Faculty quality and engagement with the 
commercialization process are quite important at the beginning of commercialization efforts, as are 
the universities degree of support for entrepreneurial activities of faculty (Markman, et al., 2005a; 
Powers & McDougall, 2005b). The type of research and the level of funding also have an impact 
upon technology transfer; institutions with high levels of research funding have higher levels of 
invention disclosure to the TLO (Friedman & Silberman, 2003), and have higher licensing activities 
and licensing revenues (Thursby & Thursby, 2007; Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Chukumba & Jensen, 
2005). Federal and industry funding levels also have a positive factor in startup formation, 
particularly industry funding levels (Markman, et al., 2004; Powers & McDougall, 2005a; O‘Shea, et 
al., 2005; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Jones, 2011).The universities policy orientation and 
support of entrepreneurial faculty can have a significant impact upon a university‘s success in 
technology commercialization; universities supportive of entrepreneurial faculty and of the TLO have 
a positive influence on growth in invention disclosures (Thursby & Kemp, 2002; Thursby & Thursby, 
2002), however incentive policies with higher rates of royalty sharing with inventors may stifle 
startup formation (DiGregorio & Shane, 2003; Markman, et al., 2004; Markman, et al., 2009).  
Previous experience with successful technology commercialization, startup formation, and 
use of equity is an important factor in subsequent successes (Digregorio & Shane, 2003; O‘Shea, et 
al., 2005). Institutions utilizing equity in licensing to university startups are typically larger research 
institutions, have strong support from institutional leadership, and correspondingly supportive 
entrepreneurial cultures (Bray & Lee, 2000; Smilor & Mathews, 2004). Feldman, et al., (2002) also 
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find structural characteristics such as a presence of a medical school and prestige (i.e. research 
universities with a Carnegie classification) increased the likelihood of use of equity in licensing 
mechanisms. Taking equity in a startup may provide additional credibility, possibly attracting 
additional investment (Feldman, et al., 2002). This licensing mechanism aligns the interests of both 
the startup and the university towards long-term success in getting the academic innovation into the 
commercial sector (Bray & Lee, 2000).However taking an ownership portion in a new venture is also 
quite risky, as often there is no interest expressed by existing industry either because the invention 
isn‘t considered profitable or no market currently exists (Feldman, et al., 2002), suggesting university 
startups may face additional hurdles in commercialization efforts. TLO structures also have an 
influence upon technology commercialization efforts. Traditionally structured TLOs (organized as an 
integral unit of the university) and TLOs with low autonomy and authority in decision making have 
lower levels of licensing revenues and startup formation, while TLOs organized under a for-profit 
structure have higher rates of startups and use of equity (Markman, et al., 2005a, Markman, et al., 
2009), and TLOs expected to be self-funded are less likely to utilize equity (Feldman, et al., 2002).  
Policy considerations for universities are many from this literature review. University 
characteristics including supportive policies and an entrepreneurial orientation of the university, 
faculty quality, research funding, amount of industry funding, experience, and business capabilities of 
the TLO are all points to consider for short and long term success of university technology 
commercialization efforts. For universities without significant previous history and success in 
licensing university inventions, there may be characteristics and attributes of the university and the 
TLO that can be evaluated and modified to influence the probability of success and establish a track 
record. Some characteristics may be influenced by university leadership, including hiring quality 
research faculty; supporting increased research partnerships with industry; reviewing and updating 
incentive policies to support entrepreneurial efforts. Commercialization skills and business networks 
of the TLO can support licensing and startup efforts (Markman, et al., 2004), however the lack of 
these skills is noted by several as potential barriers to technology transfer activities, extending the 
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length of time to finding licensees and forming startups (Siegel, Waldman & Link, 2003; Markamn, 
et al., 2005a; Markman et al., 2009; Litan & Cook-Deegan, 2011). Hiring or providing appropriate 
commercialization training to the licensing staff of the TLO may help address some of these barriers. 
External characteristics such as venture capital availability and the concentration of related industry 
can be taken into consideration in developing policies regarding licensing, startup formation and the 
utilization of equity in licensing to startups.  
Collaborative Technology Transfer 
The case study of an early technology licensing consortium provides lessons learned from the 
efforts of Duke University, North Carolina State University and The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill to collaborate on technology commercialization and licensing. Analysis of this early stage 
consortium suggests pooling resources through a single licensing consortium increased effectiveness 
in technology commercialization efforts at the individual universities. This case study provides 
compelling evidence in support of increased technology licensing activities from the three triangle 
universities through combined efforts and shared subject domain expertise in the licensing staff 
members of TULCO. Combining licensing efforts through a single entity allowed more inventions to 
reach the commercial market than each of the universities could do on their own, as they each had 
little internal infrastructure and no (or few) established processes for technology commercialization. 
Successes and pitfalls from the early consortium are analyzed, as well as trends in licensing and 
patenting activities for the three universities during and immediately following the consortium. This 
consortium helped to address a burgeoning need and desire of regional policy makers and university 
leadership to move academic inventions forward by engaging with and licensing these inventions to 
industry. Once established, TULCO was quite effective in licensing efforts; however the growing 
needs of the three universities and their entrepreneurial faculty outpaced the capacity of the 
consortium, leading to internal infrastructure development at each of the universities to meet the 
needs TULCO was unable to fill. Findings from this project are timely and are applicable to 
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institutions considering partnering with others to more effectively and efficiently license and 
commercialize academic based research results. 
In particular, the policy implications of the TULCO experience for the University of North 
Carolina system may be particularly informative. Currently, the two large research universities of the 
system, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University in 
Raleigh lead technology commercialization and startup activity within the 17 campus UNC system, 
and have well-established infrastructures for marketing and commercialization efforts (AUTM, 
STATT, 2012). A group of smaller universities within the North Carolina system, including UNC 
Charlotte, East Carolina University, UNC Greensboro, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical 
State University, and to some extent, UNC Wilmington have established small technology licensing 
offices to help move commercially viable innovations forward to the market. The remaining 10 
institutions across the state (Appalachian State University, Elizabeth City State University, 
Fayetteville State University, North Carolina Central University, UNC Asheville, UNC Pembroke, 
UNC School of the Arts, Western Carolina University, Winston-Salem State University, and the 
North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics) are without any formalized marketing or 
commercialization mechanisms on their campuses; as low level research campuses, there may not be 
a budgetary justification for the establishment of an on-site technology commercialization resource. A 
technology licensing consortium for the UNC system schools would provide a mechanism for those 
institutions currently without any technology commercialization capabilities to be able to access 
resources not currently available to their campuses. Universities that now have on-campus technology 
commercialization capabilities could leverage any resources provided through a system-wide 
licensing consortium to enhance existing internal capabilities for marketing and commercialization 
efforts, thereby expanding existing domain expertise and industry networks. As entrepreneurial 
cultures become more commonly accepted in university environments, and research activities 
continue to grow, universities with active engagement in research activities and industry collaboration 
 167 
may eventually require an on-site TLO to develop relationships and provide in-person support to 
faculty researchers and other innovators across their respective campuses.  
Organizational Characteristics and Technology Transfer Performance 
Institutional, organizational, and TLO characteristics are shown in several previous studies to 
have an impact on technology commercialization outcomes. Organizational reporting structures of the 
university TLO can facilitate technology transfer outcomes through their coordination and integration 
with other functions internal to the university as well as resources external to the campus environment 
(Bercovitz, et al., 2001; Feldman & Bercovitz, 2010; Markman, et al. 2009). The empirical analysis in 
Chapter 4 of the reporting structure of the TLO, educational background and tenure of the TLO 
director find these characteristics can factor into the university technology transfer process and its 
outcomes.  
Positive relationships are found between TLOs reporting to multiple functions within the 
university and increased licensing activities; and between TLOs reporting to an economic/business 
development function or the university leader and increased startup formation when compared to 
TLOs reporting to the office of research. The strength of these relationships and the effect sizes on 
these alternative TLO reporting structures in comparison to the most common reporting structure 
(office of research) support the initial premise that different TLO reporting structures may have an 
impact on certain technology transfer outcomes over others. The increased coordination efforts of 
TLOs reporting to multiple functions within the university may provide an expanded network from 
which to develop industry contacts for successful licensing. TLOs reporting to the university leader or 
to an economic/business development function may be coordinating efforts with external resources, 
providing access to an expanded industry network and investment funding in the region, potentially 
influencing startup formation as suggested by Markman, et al., (2009, p.636).  
The educational background of the TLO director most aligned with the calls for increased 
commercialization skills (MBA) is positively related with invention disclosure receipt and startup 
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activity when compared with TLO directors with PhD educational backgrounds. TLO directors with 
MBAs are also more effective in licensing when compared with TLO directors with legal (JD) 
educational backgrounds. The results from this study suggest TLO directors with legal (JD) degrees 
are less effective in licensing activities when compared to TLO directors with all other educational 
backgrounds, potentially due to risk adversity and legal wrangling as suggested by others (Siegel, et 
al., 2003). The intersection of educational skills and experience developed beyond educational 
degrees remains an open question for further analysis. From a policy perspective, the relationship 
between TLO directors with a legal degree and lowered licensing activity may be worth noting as 
university administrators work to find ways to remove barriers for effective technology 
commercialization. An evaluation of those directors with MBA degrees who are effective in obtaining 
invention disclosures and licensing academic inventions from their university may provide some 
additional knowledge and indications of the types of skillsets and experience that enable successful 
efforts.  
Policy implications are such that universities who may be interested in emphasizing one 
particular commercialization path over others may consider the structural alignment of their internal 
TLO function to ensure maximum coordination and integration efforts with other university units that 
can effectively support those strategic commercial pathways, whether for licensing directly to 
industry or forming startups. If a general increase in each type of technology commercialization is the 
objective, ensuring appropriate resources are available to the TLO as well as capabilities of 
coordination with other units and entities external to the university that can support both licensing and 
university startup efforts. Building relationships with other university units increase opportunities for 
effective integration with the campus community, establishing relationships with industry partners for 
research and prospective licensing, and capabilities of the TLO to leverage external resources in 
support of the technology transfer process can all have a positive influence on university technology 
commercialization efforts.  
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Conclusion 
Technology commercialization at research universities necessarily occurs in environments 
influenced by regional attributes (geographic, industry and entrepreneurial characteristics, investment 
availability), policies and regulations (local, state and national laws, conflict of interest policies), as 
well as characteristics of the research university itself, and of its TLO. Universities evaluating 
organizational structure, skills and capabilities for potential alignment to facilitate the technology 
transfer process, whether licensing activities, startup formation, or both commercialization paths, will 
likely find this analysis of characteristics of the university and TLO on the technology transfer 
process helpful. Determining and using the best alignment of organizational structures and 
capabilities may increase a TLO‘s effectiveness in transferring academic inventions to the market 
through coordination with other university functions strategically aligned with the focus of the TLO. 
As summarized in prior work, the characteristics under control of university leadership that can 
influence a culture of entrepreneurship and potentially increase the university‘s regional economic 
development impact are many. Supporting increased research partnerships with industry can also 
contribute to an entrepreneurial culture, and may stimulate the formation of startups from the 
university, as found in the current empirical analysis and in prior studies (Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; 
Powers & McDougall, 2005).  
Licensing consortia may be fruitful for research universities with smaller levels of research 
funding and that may not have the infrastructure or funding for the development of a full functioning 
office. Consortia among research universities to help move publicly funded academic innovations are 
being discussed at the national policy level, and the case study analysis provides some guidance from 
the history of an early stage consortium designed to increase licensing and commercialization efforts 
among the three triangle universities in North Carolina‘s Research Triangle Park. Combining 
resources with other institutions can provide opportunities to leverage tools more effectively (market 
research reports, data engines and other services), expand subject matter expertise and provide access 
to expanded industry networks that might not be accessible when universities are working alone. 
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Geographic limitations may have been broken down somewhat through advanced means of 
communication, so may not be as important today as it was during the time of TULCO, however 
successful relationships will be cultivated through good communication among the members of any 
technology licensing consortia, among the member institutions, the inventors, and industry networks. 
The promises and pitfalls from TULCO‘s early efforts can provide guidance for institutions 
considering forming partnerships for technology commercialization efforts.  
TLO organizational characteristics, including financial structures (Markman, 2005a), 
organizational form (Feldman et al,. 2001), level of autonomy (Markman, et al., 2009), as well as the 
TLOs reporting relationship can all factor into a TLO‘s effectiveness in working with faculty to 
increase invention disclosure submission, and the degree to which they are able to negotiate licenses 
with industry and support university startups. A lack of commercialization skills within the TLO has 
been held up as a potential barrier to technology licensing and startup activity, with additional 
suggestions that universities hire or provide appropriate training to increase or enhance business 
development and commercialization skillsets of the TLO (Smilor & Matthews, 2003; Siegel, et al., 
2003; Markman, et al., 2004; Markman, et al., 2009), and of entrepreneurial faculty (Siegel, 2012). 
The empirical study in this dissertation begins to analyze how educational background of the TLO 
director can facilitate or hamper technology commercialization activities. Some alignment with 
educational backgrounds can be done to remove potential barriers; however the characteristics of a 
TLO director and staff members that facilitate successful licensing and startup formation are likely to 
be beyond pure educational background, but rather a combination of education, skills, experience, and 
possibly luck. Educational degrees of the TLO director are a rough proxy for knowledge and skillsets, 
and may be missing other factors related to knowledge and skills gained through experience or other 
mechanisms. Further research and evaluation of commercialization skillsets of TLO licensing staff 
members may help determine the variety of skills that may lie in the set of ‗broad based 
commercialization skills‘ considered lacking in many university TLOs.  
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The empirical evaluation adds to previous academic studies by evaluating possible 
correlations and relationships between specific TLO characteristics (reporting structure of the TLO 
and the degree of the TLO director) with an institution‘s effectiveness in commercializing academic 
inventions through licensing and startup formation. This project contributes to the knowledge base 
and understanding upon which academic technology transfer activities are evaluated for university 
administrators, regional and national legislators and those external to the research university 
environment, providing insight for the decision making processes of US research universities as they 
evaluate the effectiveness of their entrepreneurial support and technology commercialization efforts.  
General findings from these research projects will be noteworthy to university administrators, 
boards, and trustees who wish to facilitate technology transfer and entrepreneurial activities of their 
research faculty. The information provided through each of the research papers included in this 
dissertation project delivers a collection of information on university attributes and TLO 
characteristics that may also be of interest to and utilized by funding agencies and legislators involved 
in policy development for US research universities. University administrators focused upon a 
particular strategic direction for technology commercialization efforts are provided with information 
regarding characteristics that may influence that strategic direction, and can make changes 
accordingly to those characteristics over which they have some control. University administrators, 
policy makers and government agencies who fund research being conducted at US research 
universities will find the results of these studies informative as universities and TLOs respond to 
increased regional and national expectations for economic development impact. 
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APPENDIX A TULCO DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
Discussion Guide for A Case Study and Historical Analysis: 
Triangle University Licensing Consortium (TULCO) 
 
Research study conducted by Lisa A. Goble and Maryann Feldman 
Department of Public Policy, UNC-Chapel Hill 
 
1. Please would you describe for me your role as a staff member, inventor or licensee? What 
time period(s)?  
 
2. I understand the primary responsibility of this partnership was to market and license the 
inventions, and develop industry-sponsored research collaborations to further develop those 
inventions. Do you think TULCO achieved those primary objectives? Why or why not?  
 
3. Prior to TULCO there was little patenting and licensing at the 3 Universities? Do you feel 
that the consortium was successful in: Encouraging patenting? Licensing innovations 
created at the universities? Creating more industry sponsored research? 
 
4. How did the 3 Universities (Duke, UNC and NCSU) work together?  
 
a. Any instances of collaboration between the 3 universities?  
 
b. Were there rivalries?  
 
c. Do you feel that the institutions working together realized efficiencies or gains in 
cooperation? Why/why not? 
 
5. There was probably a tension between providing quality service to the faculty inventors and 
focusing on other objectives. What was TULCO‘s priority?  
 
6. Why was TULCO disbanded? What led to its demise? What were the circumstances 
leading up to the disbanding of TULCO? Were there specific reasons stated? 
 
7. Would you recommend this type of consortium model for other institutions? 
 
8. Are there any additional comments you‘d like to add to what we‘ve already discussed, or 
can you suggest additional questions that should be included? 
 
9. Are there other individuals that you can recommend I speak to whose knowledge can 
contribute to this preliminary analysis?  
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APPENDIX B TULCO FIGURES 
 
University Issued Patents, 1980-2003 
Figure 3.4 University Issued Patents by Application Year, 1980-1987 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 University Issued Patents by Application Year, 1988-1995 
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Figure 3.6 University Issued Patents by Application Year, 1996-2003 
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APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 4.15 Regression Results, Economic/Business Dev. Reporting & MBA as Comparison 
 
OLS (08-10) (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
Invention 
Disclosures 
 Licenses  Startups  
Research Office 0.394 48.29% 0.0288 2.92% -0.257+ -22.66% 
 (0.329)  (0.226)  (0.143)  
Institutional Leader 0.565 75.94% 0.215 23.99% 0.0526 5.40% 
 (0.414)  (0.243)  (0.159)  
Multiple Offices 0.599 82.03% 0.693+ 99.97% -0.321 -27.46% 
 (0.420)  (0.396)  (0.247)  
Director PhD -0.451* -36.30% -0.0380 -3.73% -0.295+ -25.55% 
 (0.216)  (0.209)  (0.168)  
Director JD -0.508 -39.83% -0.493* -38.92% -0.178 -16.31% 
 (0.307)  (0.226)  (0.208)  
Director BS -0.367 -30.72% 0.321 37.85% -0.0561 -5.46% 
 (0.294)  (0.274)  (0.191)  
Director tenure -0.0237 -2.34% -0.0103 -1.02% -0.0115 -1.14% 
 (0.0185)  (0.0147)  (0.0127)  
Private 0.393* 48.14% -0.349* -29.46% -0.237* -21.10% 
 (0.186)  (0.154)  (0.106)  
Medical School 0.556* 74.37% -0.170 -15.63% 0.0831 8.67% 
 (0.212)  (0.206)  (0.122)  
Law School 0.334+ 39.65% 0.0868 9.07% 0.269* 30.87% 
 (0.172)  (0.178)  (0.114)  
Licensing Staff/ M$ 
Research Funding 
-12.24* -1.00% -6.574 -1.00% -4.966+ -0.99% 
 (5.300)  (4.873)  (2.605)  
Industry Research % 2.303* 9.00% -0.110 -0.10% 1.463+ 3.32% 
 (0.924)  (0.884)  (0.874)  
TLO AGE 0.0307*** 3.12% 0.0000600 0.01% 0.00729 0.73% 
 (0.00684)  (0.00535)  (0.00447)  
Log Avg. Inv. Disc. T1   0.859*** 0.858% 0.659*** 0.658% 
   (0.0938)  (0.126)  
Log Avg. Licenses T1     -0.235+ -0.234% 
     (0.135)  
_cons 3.348***  -0.491  -0.751+  
 (0.585)  (0.571)  (0.421)  
N 76  75  75  
R
2
 0.524  0.711  0.679  
adj. R
2
 0.424  0.643  0.597  
F 10.38  27.80  10.12  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.16 Regression Results, University Leadership Reporting & BS as Comparison 
 
OLS (08-10) (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
Invention 
Disclosures 
 Licenses  Startups  
Research Office -0.171 -15.72% -0.186 -16.97% -0.310* -26.66% 
 (0.300)  (0.204)  (0.142)  
Economic/Bus. Dev. -0.565 -43.16% -0.215 -19.35% -0.0526 -5.12% 
 (0.414)  (0.243)  (0.159)  
Multiple Offices 0.0337 3.43% 0.478 61.28% -0.374+ -31.20% 
 (0.378)  (0.383)  (0.214)  
Director PhD -0.0833 -7.99% -0.359 -30.16% -0.238 -21.18% 
 (0.280)  (0.273)  (0.171)  
Director JD -0.141 -13.15% -0.814** -55.69% -0.122 -11.49% 
 (0.335)  (0.259)  (0.220)  
Director MBA 0.367 44.34% -0.321 -27.46% 0.0561 5.77% 
 (0.294)  (0.274)  (0.191)  
Director tenure -0.0237 -2.34% -0.0103 -1.02% -0.0115 -1.14% 
 (0.0185)  (0.0147)  (0.0127)  
Private 0.393* 48.14% -0.349* -29.46% -0.237* -21.10% 
 (0.186)  (0.154)  (0.106)  
Medical School 0.556* 74.37% -0.170 -15.63% 0.0831 8.67% 
 (0.212)  (0.206)  (0.122)  
Law School 0.334+ 39.65% 0.0868 9.07% 0.269* 30.87% 
 (0.172)  (0.178)  (0.114)  
Licensing Staff/ M$ 
Research Funding 
-12.24* -1.00% -6.574 -1.00% -4.966+ -0.99% 
 (5.300)  (4.873)  (2.605)  
Industry Research % 2.303* 9.00% -0.110 -0.10% 1.463+ 3.32% 
 (0.924)  (0.884)  (0.874)  
TLO AGE 0.0307*** 3.12% 0.0000600 0.01% 0.00729 0.73% 
 (0.00684)  (0.00535)  (0.00447)  
Log Avg. Inv. Disc. T1   0.859*** 0.858% 0.659*** 0.658% 
   (0.0938)  (0.126)  
Log Avg. Licenses T1     -0.235+ -0.234% 
     (0.135)  
_cons 3.546***  0.0446  -0.754*  
 (0.523)  (0.547)  (0.363)  
N 76  75  75  
R
2
 0.524  0.711  0.679  
adj. R
2
 0.424  0.643  0.597  
F 10.38  27.80  10.12  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.17 Regression Results, Multiple Reporting & JD as Comparison 
 
OLS (08-10) (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Invention 
Disclosures 
 Licenses  Startups  
Research Office -0.205 -18.54% -0.664+ -48.52% 0.0640 6.61% 
 (0.305)  (0.354)  (0.211)  
Economic/Bus. Dev. -0.599 -45.06% -0.693+ -49.99% 0.321 37.85% 
 (0.420)  (0.396)  (0.247)  
Institutional Leader -0.0337 -3.31% -0.478 -38.00% 0.374+ 45.35% 
 (0.378)  (0.383)  (0.214)  
Director PhD 0.0579 5.96% 0.455* 57.62% -0.117 -11.04% 
 (0.294)  (0.203)  (0.178)  
Director MBA 0.508 66.20% 0.493* 63.72% 0.178 19.48% 
 (0.307)  (0.226)  (0.208)  
Director BS 0.141 15.14% 0.814** 125.69% 0.122 12.98% 
 (0.335)  (0.259)  (0.220)  
Director tenure -0.0237 -2.34% -0.0103 -1.02% -0.0115 -1.14% 
 (0.0185)  (0.0147)  (0.0127)  
Private 0.393* 48.14% -0.349* -29.46% -0.237* -21.10% 
 (0.186)  (0.154)  (0.106)  
Medical School 0.556* 74.37% -0.170 -15.63% 0.0831 8.67% 
 (0.212)  (0.206)  (0.122)  
Law School 0.334+ 39.65% 0.0868 9.07% 0.269* 30.87% 
 (0.172)  (0.178)  (0.114)  
Licensing Staff/ M$ 
Research Funding 
-12.24* -1.00% -6.574 -1.00% -4.966+ -0.99% 
 (5.300)  (4.873)  (2.605)  
Industry Research % 2.303* 9.00% -0.110 -0.10% 1.463+ 3.32% 
 (0.924)  (0.884)  (0.874)  
TLO AGE 0.0307*** 3.12% 0.0000600 0.01% 0.00729 0.73% 
 (0.00684)  (0.00535)  (0.00447)  
Log Avg. Inv. Disc. T1   0.859*** 0.858% 0.659*** 0.658% 
   (0.0938)  (0.126)  
Log Avg. Licenses T1     -0.235+ -0.234% 
     (0.135)  
_cons 3.438***  -0.292  -1.250**  
 (0.486)  (0.665)  (0.409)  
N 76  75  75  
R
2
 0.524  0.711  0.679  
adj. R
2
 0.424  0.643  0.597  
F 10.38  27.80  10.12  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.18 Average Disclosures, Detailed Statistics 
 
  AVGInvDisc  
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 6 6   
5% 12.66667 11.33333   
10% 20.33333 12.33333 Obs 76 
25% 40.83333 12.66667 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 84.5  Mean 121.4649 
  Largest Std. Dev. 111.0159 
75% 162 359   
90% 310.6667 362 Variance 12324.53 
95% 359 450.3333 Skewness 1.476691 
99% 512.6667 512.6667 Kurtosis 4.770275 
 
Figure 4.5 Average Invention Disclosures 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.19 Average Licenses, Detailed Statistics 
 
  AVGLicenses  
 Percentiles Smallest  
 1% 0.6666667 0.6666667  
 5% 2 1.666667  
 10% 3 2 Obs 76
25% 7 2 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 18.83333  Mean 24.98904 
  Largest Std. Dev. 22.91127 
75% 41.33333 69.33333   
90% 57.33333 75.33333 Variance 524.9262 
95% 69.33333 80.66667 Skewness 1.122249 
99% 103.6667 103.6667 Kurtosis 3.772648 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Average Licenses  
 
 
 
Table 4.20 Average Startups, Detailed Statistics 
 
  AVGSTRTUP  
 Percentiles Smallest  
 1% 0 0  
 5% 0 0  
 10% 0.3333333 0 Obs 76
25% 1.333333 0 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 2.666667  Mean 3.594298 
  Largest Std. Dev. 3.702385 
75% 4.166667 11   
90% 9 11.66667 Variance 13.70766 
95% 11 18.33333 Skewness 2.197896 
99% 19 19 Kurtosis 8.61022 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Average Startups  
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Table 4.21 Logged Average Invention Disclosures, 
Detailed Statistics 
 
  LogAVGInvDisc  
 Percentiles Smallest  
 1% 1.94591 1.94591  
 5% 2.61496 2.512306  
 10% 3.060271 2.590267 Obs 76
25% 3.733495 2.61496 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 4.448514  Mean 4.401166 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.9566012 
75% 5.093648 5.886104   
90% 5.741934 5.894403 Variance 0.9150859 
95% 5.886104 6.112206 Skewness -0.2184018 
99% 6.241575 6.241575 Kurtosis 2.479071 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Logged Average Invention Disclosures 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.22 Logged Average Licenses, Detailed 
Statistics 
 
  LogAVGLicenses  
 Percentiles Smallest  
 1% 0.5108256 0.5108256  
 5% 1.098612 0.9808292  
 10% 1.386294 1.098612 Obs 76
25% 2.079442 1.098612 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 2.98648  Mean 2.810995 
  Largest Std. Dev. 1.022706 
75% 3.745296 4.253246   
90% 4.066174 4.33511 Variance 1.045928 
95% 4.253246 4.402646 Skewness -0.2129932 
99% 4.650781 4.650781 Kurtosis 1.956492 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Logged Average Licenses 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.23 Logged Average Startups, Detailed 
Statistics 
 
  LogAVGSTRTUP  
 Percentiles Smallest  
 1% 0 0  
 5% 0 0  
 10% 0.2876821 0 Obs 76
25% 0.8472978 0 Sum of Wgt. 76 
50% 1.299283  Mean 1.279339 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.6927406 
75% 1.641707 2.484907   
90% 2.302585 2.538974 Variance 0.4798896 
95% 2.484907 2.961831 Skewness 0.1978639 
99% 2.995732 2.995732 Kurtosis 2.842515 
 
Figure 4.10 Logged Average Startups 
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    Table 4.24 Pearson Correlations, All Variables 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) 
Log Avg. Inv. Disc. (a) 1 
                    Log Avg. Licenses (b) 0.79 1 
                   Log Avg. Startups (c)  0.74 0.52 1 
                  Log Avg. Inv. Disc. T1 (d) 0.94 0.78 0.73 1 
                 Log Avg. Licenses T1 (e)  0.84 0.90 0.55 0.87 1 
                Log Avg. Startups T1 (f) 0.77 0.64 0.77 0.82 0.71 1 
               Institutional Leader (g) 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.07 1 
              Office of Research (h) -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.55 1 
             Economic/Bus. Dev. (i) -0.08 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.18 -0.52 1 
            Multiple Offices (j) 0.11 0.24 -0.01 0.17 0.27 0.12 -0.13 -0.37 -0.12 1 
           Director PhD(k) -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 0.31 -0.19 0.12 -0.24 1 
          Director JD (l) 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.36 -0.39 1 
         Director MBA (m) 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.25 0.25 0.03 -0.17 -0.46 -0.27 1 
        Director BS/BA (n) -0.06 0.12 -0.15 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.10 0.07 -0.09 0.12 -0.37 -0.22 -0.26 1 
       Director Tenure (o) -0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.16 0.12 -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.18 -0.20 -0.20 0.17 0.26 1 
      Private (p) 0.29 0.14 0.12 0.31 0.20 0.25 0.29 -0.24 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.19 0.14 1 
     Medical school (q) 0.33 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24 -0.29 0.14 0.01 0.25 -0.01 -0.25 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 1 
    Law school (r)  0.37 0.27 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.33 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.15 -0.08 0.07 -0.19 -0.04 0.17 0.25 1 
   TLO Age (s)  0.41 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.50 0.22 -0.10 -0.15 0.12 0.25 -0.14 0.19 0.03 -0.04 0.19 0.13 -0.10 0.04 1 
  Industry Research % (t) 0.06 -0.03 0.18 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.14 0.14 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.14 0.01 -0.19 -0.21 -0.19 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 1 
 LicStaff/M$Research (u) -0.37 -0.40 -0.31 -0.35 -0.37 -0.32 -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.24 0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.23 -0.21 -0.10 0.14 1 
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